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Abstract

•'The Transcendental Element in the Absent Presence"
analyzes the absent presence, the rhetorical and literary
states of being there in the mind of the perceiving
individual, though not there physically.
answer:

It seeks to

What does the term "absent presence" mean?

Is

there a difference between rhetorical and literary absent
presences?
process?

If so, how is each manifest through the reading
And, what sustains these absent presences?

Evidenced through selected works of Plato, Aristotle,
New Testament writers, Sidney, Shakespeare, and Dickinson,
the study argues for the intellectually, spiritually, or
aesthetically transcendent quality of the absent presence.
Any encounter between reader, text, and writer affirms a
dialogic "other," a rhetorically recognizable presence,
albeit absent, that operates from both sides of the text,
from both the writer's composition and the reader's
reading.
Literary absent presences, emanating from the
rhetorical text, additionally influence both writer and
reader.

This is especially evident in the poetry of

writers whose personae are poet-lovers lamenting their
departed beloveds.

Through a kind of aesthetic

transcendence, these poets transform the absence of the

beloved into a viable absent presence, a textual presence
which is subsequently controlled by the artist to "speak11
to the reader.
Success is determined by the degree of love which
dominates the exchange.

Whether reacting to eros or agape,

cupiditas or caritas, the poet-lover and reader reflect
that which dominates their response to the significant
rhetorical or literary "other."

The consequence is either

negative or positive; the perceptor (poet-lover or reader)
languishes in personal or interpretive frustration, or she
soars in aesthetic or hermeneutic fulfillment as she comes
to greater understanding of self, world, and other.
An implicit premise is that these rhetorical and
literary operations are an integral part of any textual
experience— both the writer's composing and the reader's
reading.

They are subtle textual energies that

significantly contribute to understanding— that instant of
intellectual, spiritual, or aesthetic fusion between writer
and reader.

xii

Chapter 1
Introduction

The topic for this study is the plurality of absent
presences that operate rhetorically and literarily through
a reading experience.

The absent presence, as a rhetorical

term, assumes duality, functioning from either side of the
text— writer to reader and reader to writer.

The absent

presence, as a literary term, likewise assumes duality,
working between writer/persona and reader/persona.

For the

purposes of this study, the term, though metaphorical by
implication, is more than metaphor; it describes the
rhetorical relationships between writer/reader and
reader/writer and the aesthetic relationships between poetlover/beloved and reader/persona.

Though not there

physically to the other, each absence is there in the mind
of the individual.

It becomes an absent presence.

My thesis is that absent presences, both rhetoric and
aesthetic, dominate any textual experience involving
Western literature; they are implicit in both the writing
of a text and the reading of a text.

But since I could not

take, since I do not assume, that all Western literature is
my province of study, I had to find a way to limit the
focus— for my research and for my future reader.
Capitalizing on the conventional view that Western
1

2
civilization has two major roots, classical and Hebraic, I
begin at the most rudimentary level; specifically, I seek
an explanation of the origin of the term in the culture
that is ours.

As a result, the second and third chapters

return to the source of Western thought:

to germane texts

of Plato and Aristotle and to the Bible, primarily the New
Testament, which becomes my link between the rhetorical and
the literary operations of the absent presence.
In its literary context, the term absent presence is
especially relevant to poetically rendered relationships
between a poet-lover and a beloved.

As a common

denominator in the sonnet-sequence of Sir Philip Sidney,
the sonnets of William Shakespeare, and the fascicle poetry
of Emily Dickinson, these dominant literary absent
presences can best be understood in relation to their
rhetorical correlate.

I will thus argue that the literary

absent presence is a direct consequence of the rhetorical
absent presence that operates within the triangular
framework of writer/text/reader.
The purpose of this dissertation study, then, is to
explore the concept of the absent presence.
to answer several critical questions:
"absent presence" mean?

I will attempt

What does the term

Is there a difference between a

rhetorical and a literary absent presence?

If so, how is

each manifest through the reading process?

And, what is

the force that sustains these absent presences?

3
This study will not be a history of the idea of the
absent presence.

Rather, it will be severely limited in

scope, beginning with a chapter that explains why the
rhetorical term came into being, moving to a chapter that
suggests how the literary version came into being, and
developing through three chapters that provide examples of
how the rhetorical and literary aspects of the term
conflate in the texts of the poet-lovers of Sidney,
Shakespeare, and Dickinson.
Critical thought that influenced this study is varied.
Although I am not a proponent of deconstruction, I realize
that Derrida's poetics have permanently altered the
theoretical landscape.

His analysis that language abounds

with absences, what he refers to as a gap, a slippage, or a
lack, stimulates my own discussion of what the absent
presence seeks to accomplish within and through a text.
Since I will focus on those rhetorical and literary
absences that result from the printed word, my approach is
hermeneutic.

Essentially I conclude that the term

"hermeneutic circle," which originates with Martin
Heidegger in Being and Time and is amplified by Paul
Ricoeur in The Conflict of Interpretations, inaccurately
describes understanding that comes through recurring
reading experiences.

Circle implicitly denotes closure,

implying definitive readings of a text.

Since I argue that

interpretations are as numerous as the individuals who

4
bring their various experiences to the reading table, I
offer "hermeneutic spiral" as a term that better explains
an open system of interpretation which allows for a
multiplicity of, and successive, readings by a given
reader.
Several theorists and their works will undergird my
development.

Even when I do not refer specifically to Ong,

Ricoeur, Steiner, and Hall, their discussions, especially
those concerning textual transcendence, guide my work.
Referring frequently to the writings of Walter J. Ong,
primarily to his two texts The Presence of the Word and
Interfaces of the Word, I will credit the onset of the
absent presence to the emergence of the written word.
The written word is that which allows transcendence, a
term that I use interchangeably with understanding.

My

source for this synonymizing of terms is Ricoeur's The
Conflict of Interpretations: "to understand, for a finite
being, is to be transported to another life" (C£ 5).
Developing my thesis along intellectual lines with regard
to Greek writers, spiritual lines with respect to New
Testament writers, and aesthetic lines with attention to
poet-lovers, I, too, argue that each rational being who
processes thoughts is temporarily, for the duration of the
text, "transported" into the life of the other.
Steiner takes up the idea of transcendence in Real
Presences;

Is there anything in what we say?

His text
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attempts to explain the literary transcendence that occurs
when a reader willfully and willingly engages the text of
another.

He contends "that in the art-act and its

reception, that there is in the experience of meaningful
form, a presumption of presence" (EE 214).

Whether fully

cognizant, as perhaps is the writer who envisions the kind
of audience who might read his text, or unaware of the
operations, as generally are most readers who pick up that
same text, an absent, yet discernible, presence emanates
from either side of all written communication.

Though

neither individual is corporeally present to the other,
both writer and reader can recognize the effects of the
other.

These effects are indisputably real as they are

manifest through the intellect, the experiences, and the
emotions of the other.
If any literary text is to make meaning, it requires a
meeting point of identity between writer and reader.
must overcome difference.

It

But a text by itself, that which

Ross Chambers calls "deferred communication" (JOT 137),
cannot accomplish correspondence between writer and reader;
it demands participation from each individual on opposite
sides of the text.

The writer must make the first overture

to overcome difference by putting his words to paper; the
reader can be no less active.

So as to glean even an

instant of hermeneutic fusion with the writer, she must
participate fully in the textual activity.

6
I will develop my argument from the assumption that a
kind of intellectual, spiritual, or aesthetic transcendence
occurs each time that a reader gleans understanding from a
text.

Such an encounter between reader, text, and writer

admits to a dialogic "other," to a recognizable presence
that aids the reader in the hermeneutic possibilities of
the text.

This presence operates from both sides of the

text, from both the writer's composition and the reader's
reading.
The "deferred communication," which is the written
aesthetic text, relies on the reader to interpret the
discourse offered by the absent writer, termed by Chambers,
as the "enunciator."

Chambers describes this rhetorical

process as that which gives "texts their social function,
enabling them to pursue their existence as 'literature' by
effecting their on-going meaningfulness" (£121 137).
The texts of Burke and Hall will support my exposition
of this "ongoing meaningfulness" of printed texts.
Frequently I will refer to Burke.

His extensive corpus,

which explores the complex roles of language, both oral and
written in modern society, helps to shape my understanding
of absent presences as pervasive elements in written
communication.
But it is Hall's Word and Spirit that can bring
written language, and the attending transcendence, clearly
into focus.

As Hall begins his book, relying heavily on
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’’our modern prophet” Kierkegaard in order to understand
spirit, he clearly states his thesis:
What I want to explore, with Kierkegaard’s help,
is the particular character of this modern
spiritlessness, the peculiar twists of the
modern resistance to, and ultimate denial of,
spirit, I will make the case that Kierkegaard
also wants to make, namely, that the denial of
spirit in the modern age is ironically dependent
on the impact of Christianity.
(K£ 4)
Proceeding in the first chapter of his text, Hall gives a
convincing explanation of how "the advent of Christianity
radically changed human consciousness" (J£S 5), how it moved
rational man from a "psychic" (intellectual and static) to
a "pneumatic" (spiritual and dynamic) way of thinking.

It

is this pneumatic "world-picture" (JJS 6) that allows a
reader to transcend self; it is that which enables her to
visualize past, present, and future.

And it is

accomplished through speech, most notably written speech,
which is the literary text.
An implied trait in any literary work, be it a lengthy
treatise on rhetoric, an inspired guide on spirituality, or
an organized collection of brief poems, is that it
continues to provide meaning each time a reader takes a
text into herself.

In any rhetorical interchange, she

becomes an essential player.

In effect, she completes the

rhetorical experience when she interprets the words of the
writer.

And when she interprets the words of the other

through her experiences, when she slants them through her

8
own perceptions, they begin to make meaning for her

as she

relates to self, world, and Other.
The role of the reader, then, is crucial both to the
rhetorical and the literary processes.

She must be a

willing, a kind of loving, participant who submits her
intellectual and emotional self to

the text offered by the

writer.

to achieve at least

As she does, she can hope

momentary hermeneutic fusion with the absent author.
fusion, I will argue, is the direct result of love.

This
As

that which seeks to overcome difference, love is necessary
for a successful rhetorical union between text, writer, and
reader.

Love is that which allows intellectual, spiritual,

emotional, or aesthetic fusion between writer and reader;
it is that which enables transcendence.
To support the premise that love is implicit in a
rhetorical exchange, I will note the manner of love that
selected writers incorporate in their methods of rhetoric
so as to overcome the difference that separates writer and
reader.

Plato/Socrates depends upon eros to bring a like-

minded interlocutor into shared understanding; God relies
upon agape to close the separation between Creator and
creation; and the poets Sidney, Shakespeare, and Dickinson
vacillate between cupiditas and caritas in their searches
to reconcile poet-lover and beloved.

As my argument

examines how the dominant literary absent presence of a
text operates in conjunction with the rhetorical absent

9
presences, love will be a pervasive assumption.

It will be

the singularly significant element that links each selected
writer to his or her audience.
Adhering to the Socratic practice of defining terms
early in a dialogic exercise, I will fully define the term
"absent presence" in the second chapter.

Then, because of

their impact on all of Western literature, I will focus on
selected writings of Plato and Aristotle, specifically on
those that explore principles and practices of rhetoric.

I

will posit that the very act of writing those principles
and practices on paper for future readers to digest bespoke
the existence of a rhetorical absent presence.
Before Plato, and with the exclusion of drama, the
most respected communication was oral— the physical
presence of both speaker and listener joined in dialectic
relationship through the spoken word.

In his Phaedrus and

The Republic. Plato defends the spoken word, as practiced
by his mentor Socrates, against those who would tarnish
dialectic exchange through the practice of putting words to
paper.

Rooted in Plato's defense of the spoken word,

however, was a problem that would not go away:

How could

he preserve the words of his beloved mentor Socrates
without putting those cherished words to paper?

This

inescapable irony is that which set the rhetorical stage
for the emergence of the absent presence.
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Aristotle, along with his rhetorical triangle, only
exacerbated the irony, but his methodology began to provide
the means whereby readers might begin to accept, if not
fully understand, the invasion of an absent presence into a
rhetorical exchange.

Aristotle's On Rhetoric heralded an

"acceptable" written treatise of ideas, precisely the ideas
of rhetoric, of the correct means of communicating and
sharing knowledge.

In his book, Aristotle describes the

rhetorical triangle between logos (text), ethos (writer),
and pathos (reader).

Inherent in this triangle is the idea

of absence— absence of the reader during the time of the
author's writing of the text and absence of the writer
during the time of the reader's reading of the text.
Because his On Rhetoric is the earliest discussion of that
which occurs when two individuals, the writer and the
reader, communicate through a text, his work sets the stage
for literary endeavors; and key players on that literary
stage are rhetorical absent presences operating from either
side of the text.
The third chapter, which looks to Christian theology,
continues the discussion of rhetorical absent presences,
but it argues that an additional absent presence, a
literary one that operates between persona and beloved of
the text, emerges in the writings of the New Testament.
Jesus, who is the Word, is both character in and text of
God's communication with humanity.

A kind of
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transcendental act occurs between the believing reader who
communicates with God through his Holy Spirit, understood
as the paraclete of Jesus Christ.
In the final three chapters, as I provide literary
examples of absent presences, I will focus on selected
poetry of Sidney, Shakespeare, and Dickinson that
especially reveals an absent "other.11

Observing as each

poet explores the creative tension arising from the
relationship between poet-lover and beloved, I will note
that love is the force which impels the aesthetic endeavor.
Although the love may have been spurned or thwarted, it
nevertheless is the essential element in the verbal
rendering of that relationship between poet-lover and
absent beloved.

As each writer creates a persona who is in

emotional conflict with a beloved, each professes the
tangible quality of love— even when the source of that
love, the beloved, is physically absent.
Julia Kristeva's book Black Sun helps to explain the
means whereby the poet-lover refines personal depression
and melancholia into verbal art:
By means of a leap into the orphic world of
artifice (of sublimation), the saturnine poet,
out of the traumatic experience and object of
mourning, remembers only a gloomy or passional
tone. He thus comes close, through the very
components of language, to the lost Thing. His
discourse identifies with it, absorbs it,
modifies it, transforms it: he takes Eurydice
out of the melancholy hell and gives her back a
new existence in his text/song.
(BS 160)
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The poet-lovers of Sidney, Shakespeare, and Dickinson
follow the pattern described by Kristeva:

skillful in

their professions, they successfully transform personal
disappointment in love into works of art.

Gifted with a

bit of "magic" (akin to that of the mysterious Orpheus),
the poet-lovers offer their texts to readers.

Through

rhetorical identification, readers can share the poetlover 's gloomy experience with an absent beloved.

Then,

like Eurydice who learned to cope in a life without her
husband Orpheus, Kristeva suggests that readers, too, might
find solace, perhaps even a song, in the poet-lover's
language which depicts the beloved poetically transformed
into an absent presence.

Although poetry may be a "fragile

filter," according to Kristeva, it is the "basic,
fundamental sieve that will sift . . . sorrow and joy into
language" (fiS 161).
Why is it necessary to "sift . . . sorrow and joy into
language"?

The answer, in highly reductive terms, is to

provide meaning for that which seems meaningless.

To

paraphrase Kristeva, individuals can become dysfunctional
if they fail to ascribe meaning to those experiences that
are shrouded in sorrow and disappointment.

In a worst-case

scenario, they can succumb to a melancholic depression that
robs them of their ability to translate and metamorphose
their own gloomy experiences (Bg 39-43).

Poetic art is not

simply a thought in isolation; it becomes literary
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identification between poet and reader.

As long as the

poet-lover translates and metamorphoses personal experience
and as long as the reader can share through her equally
personal interpretation of that experience, meaning is
effected for each on opposite sides of the text.
Kristeva's psychological insights, which will underpin the
development of chapters 4, 5, and 6, provide the rationale
for understanding the transformation of an absence into an
absent presence:

creation of an absent presence makes the

absence sufficiently meaningful.
Sidney, the first literary writer in my study who
sustains a persona who is poet-lover, addresses a complex
view of love.

After describing Astrophil's unmistakably

erotic love for Stella, a passionate love that is not to be
consummated, Sidney refines Astrophil's physical love to
its more acceptable aesthetic level.

At the end of the

sonnet sequence, Astrophil's masks are removed, and he is
left with self-knowledge, with an incisively painful selfknowledge that may somehow redeem him from his failure in
love.

Sidney offers the aesthetic word as the means

whereby his persona Astrophil might begin to probe the
chasm of his own being.

As he does, readers share in his

search for epistemological clues that might help him (and
those who share his experiences through the written word)
understand a personal existence that began in hope but
ended in disappointment.
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Shakespeare views love in a different context, but he,
too, creates a poet-lover who transforms the absence of his
beloved Fair Friend into a productive absent presence.
Boldly, Shakespeare's poet-lover likens his artistic
ability to the creative powers of God.

Claiming his

ability to eternize his beloved Fair Friend, Will, who is
poet-lover, likewise eternizes himself through the poetry
that he leaves to his readers.

Through this written word,

the poet-lover firmly establishes his own dominant presence
in the poetic text.

For his persona Will, love is a

rational and necessary requisite for all that is good.

It

is that which forgives indiscretions, transforms
relationships, and perpetuates both beloved and poet-lover;
it is also that which motivates intellectual and meaningful
correspondence between writer/reader and reader/writer.
Shakespeare exposes lust, the counter side of love, as
he writes of Will's relationship with the Dark Lady.

This

relationship is void of meaning; it has no redeeming value
to the poet-lover.

It inhibits his artistic ability and

confounds his emotional self.

In contrast to the

meaningful absent presence of the Fair Friend, the Dark
Lady (though erotically fulfilling) is a meaningless
presence in his professional life.

Positing the negative

against the positive, the poet-lover describes his lust for
the Dark Lady as that which is counter-productive to love.
As Will rather graphically depicts that which is
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not love, Shakespeare further defines the force that yields
a literary text.
Dickinson, refusing to adhere to boundaries of either
religion or literary tradition, explores painful
ramifications of love.

Especially in the fascicles, she

focuses on love in absence of the beloved.

But her poetry

depicts more than the absent presence of the beloved; hers
is a poetry of absence.

In syntax, subject, and signature

slash (which implies omissions and absences), she
demands participation from her reader.

To comprehend such

a complex canon, Dickinson's reader cannot be passive.
Rather, she must be proactive, bringing her own
experiences, her own intellect, and her own creativity to
the rhetorical experience.
Selected poems in Dickinson's fascicles continue the
tradition of Sidney's Astroohil and Stella and
Shakespeare's Sonnets.

All depict a poet-lover who learns

to create and then, like Eurydice, learns to cope with the
absent presence of a beloved who has departed.

These

absent presences are not static on the printed page;
rather, they continue to alter and shape the literary
experiences of modern readers.

The legacy is vital, but it

is one about which most readers are generally unaware.
a rule, readers simply take the rhetorical and literary
operations for granted, not realizing (perhaps not even
caring about) the mental and aesthetic processes that

As
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compel a reader to pick up a text, that enable her to read,
and that subsequently allow her to comprehend the ideas set
forth by authors whom she never personally encountered in a
dialectic exchange.

My study may cause such readers to

consider, as the sophist Gorgias propounded in the fifth
century B.C., that there is indeed a bit of "magic" in the
reading process.

Neither hocus-pocus nor sleight-of-hand,

this "magic" describes that intellectual, spiritual,
emotional, or aesthetic something that accompanies a
successful reading experience.

It is what Dickinson refers

to as that "spectral power" which leads to understanding of
a text.
Something viable happens when one reads.

A reader may

be unable to describe or specify exactly what as she
recognizes that her intellectual, spiritual, or emotional
self has been altered through the reading experience.
Whether elucidating ideas of rhetoric, sharing messages of
spirituality, or telling tales of a poet-lover and an
absent beloved, the absent presence of the writer offers
new insights, additional information, opposing views, or
comforting affirmation of personal experiences.

For a

brief interlude, the reader is "magically," through the
words of another, transported into a meaningful, perhaps
even a different, realm of understanding.

Chapter 2
Is It or Is It Not?

The Transcendental Element
in the
Absent Presence

Viewed from the perspective of theoretical analysis,
the concept of the absent presence is a relatively modern
critical term, emerging significantly in the twentieth
century as a valid subject for rhetorical inquiry.

In this

chapter, I will attempt to define the term, to separate it
into its two categories (the rhetorical and the literary),
and to highlight critical stages of its development.

I

will also argue that the roots of the term absent presence
are found in the rhetorical writings of Plato and
Aristotle.

Since my purpose is to highlight a singular

element in the complex philosophies of Plato and Aristotle,
this chapter will, in no way, provide an exhaustive study
of any of the texts of these progenitors of Western
thought; rather, it will explore selected texts as a point
of departure for a discussion of the absent presence.
Is the term absent presence an oxymoron or a paradox?
I propose that it is analogous to both but synonymous with
neither.

Like an oxymoron, the term is incongruous; like a

paradox, it posits a truth from contradictory elements.
But unlike either the oxymoron or the paradox, both which
unite two disparate elements, the seemingly contradictory
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terms, absent and present, share the same etymological root
in both the Latin and the Greek languages.

Since my study

begins with writings of Greek philosophers, the Greek
rendering seems appropriate.
Translating the Greek verb demeo, which means to be at
home, the Greek language adds prefixes to distinguish the
quality of being:

ek-demeo, or "absent," literally means

"out of being at home",* en-demeo, or "present," literally
means "in being at home."

Rather than suggesting

contradictory locations, the separate forms of the verb
suggest different states of "being at home."

The

importance is that each word denotes a specific relation to
being "at home."
When applying th i s 'explanation to rhetoric and the
reading experience, the question arises:
have to do with the reading process?"

"What does home

I would suggest that

home is that spiritual/intellectual/emotional self, which
comprises human thought.

If so, then the absent presence

refers to that which is not at home in the physical sense,
but is very much at home in the spiritual, intellectual,
and emotional sense.

It is that which, for whatever

reasons, refuses to dislodge itself from the thoughts of an
individual.

Certainly it involves memory; but more than

memory, which tends to be notoriously tricky, it becomes a
dynamic action in the mind of the individual.
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Such a statement sends my discussion of the absent
presence into an immediate, but brief, detour.

Any

reference to that which occurs in the mind suggests
philosophy, a potentially dangerous

and imprecise realm.

Because it is comprised of ideas, which can be as varied as
the individuals who have them, philosophy has been, as a
whole, an inexact and nebulous discipline.

However, a

study of rhetoric cannot be separated from philosophy.

The

symbols used by humanity, what we refer to as language, are
the mental capacity that enables anindividual to
understand who he is in relation to

begin to

hisworld and his

creator.
Anthony J. Cascardi addresses the relation between
language and philosophy and the roles they play in any
study of rhetoric.

In his article, "The Place of Language

in Philosophy; or, The Uses of Rhetoric," he argues;
Since its beginnings, philosophy in the
Western tradition has taken for itself a number
of first questions: the fact that there is
anything at all, and that there is nothing, for
instance; that man is a thinking thing, capable
of reflection and self-guidance; that he does not
live alone but has the existence of others with
which to contend. Just how it is that
philosophizing begins— whether in amazement or in
reflective thought or in response to social or
political needs— is probably undeterminable; the
prospect of establishing the first question of
philosophy may be impossible. What is
nonetheless certain is that the practice of
philosophy as we know it is inseparable from the
use of language.
(217)
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If philosophy is "inseparable from the use of language,"
and if a language of symbols is the medium through which an
individual processes his thoughts, then rhetoric, which
encompasses all of language— words, sentences, complete
discourses, and the diverse styles through which they are
uttered or written— is that which, as Cascardi suggests,
renders the individual "capable of reflection and self
guidance."

It is that which makes him realize that he has

a point of beginning, perhaps even a creator, and "that he
does not live alone but has the existence of others with
which to contend."

It is that which validates his being.

This theoretical knowledge is embodied in, and can be
expressed through, various forms of rhetoric.

In this and

subsequent chapters, I will argue that these various forms
of rhetoric— the dialectic discourses of Plato and
Aristotle, the spiritual treatise of the writers of the New
Testament, and the aesthetic poetry of Sir Philip Sidney,
William Shakespeare, and Emily Dickinson— are critically
linked:

they each approach the philosophical musings of

self in relation to world (primarily to the others in it)
and the self in relation to creator (or Other).

Since that

which is "other" cannot be fully present to the mind that
muses, it becomes an absent presence.

Though not there

physically, it definitely is there in the mind of the
individual.

It is not physically at home in the mind.

That is, it is not present, but it nevertheless is home,
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exercising its power and leaving its tracks, in the mind.
It heralds an absent presence.
Writers selected for this study use the journey trope
as the allegorical method to depict the means through which
the individual comes to terms with an absent presence.
Subtly different in its depiction, the trope is either
intellectual, spiritual, or psychic.

Plato and Aristotle

embark upon a dialectic journey toward the Ideal or the
Good; writers of the New Testament launch the spiritual
journey that will return them and their readers to God; and
Sidney, Shakespeare, and Dickinson offer personae who
initially flounder, but ultimately survive to varying
degrees, the psychological musings of self, world, and
other.
Samuel C. Chew's text The Pilgrimage of Life quite
thoroughly explores the journey trope in verbal and visual
imagery.

Discussing symbols used by "the painter, the

sculptor, the engraver, the tapestry weaver, the designer
of pageantry, the poet, and the writer of imaginative
prose,” Chew limits his focus to English and Continental
models that represent a journey of the mind or spirit
(xxiii, xxii).

Although he does not extend his analysis to

the writings of Plato and Aristotle, they can be included
in the same analysis if we accept that their philosophical
musings did indeed seek to understand self in relation to
world and Other.

In the words of Lucy Chew, who penned the
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Preface to her husband's posthumously published text, they,
too, ponder "man's journey through life from cradle to
grave" (£L vi)-

Their dialectic discourses, not unlike

those texts of the writers of the New Testament and the
poets of sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, imply a
seemingly intrinsic need of the individual to find where he
is, and where he ultimately will go, in the life that is
his.

For Plato, it is to True Being.

In The Republicf

Plato likens the journey to that of a cave-dweller who
slowly works his way up to light, to supreme knowledge (Rep
514a).
Aristotle does not ostensibly offer the journey motif
as explanation for the individual's movement toward
knowledge.

However, he does emphasize action, suggesting a

logical progression toward something that is better than
the present state.

For Aristotle, that successive motion

is to take him to his potential, to move him to that which
is the best of himself.

Aristotle describes the process in

Natural Science (or Physics).
participates m

As each individual actively

the drama of his own life, he

is

continually "Coming to be" or "Coming into existence" (NS
12, 13):
For in every case there is something already
present, out of which the resultant thing is
born; as animals and plants come from seed.
'Coming into existence' takes place in several
ways:
(1) by change of shape, as a bronze
statue; (2) by accretion, as things that grow;
(3) by subduction, as a Hermes chiselled from a
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block of marble; (4) by combination, as a house;
and (5) by 'qualitative alteration' (alliosis),
where the material itself assumes different
properties.
In all of these cases it is evident
that the process of coming into existence
presupposes a substratum already existing.
(HS 13)
Seeking to explain the meaning of his term "coming to be,"
Aristotle provides five dramatistic examples of differing
ways that individuals may achieve completeness of self.
The terms "change of shape," "accretion," "subduction,"
"combination," and "qualitative alteration" suggest
modifications that will alter the original for the better,
modifications that will make the original more meaningful,
more useful, or more aesthetically beautiful.

Implicitly

incorporating the idea of flux in his theory of being,
Aristotle suggests that change, which attends the human
condition, at least theoretically, progressively improves
the self.

It is only through change that the individual

hopes to realize the potential which was present in the
"seed" of his rational being.
Philip Wheelwright's introduction to Natural Science.
Psychology, and The Nicomachean Ethics offers a clear and
succinct explanation of the fluctuating individual as
envisioned by Aristotle.

Positing that Aristotle offers a

theory which avoids both "the pure relativism of
Heracleitus [sic]" and "the metaphysical extravagance of
the Platonic theory of archetypes" (NS xxx), Wheelwright
elucidates the specifics which notably separate Aristotle's
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theory of being from those previously espoused by
Heraclitus and Plato:
In short, man as a moral agent is not entirely
determined by external conditions. He has within
himself— or perhaps better, he is within
himself— a power (dynamis) to become reasonable,
i.e. to follow reason. His actualization of this
power is precisely the effort of 'moral choice'
(proairesis), which gives rise to 'moral action'
(praxis).
It is as an unmoved mover, then, that
the soul performs, and is responsible for, moral
action. Man has the power to steer his own
course.
The goal at which he aims is his happiness
(eudaimonia), real or imagined.
(NS xxxix)
To further paraphrase Aristotle:

man is a rational being

who determines his life's choices and is responsible for
his personal actions within a society.

A presumption of

morality which engenders happiness underscores Aristotle's
view of the individual within the state or community.
Aristotle's theory of being is thus overtly ambitious, and
implicitly energetic.

Wheelwright reminds us that

Aristotle's word energeia is that which describes the
dynamic "process of achieving such fulfillment" (HS xxxiv).
As this study develops, energeia will be a significantly
recurring term, referring to the poetically empowered word
which seeks to achieve its hermeneutic potential.
Considering the term in relation to his process of
becoming, I suggest that Aristotle's theory of being
assumes journey-like characteristics.

The terms "coming to

be" and "coming into existence" suggest a linear movement
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from one state to a different, more advanced, state.
Counterpoint:

In

Kenneth Burke and Aristotle's Theories of

Rhetoric. L. Virginia Holland comments on this intellectual
journey as a movement toward one's highest good:
All life processes and the art of living itself
thus become an actualizing of the potential, or
of the latent possibilities of development which
a thing has. Man has a specific function which
distinguishes him from other species and makes
him what he is.
fCot 77-78)
She correctly recognizes that this function which
distinguishes man from other animals is the soul.
I would add that the soul (and I use a previously
discussed term) is the intellectual "home" for rational
faculties.

These complex faculties are comprised of the

organic and the spiritual.

Organic operations of the mind

can be explained at least in part by scientists, but
spiritual qualities of the soul continue to baffle
philosophers and theologians.

A singular point of

agreement might be that the intellectual soul is that which
enables the individual to translate experience and musings
into metaphorical language.

As the individual moves

through life, he metaphorically filters one experience
through another so as to achieve understanding.

As he

progresses in that journey, his reservoir of experience
builds and propels him toward that which presumably will
provide personal fulfillment.
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The journey trope becomes more prominent in the
biblical text.

The Old Testament plots humanity's

spiritual journey away from God, while the New Testament
provides a prescription for individuals to return to him in
Paradise.

Poets Sidney, Shakespeare, and Dickinson all

continue the journey trope, offering the poet-lover as the
one seeking to conciliate the self who has been abandoned
by the beloved.

Whether philosopher, Christian, or poet-

lover, language is that which allows internal dialogue with
Other.

It is that which bridges the chasm between the

individual and the absent presence.
Critical to the development of my analysis are the
thoughts of Walter Ong who argues in several of his texts
that written, not oral, language is that which initiates
the relationship between the individual (the reader) and an
absent presence.

In his book Interfaces of the Word:

Studies in the Evolution of Consciousness and Culture. Ong
argues
that although oratory was tens of thousands of
years old [before Plato and Aristotle], the kind
of thinking about oratory you have in Aristotle's
Art of Rhetoric had never been done before
writing.
The human mind had never gone through
this series of maneuvers, never traced this kind
of trajectory of thought. But once you had
produced, with the help of writing, treatises
such as Art of Rhetoric and of Plato's Republic,
this kind of thinking and expression would ring
in your ears.
(IW 87)
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How does writing, which is unspoken, "ring" in the ears of
its receptor?

Speaking metaphorically, Ong describes the

habitation of an absent presence in the mind of a reader.
It becomes a discernible, an unmistakable, yet physically
absent, presence which guides and shapes the rhetorical
process between writer and reader.

It becomes a rhetorical

absent presence.
Now that I have defined the term absent presence and
have provided at least a cursory explanation of why it came
into being, my discussion will explore the earliest
beginnings of the rhetorical element.

Plato and Aristotle,

though perhaps through no willful design of their own, can
be called the creators of the absent presence.
Although Plato and Aristotle may not have particularly
addressed the issue of the absent presence, which
ultimately emanates from the logos, the evolution of this
concept necessarily begins with their philosophies, which
are, in many ways, reactive developments to the rhetorical
practices that preceded them.

It is important to remember

that Greek philosophy often opposed itself to rhetoric,
especially to the sophists who were disparaged as "bearers
of eloquence."

In an attempt to defend and to establish

the usefulness of rhetoric, Plato and Aristotle,
respectively, sought to turn it into something respectable.
As progenitors of contemporary rhetoric, they provide the
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rationale from which the image of the absent presence will
develop.

And that rationale is rhetoric.

As a metamorphic offspring of classical rhetoric, the
process does not occur quickly.

Quite the contrary.

It

requires centuries of verbal and linguistic adaptations to
shape its modern meaning.

Its nucleus can be traced to

Greek rhetorical philosophy, to the writings of Plato.

As

he attempts to define rhetoric and determine its worth in
society, Plato offers his Phaedrus as a response to
Gorgias's earlier work, Encomium on Helen.

A compendium to

sophistic views, the Encomium focuses on logos, the spoken
word.

But more than simple utterance, Gorgias submits that

logos has almost unlimited power over the individual.
Plato likewise views logos in its Greek context.

More

than speech or language or the individual words that
comprise the two, logos encompasses reasoning,
understanding, and reckoning or calculating.

Viewing logos

as a subtle master of the individual, Gorgias and Plato
attempt to explain its power through the materiality of the
word as it penetrates the materiality of the soul.

In the

Encomium. Gorgias describes the word organically, as a
physical entity that makes its way into the body (the soul
of the listener) through the ear.

o

After entering the

soul, logos then elicits visible responses, which are
evident through discernible bodily reactions:

the heart

races, the face flushes, the blood rises, or the palms
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sweat.

To explain how these emotional reactions are the

direct result of verbal constructs, Gorgias relates the
mythological account of Paris's rape of Helen of Troy.
Paris (logos) penetrates Helen (the feminized listener),
who is unable to resist his compelling erogenous force.
Because the material word generates desire in the listener,
the listener in turn responds erotically, awakening in kind
to passion and love.
In his defense of the Greek beauty, Gorgias argues
that Helen is overpowered by forces stronger than she.

Not

the least of these is logos:
The power of speech has the same effect on the
condition of the soul as the application of drugs
[pharmaka] to the state of bodies; for just as
different drugs dispel different fluids from the
body, and some-bring an end to disease but others
to life, so also some speeches cause pain, some
pleasure, some fear; some instill courage, some
drug and bewitch the soul with a kind of evil
persuasion.
(Enc 14.1-7)
Logos is a "powerful lord," one that can effect a tangible
emotional response in his listener.
logos has the power of seduction.

According to Gorgias,
Comparing it to the

effects of drugs or magic, he says that logos can sedate or
cure the spirit or it can cast a spell over the soul of the
listener.
Plato addresses this same issue in his Phaedrus.
According to Ronna Burger, in Plato's Phaedrus. Plato's
version of the passion effected by eros is even more
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intense than that described by Gorgias.

Analyzing the

spiritual journey of the soul toward True Being, Form, and
Beauty (2h 251a-252b), Burger says that, when in presence
of the beloved who commands his powerful words,
the lover is overcome with shuddering, sweat, and
burning heat. The stream of the beautiful, which
flows from the beloved, enters the lover through
his eyes and warms him, watering the passages of
his wings, allowing the hard and choked ducts to
become soft so that the wings can grow from
roots all over the soul (251b).
Erotic passion
is marked by the intense mingling of pain, from
the pricking and throbbing in the roots of the
wings, with temporary pleasure, from the sight of
the beautiful one, warming and moistening the
passages (251c).
(EEh 61)
Why such graphic emphasis on eroticism?
relation to logos and rhetoric?

What is its

The answer lies in 5th-

century Greek pederastic practices, which will be discussed
later in greater detail.

Basically, though, eroticism is

validation to the listener that the words he hears are from
the god that he should follow; it affirms to the individual
that the words espoused by his beloved are worthy of his
life's allegiance.

Burger explains:

"Through his

attraction to a particular beloved, the lover discovers the
god he must follow in accordance with his own nature" (PPh
63).

The god, the supreme beloved, is found in the logos,

which is uttered by his earthly representative, the learned
philosopher.
Descriptions of the erotic power of logos, similar in
their effects but different in their partnering, are found
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in the accounts of Gorgias and Plato.

Presumably offered

as more than metaphor, each writer describes the
implications of eros in metaphorical terms, something that
Kenneth Burke suggests is an integral part of all language
— the everyday as well as the artistic.

According to

Burke, metaphor, quite simply, is "a device for seeing
something in terms of something else.

It brings out the

thisness of a that, or the thatness of a this" ("Four
Master Tropes" 503).

Since Gorgias depicts the power of

logos (the "thisness") in terms of "that" sexual mastery
(rape) and vice versa, and Plato relates the effects of
eros (the "thisness") to those of drugs or magic ("that),
Burke explains what Gorgias and Plato were doing through
their explanations of the logos:
Language develops by metaphorical extension,
in borrowing words from the realm of the
corporeal, visible, tangible and applying them by
analogy to the realm of the incorporeal,
invisible, intangible; then in the course of
time, the original corporeal reference is
forgotten, and only the incorporeal, metaphorical
extension survives.
("FMT" 506)
Both Gorgias and Plato were attempting to explain what
happens when one takes the words of another into himself.
Gorgias describes that activity like a rape, a violently
tactile experience.

Applying Burke's analysis to Paris's

rape of Helen, the physical act becomes subsumed by its
metaphorical representation, which verbally becomes more
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"real" than its reality.

Burke thus makes a tremendous

leap of linguistic application.
The comments of Ronald L. Hall may further elucidate
how logos effects its own reality in the mind of a reader.
In his book Word and Spiritf which contemplates what it
means to be human, fully human, Hall begins the development
of his thesis with the Greek activity in which the
intellectual and the spiritual coalesce through the logos:
we might say that because logos represents the
very heart of the real, namely, eternal form and
order, that it comes to stand, for the Greeks,
as the very essence of the cosmos. . . .
More and more logos was uprooted from the
lively dynamic act of speaking— and hence from
the embodied speaker— and came to stand for the
eternal and fixed order of the cosmos.
(WS 21)
If, for the Greeks, logos is that which is real, that which
is the "essence of the cosmos," then words and speaking are
the primary means whereby one might approach that which is
real.

Language for the Greeks (and for all humanity) is

that faculty enabling them to "see."

Hall warns us that

this sight is
an abstracted structure of vision and not the
concrete activity of seeing something. The
latter is hardly static; rather, because it is an
essentially embodied activity, it pulsates with a
dynamic orienting motility, with the dynamic
kinesthetic intentionalities of my posture,
focus, attention, and so forth.
(WS 22).
The "concrete," the "dynamic," the "kinesthetic" all
suggest the organic, that which is the essence of life.
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And what describes the essence of life better than a
graphic reenactment of the passionate coupling of lover and
beloved?
Helen

This seems to be what Gorgias through the rape of

( Encomium )

and Plato through the myth of the soul

(Phaedrus 251a-252b) attempt to do:

existentialize the

power of logos upon the intellect.
To better understand the import of these premises
offered by Hall and Burke, we need to look at a question
Burke poses in The Rhetoric of Religion:

"But isn't there

still a notable difference between thinking of something
when it is present and thinking of it when it is absent?"
(148-49)

Burke seems to have already answered this

question in his earlier text, A Grammar of Motives.

In it,

he plays grammatically with the word "transcend" and its
derivations:

transcendence, transcendent, transcendental.

As he comments on moral transcendence in the philosophy of
Immanuel Kant, Burke leads us to, and through, his own
ideas that help to explain his view of what happens in the
absent presence:
For according to our account, the world as we
experience it is but a world of appearances. The
objects of experience, we have said, derive their
appearance from the nature of our minds (as all
colors will seem like shades of but one color if
we observe them through colored glasses). But if
they are appearances, what are they appearances
of? Our desynonymizing here will lead us to the
answer. The empirical realm is the realm of
appearances. The transcendental is the realm
that gives things the nature they seem to have in
the empirical realm. The transcendent realm will
be the realm of things as they are 'in
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themselves,' not as empirically conditioned by
the conditions of the transcendental.
(£M 192-93)
Burke's movement up the rhetorical ladder of a
morphological analysis of the word "transcend" echoes the
ascending philosophy of True Being, which obliquely refers
to Plato's doctrine of Forms

(Republic.

Books VI and VII).

In Plato's doctrine, the philosopher can reflect the
"eye of the soul" (Republic 508.d.4) of True Being only
when he forsakes all other pursuits.

For Plato, this eye

is spiritual and supernatural, the source of ultimate
truth.

The individual approaches this truth, which

ultimately becomes present in the philosopher though absent
in the world of reality, through a kind of transcendental
movement, which Plato describes in the parable of the
prisoners in the cave.

In his notes, Hackforth equates the

movement of the prisoners from shadows to sunlight with the
journey of the dialectician in his search for philosophic
knowledge: "the goal of the dialectician's upward path is
the cognition of the Form of the Good conceived as the
source of all being and knowledge" (£h 135).

And,

according to Plato, part of that cognition enables the
philosopher to discern the only appropriate and worthy
rhetorical endeavors, those that preserve knowledge and
perpetuate justice in the republic.
True to his "Platonic" reputation, Plato often
prescribes a noble and purist form of rhetoric.

In his
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search for truth that can be found in True Being, Plato
suggests that he at least recognizes a variable, one which
he does not adequately address, in the discursive process.
While talking to Gorgias and trying to determine the right
and wrong uses of discourse, Socrates wonders what "this
power of rhetoric can be.

When I examine its vast

proportions, it seems to me little short of supernatural"
(Goraias 456.5-7).

Is Plato admitting to a bit of magic in

the rhetorical experience?

Is this reference to the

supernatural simply to be discounted as Socratic irony, or
does it hint at a broadening of the scope of rhetoric— a
broadening that might include Burke's argument for
transcendence?

Plato's "supernatural" at least implies a

transcendent movement that views rhetoric as operating
beyond the confines of the spoken word.

And undulating

within that movement will be another presence, what will
become known as the absent presence.

Although not

specifically addressed by Plato, the concept emerges
slowly, but perceptibly, in his rhetorical treatises.
Presumably perfecting a flawed model, Plato frames his
rhetoric according to the accepted pederastic conventions
within his Greek society, but he does significantly alter
those conventions.

In "Love, Rhetoric, and the

Aristocratic Way of Life," Albert William Levi cautions us
to view this practice from Plato's point of view:
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The Platonically approved love is . . . frankly
homosexual, but it is not 'wicked,' for it seeks
commerce with a soul and not a body, and its
abiding concern is service to the other in
pursuit of intellectual excellence and wisdom.
The Platonic ideal, whatever its degradation in
actuality, is essentially a 'pedagogical' love
between an older man and a younger.
("LRAW" 197)
In Greek society, patronage and pederasty provided accepted
methods of instruction for young aristocrats.

The young

male, learning from the older male teacher, comes to
understanding through the spoken word (speech) which,
according to Plato, is the primary vehicle for rhetoric,
for that communication which leads to knowledge.
In "Eros," a chapter from Plato's Thought. G.M.A.
Grube attempts to explain the Socratic slant of pederasty,
a slant which differentiates it from the homoerotic
pederasty practiced by other Greeks.

Especially in the

Socratic dialogues, male-to-male relationships are not
necessarily physical, hence homoerotic, unions between a
young and an older man; but they are highly erotic in that
each individual intellectually stimulates the other to
greater, eminently fulfilling, knowledge.

Grube writes;

Socrates loved young men and, instead of the
satisfaction of physical intercourse, he sought
to make his many friends into better men, he
loved their souls even better than their bodies.
(PT 90)
Though ostensibly sexual, pederasty, as envisioned by
Socrates, becomes that ideal relationship through which
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"mutual love" allows a "joint search for supreme truth" (PT
96).
According to Grube, although it may be rooted in
eroticism, such a relationship most clearly succeeds when
it is asexual.

Only then can the two parties focus upon a

sharing of knowledge:
Teaching always remained to him a communion
between master and pupil, research always a
common quest between friends. He knew that man
cannot stand alone, that he needs sympathy from,
and interchange of ideas with, congenial minds.
And here the homosexual habits of his
contemporaries may have helped him to dissociate
Eros from all physical contacts.
(P£ 115-16)
In thispassage,
the views

Grube

surmises that Plato, ascribing to

of his mentor Socrates, took that which he most

admired about the homosexual relationship, "sympathy from,
and interchange of ideas with, congenial minds," and
conflated it with an asexual eros.
personal view of pederasty.

The result is his

In the words of Grube, it "is

the Platonic love, the love of truth and beauty quickened
by mutual affection" (£T 117).

Ideally, knowledge, rather

than sexual gratification, results from the process of
dialectic, from the give-and-take, the question-and-answer
format of dialogue.
In the Phaedrus , as he regales the spoken word as the
stimulus, even the requisite, for knowledge, Socrates
inversely discounts the written word as a distant step
child of discourse:
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You know, Phaedrus, that's the strange thing
about writing, which makes it truly analogous to
painting. The painter's products stand before us
as though they were alive: but if you question
them, they maintain a most majestic silence.
It
is the same with written words: they seem to
talk to you as though they were intelligent, but
if you ask them anything about what they say,
from a desire to be instructed, they go on
telling you just the same thing for ever.
(£il 275d.4—10)
As he equates dialectic with a quest for truth and written
prose or poetry with an exercise in imitation, Plato
severely limits the boundaries of rhetoric, arguing that
the physical presence of the audience is required in order
to achieve the correct communication of the speaker's
knowledge, intention, and meaning.

Christopher Norris, in

analyzing Plato's myth of the invention of writing and its
dubious acceptance by Egyptian King Thamus, adds that
Socrates strongly condemns the written word.

Because

Socrates is Plato's ideal mentor, "the master in a scene of
instruction" (Per 34), he cannot commit his own thoughts to
writing.

That becomes the task of his interlocutor, Plato,

who must necessarily sully his hands with the written word.
Much of the focus in Ronna Burger's Plato's Phaedrus
is this vexing problem that plagues Plato in his text that
extols the love of discourse:

if Plato follows his own

advice and does not write the words of his beloved
Socrates, that knowledge will be lost; if he dares to go
against his advice so as to preserve that knowledge, he
begins an irreversible movement away from the presence of
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his mentor.

The consequence of such a movement is the

emergence of an absent presence.

Although Burger does not

refer specifically to this absent presence, she alludes to
that interplay between a reader and an absent writer.

In

the introduction to her text, Burger comments:
The transmission of knowledge through the art of
writing, which makes it unnecessary for every
thinker to begin with a tabula rasa, promises at
the same time to free human memory from the task
of preserving communal opinion over time, while
creating, through its independent product, the
possibility of that distance from the authority
of tradition necessary for the activity of
thinking.
(£P& 2)
For Plato, the dilemma in reading is manifest primarily
through the processing of thoughts:
independently.

communally versus

As an outspoken proponent of the dialogic

process, he understandably hesitates to sacrifice the
intimate mentor/interlocutor relationship.

Centuries of

unquestioned practice provided him with intellectual
security, albeit a false security for one on the threshold
of a rapidly changing world.

His concern was valid:

the

speaker who put his words to paper would be threatened by a
potential, if not certain, loss of power.

Unlike a

hierarchically driven dialogue, in which an interlocutor
willingly frees his own thoughts so as to become likeminded with his learned mentor, any reading activity allows
the reader to activate his own memory, to consider his own
opinions, and to ponder his own thoughts.

Though guided by
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the absent presence of the writer, any conclusions made
from the text are those of the reader.
Using the term "imitation" rather than absent
presence, Burger discusses the relationship between a
reader and an absent writer.

Describing the intellectual

tension that leads to knowledge, she writes:
The dialogue between Theuth and Thamuz is a
model in miniature of every Platonic dialogue,
whose fundamental perplexity is always determined
by the tension between the living word and its
written imitation: the products of the Platonic
art of writing represent Socratic conversation as
the paradigm of the philosophic enterprise
without ever acknowledging the deed of their
creator. While Platonic love of wisdom presents
itself as nothing but the imitation of Socratic
love of wisdom, the very act of imitation
indicates the essential separation between them.
fPPh 2)
As a writer puts words to paper, those of another or those
of his own, separation from that living, spoken word
begins.

An absence erupts.

Plato cannot be faulted for

failing to resolve this issue in the Phaedrus.

As

knowledgeable as he was, he was still a novice concerning
the manifestations of the written word.

Theorists who

would expound the complexities of that intellectual process
had yet to emerge.

Not the least of those theorists is

Jacques Derrida.
Derrida does not ignore Plato's role as amanuensis for
Socrates's dialogues.

Also pointing to the myth of Theuth,

Derrida exposes the rhetorical conundrum that helps to
define his theory of deconstruction:

meaning is
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transferred imperfectly through the written word.

Slippage

necessarily results when the reader relies upon the absent
presence, in this case Plato himself, for understanding a
text.

Including the cicada story that appears earlier in

the dialogue, Derrida comments in Dissemination:
Both myths follow upon the same question [the
status of writing], and they are only separated
by a short space, just enough time for a detour.
The first [the myth of the cicada], of course,
does not answer the question,* on the contrary, it
leaves it hanging, marks time for a rest, and
makes us wait for the reprise that will lead us
to the second.
fDis 68)
Like the first myth, the second also detours the
listener/reader.

The myth of Theuth, in conjunction with

Socrates's speech against the written word (275d), leads
the reader to believe that the philosopher condemns
writing.

Then, in one of his final admonitions to

Phaedrus, Socrates mentions writing alongside speaking:
The conditions to be fulfilled are these:
first
you must know the truth about the subject that
you speak or write about: that is to say, you
must be able to isolate it in definition, and
having so defined it you must next understand how
to divide it into kinds; until you reach the
limit of division.
(Ph, 277b.4-8)
Plato here includes the written medium as a seemingly
acceptable mode of rhetoric.

And by the end of the

dialogue, Plato moves even closer to acceptance of the
written word.

In the final stages of the discourse, he

asks for the criteria that shape a good logos, whether oral

42
or written.

The implication is that criteria do exist for

constructing written texts that might satisfy even Plato.
For Plato, as he apparently wants us to understand him
through his persona Socrates, "Writing is a dangerous gift
because it substitutes mere inscriptions— alien, arbitrary,
lifeless signs— for the authentic living presence of spoken
language" (Norris, Per 30).

Positing himself as the

philosopher/dialectician who seeks ultimate truth through
verbal interplay with a willing, like-minded interlocutor,
Socrates necessarily defends speech as the only legitimate
word.

To give unequivocal credence to the written word in

the closing chapters of the Phaedrus would result in
radically undermining its rhetorical premise, which is to
redefine and reformulate oratory that has fallen into ill
repute through the mouths of the sophists.

Nevertheless,

because his dialogue exists as a written text, because it
is, Derrida argues that
Only a blind or grossly insensitive reading could
indeed have spread the rumor that Plato was
simply condemning the writer's activity. Nothing
here is of a single piece and the Phaedrus also,
in its own writing, plays at saving writing—
which also means causing it to be lost— as the
best, the noblest game.
(Dis 67)
Like all other aspects of Western thought, the written word
is inherently comprised of polarities, of binary opposites:
saved/lost, life/death, presence/absence.

As such, it is
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Western civilization's "noblest game," enticing its reader,
sometimes with the allure of Paris, to play along.
Norris's argument that Plato sees writing as a
"dangerous gift" further supports Derrida's view of
opposing elements within a given text.

Writing is a gift,

presumably something desired, but it poses a danger to the
reader, a danger of misinterpretation.

In Plato's

Republic, the text that outlines the creation of his
perfect republic, Plato details some of the dangers of
poetry, the written text that is spoken through the
generations.

The philosopher goes so far as to call for

censorship of the writers of "tales," of those poets who
would give
names of things in the underworld which make
every hearer shudder. And perhaps it is right to
delete them for another reason: we are fearful
on behalf of our guardians, lest such shudders
make them more malleable and soft than they
should be.
(Rep 387c.2-5)
Plato recognizes that any non-dialogical speech faces the
potential threat of misinterpretation.

(Derrida would

counter that no speech, oral or written, is free of this
threat.)

Since poetry and story-telling (the written word)

do not share the advantage of dialectic, Plato argues that
perhaps they will mislead through their one-sided, stagnant
format, creating unnecessary fear, weakness, and trembling
within the spirits of the guardians of the republic.

This

stance seems to be in direct opposition to that of Gorgias
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who "recognized the persuasive force of emotion.

He

regarded an orator as a psychagogos, like a poet, a leader
of souls through a kind of incantation" (Kennedy, APG 63).
Although they may differ in the form of logos they prefer
and in the objectives they have for rhetoric, both Gorgias
and Plato advocate the actual presence of the listener.
Further consideration of Derrida's viewpoint shows
that he takes Plato's argument a major, and thoroughly
deconstructive, step farther.

He argues that "correct"

communication of any kind, either in writing or speaking,
is a misnomer— even an impossibility.

In her translator's

introduction to Dissemination, Barbara Johnson provides a
succinct overview to Derridean philosophy as it applies to
the absent presence in language.

According to her, Derrida

critically views both language and thought within the
milieu from which they spring:
cultural tradition.

Western philosophical and

Placed in this rhetorical setting,

language and thought are
structured in terms of dichotomies or polarities:
good vs. evil, being vs. nothingness, presence
vs. absence, truth vs. error, identity vs.
difference, mind vs. matter, man vs. woman, soul
vs. body, life vs. death, nature vs. culture,
speech vs. writing.
(Johnson vii)
Although not necessarily opposite in connotative meaning,
the opposing terms create a hierarchical relationship, with
the first term having "priority" over the second.

And not

strictly an either/or, neither/nor pairing of terms, they
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are arbitrated by the very culture from which (according to
Derrida) they spring.
Unlike Plato, Derrida does not argue that speech is
better than writing.

Nor does he

simply reverse this value system and say that
writing is better than speech. Rather, he
attempts to show that the very possibility of
opposing the two terms on the basis of presence
vs. absence or immediacy vs. representation is an
illusion, since speech is already structured by
difference and distance as much as writing is.
(Johnson ix)
In an abrupt twist of rhetorical terms, Derrida suggests
that absence always exists, in both language and writing.
Neither can approximate the original thought because, like
speech, any
text remains moreover, forever imperceptible.
Its law and its rules are not, however, harbored
in the inaccessibility of a secret; it is simply
that they can never be booked, in the present,
into anything that could rigorously be called a
perception.
(Pis 63)
This idea of the inability of the spoken word or the
written text to produce a "perception" is known by numerous
deconstruction terms:

a lack, a slippage, "a difference, a

gap, an interval, a trace" (Johnson x ) .

But they all

suggest the Derridean argument that presence "is an
ambiguous, even dangerous, ideal" (Johnson xii).
Absence may be the lack of presence, and presence may
be the lack of absence; but I suggest that presence, for
Derrida, is not something that can be acquired through the
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philosophical ascendancy of Plato's upward way or through
the metaphysical movement into Burke's transcendent realm.
Derrida seems to say that an exact transference of the
original thoughts of the writer/speaker to his intended
audience is impossible— either through spoken language or
the written word.

Because of the very quality of language

itself, the task is impossible— in both the present
presence of the speaker and in the absent presence of the
writer.
Ferdinand de Saussure, in his work in linguistics,
examines the difficulty inherent in any attempt to
communicate.
156).

Language is only "a system of signs" ("OL"

In this imperfect system, understanding is, at its

best, arbitrary; at its worst, understanding is
illusionary.

Nevertheless, individuals continue to strive

to find meaning, in spite of certain slippage.

The writer

of a text, much like a responsive reader, must assume
responsibility for his text; he must carefully incorporate
"signs" that will guide a reader through his maze of words.
He accomplishes this through the linguistic arrangement of
syntax, the inclusion of metaphor, and the addition of
punctuation.

If the writer succeeds at every level of

composition, the result is that the written logos works its
"magic” in the mind of the reader.

Although the action may

be deferred, the written logos, which is tangentially
linked to its now-absent creator, functions similarly to
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the learned

philosopher:

itcreates desire for verbal

intercourse

in those who are willing to participate in the

reading process.
Plato would have us believe that this desire is
totally separate from emotion.

More than a speaker

entering into a passionate exercise of persuasion "which
produces mere belief"

(Gor

454) in his audience, Plato's

partners embark upon a journey of knowledge that at death
will return the soul, as Grube notes in Plato's Thought,
"to truth and eternal Forms" (125).

Unlike Gorgias who

defends emotion as a legitimate tool that can be used
against the

listener for the purpose of convincing him of

an opinion,

Plato arguesthat a reality (truth) exists

apart from emotion, that logos, in its quest for pure
knowledge, the knowledge of Forms, supersedes emotion.
Although Plato may want to discount emotion, the words of
his mentor suggest otherwise.
One reference that tends to refute Plato's disavowal
of emotion is his myth of the soul, which depicts a
charioteer seeking to control his team of two horses.

As

John Dillon explains in his introduction to Alcinous:

The

Handbook of Platonism, the traditional interpretation of
this mythic account is that Plato uses it to elucidate his
tripartite division of the soul:
The divine soul has three aspects, the critical
or cognitive (gnostikon), corresponding to our
rational part, the appetitive or 'dispositional'
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(parastatikon), corresponding to our spirited,
and the 'appropriative' (oikeiotikon),
corresponding to our libidinous.

(&:HE xxi)
Emotions, both the "spirited" (which is the good horse) and
the "libidinous" (which is the bad horse), arise from
either part of the soul that is not rational.

That which

is dangerously emotional (the insolent and proud horse)
confuses the individual in his journey toward the ideal; it
is that which forces him to lose his wings and fall back to
earth.

When the charioteer focuses on the eyes of a

particular horse, he becomes that which he sees:

the bad

horse stirs his negative emotions and makes him rebel from
the Ideal; the good horse keeps him focused on, or
"obedient" to, the Ideal (Eh 253c).

But it is important to

note that emotions control both horses.
This myth does not represent Plato's only
acknowledgement of emotion in an individual's movement
toward the Ideal.

Near the end of his discourse in The

Phaedrus, Socrates, who previously denigrates those who
elicit emotion as a means to persuade, says:

"Since the

function of oratory is in fact to influence men's souls,
the intending orator must know what types of soul there
are" (Ph 271c-d).

The implication is that a philosophical

rhetoric will incorporate a knowledge and a use of
psychology.

This description does not seem far removed

from that which Plato denigrates, the psychagogos whose aim
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is the same as that verbalized by Socrates:
men's souls."

"to influence

Although he might disclaim the comparison,

Plato's account of the myth of the soul describes the power
of eros (logos) that is quite similar to that which is
recounted by Gorgias in the Encomium.
In the Phaedrus (251a-252b), as he explains the
physical changes wrought through the immortality of the
soul, the embodiment of spiritual love, Plato writes of
another rape, a rape reminiscent of the inception of Helen
of Troy, as depicted by W. B. Yeats in "Leda and the Swan":
A sudden blow: the great wings beating still
Above the staggering girl, her thighs caressed
By the dark webs, her nape caught in his bill,
He holds her helpless breast upon his breast.
(11. 1-4)
This sexually charged union between Zeus, in the form of a
swan, and Leda, a helpless human female, exposes the primal
nature of heterosexual relationships, a nature that Plato
reformulates for his own philosophical purposes.
Plato might shape his rape by pederastic conventions
so as to characterize an "ideal homosexual relation"
(Hackforth 98), but his reformulated description is
surprisingly similar to Zeus's rape of Leda, as poetically
rendered by Yeats, and Paris's rape of Helen, as
instructionally inscribed by Gorgias in the Encomium.
difference is that Plato seeks to transcend the sexual
limitations of the physical world:

The
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and but for fear of being deemed a very madman he
would offer sacrifice to his beloved, as to a
holy image of deity. Next, with the passing of
the shudder, a strange sweating and fever seizes
him:
for by reason of the stream of beauty
entering in through his eyes there comes a
warmth, whereby his soul's plumage is fostered;
and with that warmth the roots of the wings
are melted.
(Eh 251a-252b)
Interfacing the sexual act (which sheds its carnal wings)
with the spiritual experience (which achieves communion
with Beauty of Forms), wisdom supplants eros as the
motivating force of the logos.

Thus controlled by wisdom,

logos continues to penetrate, but its aim moves from self
gratification to self-abnegation as it reflects the "eye of
the soul" fRep 508d.4) of True Being.
Plato may seek to transcend the sexual limitations of
the physical world, but his incorporation of eros belies
his efforts.

A paraphrasing of Burke's explanation of the

relationship between persuasion and eros suggests that
Plato cannot do that which he would attempt.

Persuasion is

always implicit in eros, since the goal of eros is to
overcome difference; conversely, eros is equally implicit
in persuasion, since the conceptualization of a sexual
desire is revealed in the struggle for unity in a culture
of estrangement (RM 176-77).

If we apply this apparent

paradox to the reading experience, we might note that both
persuasion and eros are equally implicit in the reading
process:

as a writer verbalizes ideas, he generally
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solicits agreement; as a reader takes up that text, he
willingly (except perhaps in those instances of required
reading) offers himself as a pawn of persuasion.

Even if

the reader chooses not to be persuaded, if he chooses to
disagree with the ideas presented by the writer, his
willful act of participation affirms the seduction of eros.
Plato could not accept this implicit relationship
between eros and persuasion.

Seemingly undaunted in his

defense of persuasion which is void of sexually charged
eros, Plato offers his myth of the soul to counter
sophistic doctrine.

His myth frees the idealized soul from

the encumbrances of heterosexual mortality, presumably to
supersede the tacit connection between persuasion and eros.
The result is that his

method of transcendence

simultaneously creates

the fatal rhetorical wound that will

eventually lead to the

demise of his restrictive concept of

logos as a purely oral activity.
If the spoken word and the presence of the listener
are the criteria for understanding and achieving pure
knowledge, why does Plato's myth refer to the eyes ("beauty
entering in through the eyes") rather than to the ears as
points of entry (penetration) for beauty (eros), which is
the metaphorical equivalent of logos?

Although he may

profess otherwise, he lends at least some credence to the
emerging power of a persuasive written word, of a logos
that will find its energy in, and through, the non-
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deconstructed absent presence which seeks union with a
reader.
The significance in Plato's shift from hearing to
seeing is crucial.

Not only is sight the sense that

individuals use in reading, but it also is that physical
ability which computes the distance between the seer and
the seen.

The instant of transcendent union between the

two admits to distance and deferral, but it also allows for
understanding.

Ong takes up this issue in Interfaces of

the Word and The Presence of the Word.

Commenting on the

gleaning and accepting of knowledge in our Western society,
he assesses:
To a culture so visualist as ours (despite the
recent build-up of the auditory), the world of
early oral-aural man and the sense of presence it
enjoys
can appear curiously unreal. It seems too
little
objective, too much given to illusion, too
threatened by subjective forces. For us, not
hearing but seeing is believing. We feel truly
at home only in a world of sight.
(£W 169)
Ong seems to say that, somewhat curiously, the modern
individual has been lulled into a complacency of "seeing is
believing," as evidenced by
something simply

the one who accepts for truth

because he sees it in print.

For him,

such a world of sight provides a potentially deceptive
confidence that he "knows," when indeed he may not, a topic
Ong addresses in his later book, Interfaces of the Word.
In the chapter, "'I See what you Say':

Sense

Analogues for Intellect," Ong concludes that "in a field of
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sight there is always a beyond or a beneath which is not
seen" (IH 125).

For the individual to begin to grasp that

which he cannot see with the physical eye, he must be
willing to shorten the distance between seer and seen,
between knower and known, between reader and writer.
is accomplished through the intellect.

This

Willfully engaging

in synchronous activity with writer and text, the reader
comes to certain, though not necessarily the same,
knowledge as that set forth by the writer.
Plato's Republic, which espouses an idealized
rhetorical and an admittedly political environment, both
which rely on the auditory senses, ignores a seemingly
obvious fact:

for posterity to follow his philosophical

precepts, his words ultimately must be written.

Norris

explains Plato's attending paradox:
For the fact is— to put the case at its
simplest— that Plato is inescapably condemned to
writing, even as he seeks to denounce its effects
and uphold the authority of self-present (spoken)
truth. And this predicament repeats itself
wherever philosophy refuses to acknowledge its
own textual status and aspires to a pure
contemplation of truth independent of mere
written signs.
fPer 33)
Norris suggests that Plato's panegyrical avowal of "non
write" paradoxically is his reluctant admission of writing.
Once he puts his words to paper, Plato, quite unwillingly
(but perhaps not quite so unwittingly), opens the
rhetorical door to a new partner, the absent presence.
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When the word is written, the once-controlled discourse is
no longer restricted to a teacher and his like-minded
interlocutor; another presence emerges— the absent presence
of the future reader.
In Disseminationr we find Derrida's lengthy, but quite
complete, explanation of the ambivalence of written texts.
His reference to "this pharmakon, this 'medicine,' this
philter, which acts as both remedy and poison" (Pis 70)
suggests the third element in the rhetorical process;
reader.

the

Derrida determines that the reader is the

"philter," the one who determines whether a text is
"remedy" or "poison."

Referring to Plato's disparagement

of the written word, he describes how the determination
(cure or curse, boon or bane, understanding or confusion)
is made:
There is thus for Plato no such thing as a
written thing. There is only a logos more or
less alive, more or less distant from itself.
Writing is not an independent order of
signification; it is weakened speech, something
not completely dead: a living-dead, a reprieved
corpse, a deferred life, a semblance of
breath. The phantom, the phantasm, the
simulacrum (eidolon, 276a) of living discourse is
not inanimate; it is not insignificant; it simply
signifies little, and always the same thing.
This signifier of little, this discourse that
doesn't amount to much, is like all ghosts:
errant.
It rolls (kulindeitai) this way and
that like someone who has lost his way, who
doesn't know where he is going, having strayed
from the correct path, the right direction, the
rule of rectitude, the norm; but also like
someone who has lost his rights, an outlaw, a
pervert, a bad seed, a vagrant, an adventurer, a
bum. Wandering in the streets, he doesn't even
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know who he is, what his identity— if he has
one— might be, what his name is, what his
father's name is. He repeats the same thing
every time he is questioned on the street corner,
but he can no longer repeat his origin. Not to
know where one comes from or where one is going,
for a discourse with no guarantor, is not to know
how to speak at all, to be in a state of infancy.
Uprooted, anonymous, unattached to any house
or country, this almost insignificant signifier
is at everyone's disposal, can be picked up by
both the competent and the incompetent, by those
who understand and know what to do with it {ceux
qui entendent et s'y entendent) (tois espiousin),
and by those who are completely unconcerned with
it, and who, knowing nothing about it, can
inflict all manner of impertinence upon it.
fDis 143-44)
The reader, then, willingly and wittingly, in his
competence or incompetence, makes meaning for himself
through the written words in the absence of the author.
The absent presence thus becomes a dual activity, operating
from both sides of the text.
presence of the

The author presumes the

absent reader when he places his words on

paper; conversely, through the very act of reading, of
mentally interacting with those same words that the author
put on paper, the reader acknowledges the presence of an
absent author.
That which unites writer and reader is, in the words
of Burger, a "product of writing."

Hesitating to go as far

as Derrida who refers in the passage above to that product
as "a logos more or less alive" (PPh 143), she suggests
that writing has no life until a responding, and
responsible, reader takes it into himself:
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The product of writing, like the creature of
painting, is not an independent being with a life
of its own, able to speak for itself; it requires
its begetter to protect it against unjust abuse.
(PPh 97)
For meaning to be effected, the reader cannot be a passive
observer of the words before him.

He must, as Burger

further argues, purposefully engage in "the activity of
interpretation" fPPh 97).
equate with seeing.

Believing should not necessarily

Acting as both life-giver for and

guardian of the quiescent words, he must protect them
"against

unjust abuse" and careless misinterpretation (PPh

97).According to Burger,

it is then, and only

then, that

resuscitated with the breath of thought, the
written corpse of the dialogue becomes a living
being, knowing when to speak and when to remain
silent, able to defend itself against all unjust
abuse.
(PPh 3)
If the resuscitated words (a text) are positioned in a
triangular framework with a responsible reader and a
dominant authorial presence, the result is the rhetorical
triangle.
Burger does not specifically refer to the rhetorical
triangle in her discussion of the irresolute conflict
between the spoken and written word that she finds in
Plato's Phaedrus.

However, her discussion of the

responsibility of the reader, who works in tandem with the
writer, attests to an absent presence already at work.
Certainly Plato's own writings do not clearly address this
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issue of the absent presence as it operates within the
rhetorical triangle, but his dialogues lay the framework
from which this critical term will emerge.

We need to look

only as far as Aristotle to see clearer evidence of its
formulation.
Aristotle's On Rhetoric offers an irreversible
dialogic construct, the rhetorical triangle with an
implicit absent presence.

Aristotle's recognition of this

dynamic contributor to a written text affirmatively answers
Plato's question:

Do criteria exist for creating not only

an acceptable, but a masterfully cogent, written discourse?
(Ph 276a-277b)

Conforming to his philosophic tradition,

Aristotle maintains the dialogic form.
addresses this issue in Aristotle:
History of His Development.

Werner Jaeger

Fundamentals in the

He states that, presumably

like other members of the Academy, Aristotle
regarded the dialogue as the established vehicle
for giving living form to esoteric philosophy,
and . . . desired to see the master's effect
on himself reproduced in such a medium.
fA:FHD 27)
His dialogue, however, is dramatically different from those
of Plato and his peers:

he does not offer the text of a

learned teacher intellectually guiding his willing
interlocutor.

Perhaps most significantly, he does not have

an external audience; rather, he relates a discourse that
occurs in his mind, presenting a verbal interplay between
the rational spirit and the questioning self which comprise
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his being.

Proof of his mastery of the centuries-old

discursive method, Aristotle reformulates that which was
used by his mentor into an inner dialogue, making it more
suitable for the written word than was that which was
generally practiced.
Although one might argue that the two aspects of
Aristotle, the individual, are present in his creation of
an inner dialogue, he does essentially what Walter J. Ong
describes as "fictionalizing" an audience; he creates a
physically, but nevertheless powerfully, absent presence (a
mentally projected audience), which guides and directs his
treatise on rhetoric.

Aristotle's dialogue thus becomes a

treatise of metarhetoric through which the third element of
the rhetorical triangle is a recognizable force.
Aristotle may reflect Plato in some of his earlier
works, but he dramatically departs from his mentor's
transcendental quality of forms.

Reflecting his training

in biology and the empirical sciences, Aristotle considers
all forms through their organic development.

In so doing,

he creates his complex philosophical system of rhetoric as
a means for grounding words, or discourse, in a
quantitative study of being, knowledge, and language.

This

triadic system of study establishes a pattern of triangular
completeness that recurs throughout Aristotle's On
3
Rhetoric.

Arguments or speeches are either deliberative,

epideictic, or judicial [1358b];

they involve ethos,
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pathos, and logos [1356a]; and they require a listener, a
speaker, and a subject [1358a].4
And the concept of the absent presence evolves
directly from these latter two triangular systems, as one
system overlaps the other.

The modern rhetorical triangle

(reader, writer, text) directly parallels Aristotle's
ethos, pathos, and logos while it simultaneously
corresponds to his listener, speaker, and subject.
Evidence of the evolutionary movement from the oral
tradition of classical rhetoric to the written tradition of
modern rhetoric is seen as reader and writer replace
listener and speaker in the rhetorical triangle.

Ong

describes the differences that distinguish Aristotle's
triangle from its modern counterpart;
the spoken word is part of present actuality and
has its meaning established by the total
situation in which it comes into being. Context
for the spoken word is simply present, centered
in the person speaking and the one or ones to
whom he addresses himself and to whom he is
related existentially in terms of the
circumambient actuality.
But the meaning caught
in writing comes provided with no such present
circumambient actuality, at least normally.
("WA" 85)
Lacking a "present actuality" or a present presence of the
speaker, the written word necessarily relies, albeit
imperfectly, on the absent presence of its author to shape
meaning for the reader.

As the reader, who is an absent

presence when the text is composed, partners himself with
an equally absent author, he connects with that author.
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Although the connection may be incomplete and the
understanding may be arbitrary, the logos nevertheless
creates an indisputable bridge between author and reader.
The purpose of that bridge is to effect meaning
through the text; unfortunately, the process is often
precarious, as meaning slips through the mental recesses of
the reader's mind.

Burke argues that a "word's 'meaning'

is not identical with its sheer materiality" because there
is "a realm that transcends the empirical" (RR 16, 36).
Because of linguistic transcendence, the idea that the
writer placed upon the page may not materially be the same
idea as interpreted by the reader, but it has a semblance
of that materiality if the reader is, as Burger suggests,
responsive and responsible.

Burke's theory concerning this

linguistic transcendence is that language is the
individual's "dramatic" attempt to get to "the form of a
thing [that is] called its 'whatness,' or quidditas" (GM
228), a concept that can be traced to Aristotle.
As the individual seeks to understand the "whatness"
of self, world, and Other, he necessarily begins a journey
of exploration; or, as Aristotle might say, he begins his
journey toward his greatest potential.

It is a journey of

activism, involvement, perhaps even intellectual risk.
Holland summarizes Aristotle's dramatistic view of man as
speaker in his society:
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for Aristotle, man's life is an activity.
It is
a 'becoming' through acting and doing of what he
'potentially is.' The ultimate end or good for
which he strives is 'happiness.'
Individual
happiness will result when he learns to follow
the rules of reason and realizes in actuality all
the capacities of which his soul (nature) is
potentially capable. Man is not only a rational
animal, but he is by nature a political or social
animal. He will achieve social happiness when he
applies his knowledge of individual good to the
good of society.
(SEfc 8 3 )

Aristotle's writings reflect an aggressive approach to life
and a utilitarian approach to rhetoric.

To help ensure the

good of the community, he offers rhetoric as a dynamic art
that might benefit individuals in the drama of their lives.
Establishing it as a techne, a "reasoned habit of mind in
making" (NE 6.4.3), he then offers it as habit that can
pervade and positively impact every arena of living—
ethical, political, legal.

His is a rhetoric steeped in a

logic that is inherently beneficial to his society, serving
as a means both for understanding and improving the self
within his world.
Burke comments that "Aristotle's concern with logic as
the instrument (organon) of human reason is 'incipiently'
pragmatist" (GM 276).

As he espouses that logic in his

written treatise, the written word becomes an acceptable
tool (organon) for the process of communication, for the
purpose of disseminating ideas.

Applying his logical

approach to written language, Aristotle sees it as a
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natural phenomenon and as rational instrument.
Aristotle analyzes the arts of language in terms
of symbolic properties and linguistic structures.
Logic, rhetoric, and poetic are none of them
purely 'verbal arts' in Aristotle's philosophy:
they are based on the natural properties of
words.
(McKeon, "ACL'1 176)
Aristotle views all of language as an instrument, an
instrument for verbal communication that might successfully
occur both in the presence and in the absence of the
speaker.

Unlike his mentor Plato, he recognizes efficacy

in discourse that is non-dialogic.
Aristotle may not clearly elucidate for the modern
reader how this written instrument effects meaning, but his
writings yield some significant determinations.

Unlike

Plato and the sophists, he does not offer eros as that
which creates like-mindedness.

On the contrary, he submits

a rational, triangular framework as at least partial
explanation.

Rather than seducing an audience in the

manner of eros, Aristotle's speaker exudes good will,
ethos, that will draw a listener (reader) to him.
Partnered with the logos (text) and the pathos of the
listener, the speaker (writer) might elicit understanding.
Burke, speaking through his Aristotelian heritage, further
extrapolates.
Attempting to define the human individual, the
"symbol-using animal" (Symbolic Action 3), Burke overlays
Aristotle's empirical knowledge with Platonic
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transcendence, a transcendence which allows for
differentiations between essence and being.

Ontologically,

the individual communicates a sense of reality through
symbols.

The •'reality" which the words describe is absent;

nevertheless, the words themselves create their own reality
for the reader/listener.
Wendell V. Harris, in "The Critics Who Made Us,"
formulates an equation which helps explain how Burke's
system of verbal transcendence works;
symbols = verbal parallels to recognized patterns
of experience = formulas = definitions =
interpretations of situations = means of
orienting or adjusting to a situation. The
symbol names the pattern of experience, and
at the same time interprets it and helps us
orient ourselves so as to meet it successfully.
We can neither name nor define anything without
interpreting it, and our very interpretation
orients us in our response to it.
(458)
Relating this to the rhetorical triangle, which, for the
written text, implicitly contains an absent presence, the
individual necessarily interprets those symbols before him.
The meaning of the absent author thus becomes shaped in
part by the reader as he brings his own experience into the
process.

The result is that the interpretation of the

author's words becomes more real for the reader than the
actual experience about which the author writes.

The

reader, through a transcendental movement, leaps from the
essence of that author's experience to its recapitulated
being in his mind.

A similar triangle operates in the

64
spoken word as the hearer likewise struggles to understand
the speaker.

As in Derrida's diffFrance, understanding

comes only through deferral.
This mental process that links the speaker to the
listener and the reader to the writer emphasizes the power
of logos, a power that creates the bridge of collaboration
between author and reader.

Reminiscent of the erotic power

of Paris, Burke describes this collaboration in seductive
terms:
Once you grasp the trend of the form, it invites
participation regardless of the subject matter.
Formally, you will find yourself swinging along
with the succession of antitheses, even though
you may not agree with the proposition that is
being presented in this form. Or it may even be
an opponent's proposition which you resent— yet
for the duration of the statement itself you
might 'help him out' to the extent of yielding to
the formal development, surrendering to its
symmetry as such. Of course, the more violent
your original resistance to the proposition, the
weaker will be your degree of 'surrender' by
'collaborating' with the form. But in cases
where a decision is still to be reached, a
yielding to the form prepares for assent to
the matter identified with it. Thus, you are
drawn to the form, not in your capacity as a
partisan, but because of some 'universal' appeal
in it.
(RM 58)
Whether in agreement or in disagreement with the printed
words, the reader who willingly engages in the reading
process becomes a dynamic player in the rhetorical process,
"surrendering” to and "collaborating" with the text.
Helen at the hands of Paris, he may initially want to
resist the "proposition" in the text.

But, also like

Like
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Helen, who is unable to withstand the allure of Paris, he
is drawn into participation.
The reader engages, not in a violent rape, but in what
Tilly Warnock describes as a rhetorical "dance" with the
writer.

Warnock argues:
Clearly the dance that Burke is describing is no
solo performance on the part of either the writer
or the reader, and clearly the reader's
resistance and the writer's enticements, and
vice-versa are parts of the dance.
("RKB" 73)

That which holds the reader and writer together in
rhythmic, rhetorical unison is the appeal of the written
word.

And that appeal, perhaps but not necessarily

universal, is interpretively sifted through the experience
of the reader.
So, then, how does the transcendental element invade
this process?

Burke argues that transcendence occurs

through the symbolic nature of language, a process which
renders its own sphere of "reality."

Through metaphor,

metonymy, synecdoche, and irony, the writer enables the
reader to grasp meaning beyond the words in mere context.
Writing in "Volume and Body in Burke's Criticism, or
Stalled in the Right Place," Angus Fletcher explains:
Language as figured speech, in short, implies
immediate verbal transcendence. As soon as you
have poetry, figured speech, you have a beyonding
of plain indication. You point, and you point
beyond. Thus, in this larger view, signs can be
transcendences of other signs. Words for general
classes can transcend words for particulars, and
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of course, as in traditional dialectic, ideas can
transcend things and even other ideas.
("VBBC" 167)
Poetry, of course, applies rather universally to discourse,
since virtually all language contains figured speech.

As a

reader then enters into the text of an absent writer, "he
experiences 'critical moments' when he transcends the
division between himself as a reader and the text he is
reading" (Warnock, "RKB" 72).

The word, or logos, thus

becomes the instrument (the organon) of transcendence.
Although these "instruments are 'essentially' human, since
they are products of human design" (£M 283), they ascend
into the realm of the symbolic, thus transcending the realm
of the empirical.
Burke employs a system of metaphorical hierarchy to
comment on this process:

"the analogy of naturalistic

correlations becomes necessarily the reduction of some
higher or more complex realm of being to the terms of a
lower or less complex realm of being" ("FMT" 506).

This

reduction in the mind of the reader becomes a
representation of the writer's thoughts.

Much like

Derrida, Burke recognizes the slippage that is inherent in
language? it is slippage .which causes the necessarily
reductive version of that which it linguistically
represents:
Men seek for vocabularies that will be
faithful reflections of reality. To this end,
they must develop vocabularies that are
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selections of reality. And any selection of
reality must, in certain circumstances, function
as a deflection of reality.
(SM 59)
Ultimately, then, all language offers a reduction of
reality as it seeks to replicate that which is reality.

I

fully recognize that the term “reality" is an abstract
term.

It can refer to that which is divinely real, that

which allows individual transcendence to a spiritual state
of Otherness; but, it also suggests that which is humanly
real, experienced sensorily or imaginatively, hence
determined "real" by the individual.

In either reference,

however, real is that which is manifest as some something
that discernibly affects the essence, the being, of the
individual.
And Burke posits that a writer can capture the essence
of that reality through a language of words, a confusing
concept that Burke attempts to explain:
Thus, if we flatly contrast existence with
essence, it follows by the sheer dialectics of
the case that 'essences' do not 'exist.' Nor can
existence as such be an essence.
In Plato, the
world of being (that is, essence) was more real
than the world of our everyday experience (which
was for Plato the world of appearance). But
Santayana has synonymized appearances and
essences to the extent that all appearances are
essences, though there are many more essences
than there are appearances.
While I was puzzling over Santayana's way of
distinguishing essence from existence, a sixyear-old solved the problem for me when he
explained, 'There is an Easter Bunny, but he
isn't real.'
I saw the application immediately:
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the Easter bunny has a being, or essence, but he
does not exist.
(SM 219)
The same is true of the absent presence of the writer? he
does not physically exist to guide his interlocutor to
knowledge through a dialectic process.

Nevertheless, his

presence, his being or essence, is irrefutable.

Empowered

by, and through, the written word, the absent presence of
the writer of a given text establishes a common ground of
understanding with the reader.

If the reader yields

completely to that presence, he can hope for at least
momentary, though perhaps highly reductive, unity with the
writer.

The experience, which is embedded in the words, no

longer exists.

But the reader can capture the essence of

that experience through the words that are offered by the
writer.
Logos thus continues its seduction, seeking that
transcendent state of perfect union which Yeats describes
in "Among School Children":
O body swayed to music, 0 brightening glance,
How can we know the dancer from the dance?
(VIII 7-8)
Through the metaphor of the dancer and the dance or through
countless other figurative images, the writer, in his
absent presence, guides his reader to transcend the flat,
denotative meaning of words on the printed page.

The two,

writer and reader, consequently engage in meaningful mental
discourse.
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Because the reading process was in its infancy in the
time of Plato and Aristotle, these two philosophers could
not adequately address the complexities of the intellectual
process.

What they could, and did, address is the presence

of spirit, which manifests itself through a dialogic
encounter.

As Hall writes in Word and spirit.

The Greeks sensed this presence of spirit in the
place where it most normally appears, namely, in
the dynamic and lively practice of speaking to
one another in the course of their everyday
lives. And this sense of the presence of spirit
on the level of the speech-act was perhaps all
the stronger by virtue of the fact that speech
was so central to Greek life.
(W£ 72)
The Greeks took what they sensed, processed what they
believed to be true, and placed it in a verbal construct
that provided meaning for themselves and their
interlocutors.

Perhaps not realizing that they were on the

threshold of an intellectual revolution, one made possible
through the written word, they sought to understand self,
world, and Other through the best, and the most logical,
means available to them.

Little did they know that one of

their own would outline a logical framework that would
allow analysis, and subsequent understanding, of the
operations of a rhetorical absent presence.
Aristotle, choosing to use the written word to his
advantage, gives validity to the written text.

Recognizing

it as an additional linguistic tool, he fashions his text
On Rhetoric so as to perpetuate the relationship between
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logos, ethos, and pathos.

In so doing, he creates a

textual inner dialogue, which will allow the emergence of a
secondary absent presence, that which operates between a
lover and an absent beloved, both of whom are characters in
a literary text.

Narratives of conflict between a lover

and an absent beloved continue to plot the individual's
epistemological journey toward understanding of self,
world, and Other.
The next chapter continues this analysis, focusing on
the New Testament as the text that first significantly
yields a character who speaks from a text.

I will argue

that the journey trope and the literary absent presence
(Word as character) cohere in the Christian rendering of
God manifest as flesh.

In order to woo his people back

into right relationship with him, God offers his son Jesus
as the central being in his text:

Jesus, the Word of God,

is the word (text) that will unite Creator and created.
For the purposes of my development, the New Testament
readily exemplifies dual absent presences, rhetorical and
literary, that operate through a literary work.

Chapter 3
The Absent Presence in Christian Theology

Any analysis of the Christian text, even one such as
this which advocates a plenitude of hermeneutic
possibilities, is potentially vexed by the intrusion of
dogma.

Although I will strive for objectivity, I realize

the virtual impossibility of omitting dogma from an
implicitly dogmatic text such as the Bible.

Since most of

my discussion focuses on the New Testament, the avowedly
Christian text, many of my conclusions necessarily will be
stated from the Christian perspective.

In no way do I come

to these conclusions so as to preclude divergent postures
of belief; rather, as a willing, a responsible, and a
responsive reader, I filter my interpretations through the
Christian milieu from which the words proceed while
simultaneously sifting them through exegesis that is
shaped, at least in part, by our contemporary society.
Compression and panorama, an admittedly oxymoronic
approach, will determine the development of this chapter.
Within this compression, which focuses on selective
passages from the lengthy Biblical text, is a panoramic
landscape from which emerges the absent presence as
literary character.

Through a textual probing of this

bellwether of Western literature, I will suggest that not
71
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one (the writer), not two (the writer and reader), but
multiple absent presences (writer, reader, and character or
characters) merge to create meaning from a literary text.
Because the events in the New Testament are traditionally
viewed as a fulfillment, a continuation, of the Old, it is
critically linked to the Old, hence the panorama.

But it

is the text of the New Testament which produces the absent
presence as character who also figures into the making of
meaning for the reader.
To situate the New Testament in its intellectual and
spiritual milieu, I will also make periodical references to
the Greek culture which preceded it.

Ronald L. Hall's Word

and Spirit will underpin this portion of my argument, which
posits that Christianity, with the Word-as-Flesh, benefited
from a world-view that was denied the Greeks.

It is this

pneumatic world-view, spirit as speech, which allows for
Christ through his Holy Spirit, spirit and speech, to
become a textual presence that discernibly influences the
readers of God's Word.
My reasons for including the Bible, especially the New
Testament, in this study are numerous.1

Not the least of

these is that the advent of Christianity significantly
alters the formerly accepted views of time and history.
Pre-Christian Greeks, most notably Plato, tended to view
history as cyclical, moving rhythmically within a
structured and an ordered cosmos.

Plato's doctrine of
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Forms seeks to explain the process.

A highly simplistic

synopsis of that esoteric doctrine is that at death all
Forms return to their beginning; there, they are reunited
with True Being where the imperfections of human existence
fall away.

The higher the Form, such as the philosopher,

the more that Form will resemble True Being.
Hall explains some of the problems attenuating this
Platonic world-view:
In a cosmos, even the paradigms of temporal
succession are cyclical and thus closed, finite,
self-contained, and essentially timeless.
It was
this picture of temporal succession that Plato
was relying on when he said of time that it is
'the moving image of eternity.'
In such a cosmic
picture of time, novelty and contingency are
denied their ontological rights. This denial is
the consequence of picturing time as an eternally
repeating cycle of nature.
(W£ 19)
In such a view, the individual is little more than an
impersonal object who is subject to an "impersonal
principle of being, a logos” (W£> 19).

According to Plato's

cosmic world-view, the individual has no hope for latitude
in the existence beyond:

he is forever, and repetitively,

for good or for bad, locked into his earthly hierarchical
stratum.

The individual is simply a cog in the wheel of

time.
As the written word became available to the masses,
allowing the individual to read and to begin to process
ideas independently, Plato's theory became more and more
unacceptable.

Gradually came the recognition that the
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individual "cog," far from being impersonal, is a person,
with a personality and an intellect for thinking, with a
mind for pondering "Who am I?"

The very asking of the

question, it would seem, admits to "novelty and
contingency" (Hall, W§. 19).

Because Plato's questioning

implied difference and individuality, it placed in doubt
the cosmic view of life.

If man is capable of seeing the

selfhood of his being as separate from that of others, if
he is capable of questioning his beginning and pondering
his conclusion, he needs a world-view different from that
offered by the Plato and his contemporaries.
Aristotle, departing from Plato's Doctrine of Forms,
espoused a different, a more progressive, concept of man in
his world.

Assuming a dramatistic position, Aristotle

reasoned:

if man

is capable of thinking, he is capable of

becoming.

He may

(and again I over-simplify a complex

theory) be a cog in the wheel of time, but he can at least
move toward being the best cog in it.

Regardless of his

earthly hierarchical status, each individual assumes the
responsibility for reaching his fullest potential.

The

difficulty with this theory is that the standards are
arbitrary: before the individual can move toward his best,
he must first recognize what his "best" is— a potentially
difficult quandary for the non-intellectual.
The Christian view is dramatically (and
dramatistically) different from the ones offered by Plato
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and Aristotle, an analysis that William Barclay makes in
his introduction to The Bible as History.
places time in a linear sequence.

Christianity

No longer cyclical, time

is sequential; it moves along a story-line that has a
beginning and an ending.

As the Bible records this

beginning and foreshadows its ending, it creates a
narrative.

And at the center of the narrative is the

individual, possessed with a unique consciousness and an
independent will that assure him of "novelty and
contingency" (Hall, W£ 19).

These novel and contingent

qualities reflect man's greatest potential, but they also
cause his greatest downfall.

They allow him to triumph,

but they also lead him to failure.
Central to the Christian narrative, which begins with
the creation of man and his subsequent expulsion from the
immediate presence of his Creator, is humanity's attempt to
overcome spiritual difference, difference which causes
separation between Creator and created.
thus dominates the text of the Bible.

The journey trope
In his notes on The

Anchor Bible, E.A. Speiser states that the reason for the
journey "reduced to basic terms, was a spiritual one"
(xlv).

Most significantly a spiritual quest, it is given

physical dimensions in the Old Testament.
a metaphor for the spiritual.

The physical is

When God directs Abraham to

return the people of Israel to Canaan, he offers the
corporeal experience (the physical journey back to the
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homeland) as a manifestation of the incorporeal experience
(the spiritual journey back to God) he hopes to effect in
them.

Because of "the record of that progressive quest,

the Bible became and has remained a factor in cultural life
and an influence in world literature" (Speiser lii).
Especially in its narration of the physical struggles and
the spiritual triumphs of a people relating to their
Creator, the Bible is a necessary link in the idea of the
absent presence.

Significantly contributing to Western

literary thought, the Bible reveals an absent presence
which dominates the text, operating within and reaching out
from a textual narrative.
Ong suggests perhaps an even more convincing reason
for inclusion of the Bible in a study such as this:

it is

the oldest extant literary work that most clearly reflects
society's movement from an oral/aural to a verbally
scripted world.

In his book The Presence of the Word,

which plots a kind of history of "word," showing its
changes in society as it moves from the Greek oral medium
to the Hebraic printed medium, Ong suggests that the Bible
creates a standard for the communication of ideas.

Vital

to that standard is that which enables any communication:
the word.

Ong argues for numerous functions of "word," as

he sees them evidenced in the Bible.
After subdividing word as it appears in the Christian
text, Ong then delineates seven particular Biblical
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operations:

word as divine power, word as communication

between God and man, word as God's communication to the
prophets, word as that which is heard in sermons, word as
inspiration to writers of Biblical text, word as what was
actually written by those writers, and "the Word Who is
Jesus Christ" (Egf 182-84).

Certainly the term "word" as

used in the Bible functions in each of these capacities.
However, each of the seven has one of two common
denominators:
that text.

word as text or Word as character within

Logos, or word as text, was enunciated by

Aristotle, as discussed in my previous chapter.

But it is

Word as character, the physical embodiment of text, that
will be the focus for this chapter.

Word as character

cannot be isolated from the Biblical text because its being
exists in and through the text; if one accepts the text, he
also accepts the Word.

This premise is especially

evidenced in the New Testament.
Initially the Word as character refers to the physical
Jesus, God's own Son, the Word Incarnate who dwelt among
man.

During his time on earth, the New Testament describes

him as a physical presence, as one who was raised in the
household of Joseph, a carpenter.

In his chronological

history of the Bible, Essentials of Bible Historyf Elmer
W.K. Mould assesses the advent and life of Jesus:
We have now reached the central personality of
the Bible, Jesus of Nazareth.
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There are no contemporary records of the life
and teachings of Jesus. He himself wrote
nothing. Nor have any documents been found to
throw light upon his life and teachings which
date within the generation that witnessed his
life and death.
(EBH 488)
A "central personality" without textual validation other
than that which was recorded "approximately forty years"
after his crucifixion (EBH 488), this character in the
Christian narrative represented more than a textual
presence.

He was parousia, or real presence, what

Augustine refers to as the "flesh being" that was "assumed
by the Divinity," fEnchiridion X).

And his purpose was to

create dialogue between God and man; teleologically, then,
Christ entered into the narrative of humanity in order to
overcome difference or separation.
So that he could maintain his renewed dialogue with
humanity after the death of his Son, God created an
additional "character" who would continue to speak his
words:

the Holy Spirit.

From a narrative point of view,

Jesus and the Holy Spirit as characters in a text represent
a major development in the operation of the word.

Bidden

by, and integrally linked, to the author (God the Father),
they speak his words to his audience.

The result is that

the rhetorical triangle of logos (text), ethos (writer),
and pathos (reader) produces an additional triangle (what I
call a literary triangle) between text, writer, and
character.

The writer, or more precisely, the producer of
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the text, empowers his central character to be spokesman
for him— to bridge the gap between writer and reader.
Fully empowered by creator of the text, the absent presence
of the character then speaks from the text the words of the
writer to his reader.

Not only are reader and writer

rhetorically united through the logos, but reader and
character also become linked.

As the reader responds to

the words and actions of the characters within the text, he
relates to a secondary, and literary, absent presence.
The Bible is not the first text to suggest these
separate, but simultaneous operations, but it is the first
to apply them successfully— and universally.

Sappho's

poetic fragments and Homer's epics, all of which are in the
oral Greek tradition, unquestionably create characters who
emanate from the rhetorical triangle that links speaker,
listener, and spoken text.

But these characters function

primarily as representative, but textually unapproachable,
figures within their mythological worlds.

In his book

Sacred Discontent, Herbert Schneidau further assesses the
character of Sappho.

He says that she is "capable of

seeing herself as an individual— not in the fact that she
loves, but in the emotional turmoil it produces" (SjQ 260).
However, Schneidau suggests that Sappho's "seeing" does not
lead to self-examination, which would presumably, in turn
(if the rhetorical triangle were fully operational),
similarly provoke her listener.
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The metaphor of 11seeing," in Western thought, involves
more than the visual act.

As discussed in Chapter 2, it is

the predominant trope for knowing or understanding.

Hall

adds to Ong's idea that "in a field of sight there is
always a beyond or a beneath which is not seen" (IW 125).
He says that "what is 'seen' in the truest sense is not
what is seen with embodied eyes but with the introspective
'eyes of the mind'" (£JS 25).

Referring to perception as

the visibly objectified, Hall suggests that that which is
"beyond" or "beneath" can be approached only in the mind.
After the seer grasps, lays hold to, that which is beyond
the visual, he potentially gleans understanding as he
"sees" through the words of the writer.
Richard Jenkyns takes this discussion a step farther,
noting that for Sappho "there is nothing beyond the poem
itself.

Her poems state; they do not examine" fTCP 22).

She does not "see."

Because she does not see, she cannot

offer insight to her reader.

If the texts of this Greek

poet do not examine, then any voice that the listener
"overhears" is one confined within the text itself.

Such a

voice does not fully span the separation between speaker
and listener, inciting the listener to self-examination.

A

voice speaking from the text, a voice that compels the
reader to attention and then subsequently leads him to
self-examination, comes initially and most significantly in
the Hebrew writings of the Bible.

Certainly Homer's
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characters speak from their texts, but these larger-thanlife heroes of Herculean proportions negate the possibility
of a personal identification with those common mortals who
listen to their tales of superhuman valor.
In Total Presence. Thomas Altizer recognizes that
these epic heroes were some of the first to speak in a
text, but their speech was highly constricted:
While speech cannot be said to be primal or
ultimate in the Greek religious and mythical
traditions as such, it is so in the Homeric epics
and in Greek tragedy, and the historical coming
together of classical culture and the Bible in
Christendom can give us a decisive clue to
the unique identity and role of literature in the
Western tradition.
(T£ 1-2)
Although Homer and the Greek tragedians may have first
given the world speech that was "primal and ultimate,"
these writers did not initiate speech of critical selfexamination.

As Hall notes, theirs is not speech "that

impinges on our lives and demands to be reckoned with" (WS
72).

It does not force the individual to internalize, and

thus personalize, the words of the writer.

Because they do

not provide personal meaning, they do not "speak" to him in
his world.

The association between speaker, listener, and

text is present, but the relationship is a tentative one.
The Bible is the text that first profoundly bridges
the gap between speaker and listener.

When Isaiah, for

example, prophesies the mission of John the Baptist who
will herald the arrival of the Christ, we witness a self-
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alienation, an abandonment of self, which will become
characteristic of Western man— and of Western literature.
In The Birth to Presence. Jean-Luc Nancy discusses this
abandonment as that which God does for his people so that
his voice might be heard.

Filtering his ideas through

Hegel and Nietzsche and equating abandonment with a kind of
transcendental movement, he writes:
To abandon is to remit, entrust, or turn over to
such a sovereign power, and to remit, entrust, or
turn over to its ban, that is, to its
proclaiming, to its convening, and to its
sentencing.
(IE 44)
The text of the Bible, in part, relates the lives of
individuals who "abandon" themselves to God, and who, if
only temporarily, empty themselves of self and entrust
another, their Creator, to live and speak through them.
For that transcendent moment in time, they and their
Creator are one— in spiritual and intellectual communion.
Implicit in such an act of abandonment is love:
patriarchs and apostles abandoned themselves to God so as
to become spokesmen for him; God abandoned Jesus at the
cross so that his love could redeem humanity; Jesus
abandoned his followers and died a physical death to
accomplish the same end; and a reader abandons himself to
the text so that the words of another might create meaning
for him.

A death-in-life and life-in-death struggle

typifies abandonment, a struggle not unlike that which
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occurs in a reading process:

when a writer puts living,

spoken words to paper, he abandons or "kills'1 those words;
then, when a reader takes those words and makes meaning
from them, he resurrects or gives life to those dead words.
Although he does not refer specifically to the
rhetorical exercise, Nancy's discussion of love applies to
a similar abandonment that occurs in the reading
experience:
What 'the love of God' means is that love
alone abandons. What is not love can reject,
desert, forget, dismiss, discharge, but love
alone can abandon, and it is by the possibility
of abandonment that one knows the possibility,
inverted or lost, of love.
(BE 41)
The love herein described is caritas, a rejuvenating and
empowering love akin to agape, God's love.

Unlike eros or

cupiditas, both temporal forms of love, it is atemporal,
allowing for transcendence.

It is a love that overcomes

difference, that mends separation.
applied especially to the reader.

This passage can be
If he does not enter

into a text with a genuine love for knowledge, an earnest
desire to understand, he can quickly "reject, desert,
forget, dismiss, [or] discharge" the words of the writer.
But, as Augustine writes in The Trinity, a word
birthed in a love for textual mutuality has the potential
for dynamic consequences.

Allowing for both negative and

positive responses from a word "conceived in love,"
Augustine says,
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the word is born when that which is thought
pleases us, either for the purpose of committing
sin or of acting rightly. Love, therefore, as a
means, joins our word with the mind from which it
is born; and as a third it binds itself with them
in an incorporeal embrace, without any confusion.
(Trinity IX.viii)
Love seems incongruous with "committing sin," but Augustine
addresses this earlier in the same passage.

There, he

differentiates between "the word of the creature and the
word of the Creator."

One is changeable and subject to

corruption; the Other is unchangeable and allows for
redemption.

And the receptor determines his response,

negative or positive, to the words that he reads.

Only

when he abandons himself to the text, only when he entrusts
his mind to the "other," only when he submits himself to
the words of the author might he hope to achieve a
transcendent instant of understanding that will inspire him
for evil or for good.
The desire for good is that which motivates the
patriarchs of the Old Testament and the apostles of the New
Testament as they abandon themselves to "speak" the voice
of God, who is producer of the text.
affirms this premise.

The prophet Isaiah

Speaking of the forerunner of the

Christ, the Word-made-flesh, Isaiah says of John the
Baptist:

his will be the "voice of him that crieth in the

wilderness" (Isaiah 40:3).

His will be the textually

recorded voice that speaks directly to his listener,
calling for universal self-examination.

For the seeker of
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Christ, the ultimate purpose of self-examination is to
instruct him to repent from his wayward ways.

And that

repentance is to come through the Word of God, the eternal
logos that is incarnated in the world as God's own son.
Hall reminds us that the Christian logos is different
from that perceived by the pagan Greek community.

Neither

mere word nor "the dynamic act of speaking" nor "the
impersonal, rational, and static principle of cosmic order"
(WS 31-32), the Christian logos finds its roots in the
Hebraic dabhar, the spoken word as spirit.

The Hebrew

people placed the spoken word of Jehovah (Yahweh), which
was audible, dynamic, and life-altering, at the center of
their reality (WS 29).
was the great

God himself was "a speech-act."

He

"I am" who spoke

the world into existence.
In this picture God
not only creates the world with his word but also
sustains its continuity with it. Here everything
that exists, including the self, is pictured as
owing its existence to, and hence absolutely
dependent on, the creative and providential
dabhar of God. Here the paradigm of human action
is established: to act is to speak as God
speaks; in the act of speaking (dabhar) spirit
finds its decisive expression in man. This
spirit is pneuma, spirit as 'the breath of
speech.' Spirit as pneuma . . . must be sharply
distinguished from spirit as psyche, spirit as
the natural order of the cosmos.
It is precisely
spirit as pneuma that Christianity first posited.
In the Christian world-picture a radically
transcendent spirit becomes radically immanent in
the world: the dabhar— and not the logos becomes
flesh.
(WS 30)
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Because of its pneumatic and transcendent quality, word as
spirit is that ontological means through which humanity
might come to understand self in the linear span of time.
As a reader of, and a player in, the narrative of humanity,
he can look to the words inscribed in the Biblical text to
see where he stands in relation to his world .(and to others
in it) and to his Creator.

As Hall suggests, it opens up

an "awesome realm of possibility and contingency" (HS 31).
The Bible, specifically the New Testament as it
exposes Christianity to the world, is the first and
certainly the most significant written text that presents
the Word, the Hebraic Logos (dabhar), as a character who
dominates the story and who inspires both the writer in his
composition and the reader in his perusal of that created
text.

This is, and once more I quote Hall, the
word that provides a transhistorical ground to
the historical. Again, this is not the
ahistorical ground of the Greek logos, but the
temporally unfolding intentional and subjective
ground of dabhar; here the real is grounded in a
speaker whose words bring the world forth and
whose steadfast fidelity holds it together
through time.
In this biblical picture, human beings,
created in the image of God, are vested with the
power of the speech-act and hence with the power
to call the world forth in its full actuality
and to sustain it as such. . . . That is, human
beings are not called to create actuality from
nothing, rather, they are called to actualize
actuality.
(HS 127)

While the New Testament may have continued the Greek
emphasis upon logos (which can mean word or speech, or the
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meaning or structure of either), it meaningfully expands
and, as Hall recognizes, "grounds” the role of voice.
Voice is actualized in the person of Jesus Christ.

Both in

and prior to time, the Christian logos is spirit and voice,
method and matter.
Altizer addresses this issue of spirit and voice in
his discussion of the parabolic language of Jesus.
Plotting speech along a historical time-line, he describes
it as moving from that of limited participation between
interlocutors (that espoused by Plato and his
contemporaries) to that which is "primal" (that of Homer
and the Greek tragedians) to that which is "actualized"
(that spoken within the text by a character whose identity
then reaches outward to the reader).
uses the term "actualized."

Like Hall, Altizer

He, too, recognizes that

speech assumes a different role with the advent of
Christianity.

To paraphrase and further expand Altizer's

argument, we could say that speech thus assumes a new
character.

Specifically it becomes a character, one who is

"actualized" within the text:
Nothing quite like this was previously present in
either Greece or Israel, for only with the birth
of Christianity does a speech appear and sound
which is simultaneously praxis and voice.
Christian anamnesis is not mere remembrance or
recollection, it is rather a renewal or re
presentation of an identity which is originally
act and voice at once.

(IE 5)
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Underscoring a critical tenet of Christianity, Altizer
succinctly explains the role of Jesus within the biblical
text while also explaining the,.provocative role of the New
Testament.
To state Altizer's premise in theological terms, Jesus
as the eternal logos is both the message (praxis) and the
messenger (voice).

He is both the Word and the means

whereby that word finds utterance.
utterance is the New Testament.

And the avenue for that

Departing from Homeric

epics and Greek tragedies which provide "a mere remembrance
or recollection" of characters within an action, the
Christian text espouses "a renewal or re-presentation of an
identity," namely the identity of Jesus Christ, the
incarnated Son of God.

Successful textual communication

is, in great part, determined by the voice that speaks from
the text to the reader.

If that voice succeeds, it

functions in a unique way:

it intrudes into the inner

sanctum of the individual.
Richard Kroner argues that "Christianity interfered
much more seriously with the inner life of a man than Greek
religion had ever done" (SR 16).

Perhaps nothing better

exemplifies this interference than the life of St.
Augustine.

Although Augustine lived and wrote almost four

centuries after the advent of Christianity, his
autobiographical writings dramatically depict this
spiritual interference.

Because of the extensive and
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highly descriptive account of his personal struggles,
especially in his Confessions. we see the various stages of
Augustine's response to the voice that reaches out to him
from the biblical text.

In his autobiography, Augustine

plots his struggle with the voice that would have him
become a Christian.

Responding to that "actual actuality"

(God Incarnate), he first rebels against the voice, living
a life of debauchery and becoming a member of the Manichean
sect.

Then he ignores the voice, seeking life's answers

through philosophy.

Ultimately he can no longer disregard

the "meddling" voice that projects from the biblical text,*
as a consequence, Augustine's life is permanently altered
as he finally succumbs to the voice, yielding himself to
the priesthood.

His response to that dominant voice

suggests that speech emanating from the Biblical text is
quite different from its predecessors.

It is a voice which

not only allows but forcefully demands participation from
its hearers (readers).
A beneficial adjunct to this dynamic activity is that
the Christ, who is "spoken" through the text, works as a
positive force in the individual.

Allowing spiritual

movement into that which is beyond the printed word, Hall
tells us that Christian
Speech provides us with resources for situating
ourselves within a world and with the resources
for stabilizing our existence within historical
continuity. And it is able to provide this
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stability within immanence without robbing us of
our dynamic transcendence.
(WS 53)
This transcendence, effected through the words in the text,
allows the individual to "see" the spirit, which is self,
in relation to spirit, which is other, and to Spirit, which
is Other.

In "'Narrative' in Christian and Modern

Reading," Hans W. Frei refers to this act as "the
disclosing power" of the text ("NCMR" 159).
active, and capable of mediating.

It is dynamic,

The written text, in a

way precluded by the spoken word, allows the reader to
internalize thought, to suspend it in his mind, to return
to it time and again if necessary so as to apprehend its
meaning.
These dynamic, concrete, and provocative operations
within the rhetorical triangle of Bible/God/Christian
depart significantly from those espoused by Greek rhetors
of the classical age.

Although it claims to be powerful,

Christian mediation between author and reader does not
presume to be the result of Eros, magic, sorcery, or the
physical penetration of the word through the ear.

The

textual logos of Christianity does not assume materiality;
it thus opposes the Gorgian theory of the materiality of
both word and soul.

It also negates the premise that the

rhetorical exchange is a psychic or physical experience,
one that Gorgias compares to Paris' rape of Helen (Encomium
on Helen).

Neither is it comparable to Plato's form of
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logos which creates a hegemonic relationship between the
more knowledgeable older speaker and his willing, but
inexperienced interlocutor.

Plato may presume to establish

a rhetorical relationship that reciprocates between speaker
and listener, but in actuality he creates a hierarchical
exchange.

The dominance may be subtle as the speaker

guides his listener, but it nevertheless determines the
structure of the discourse.
in Christian rhetoric.

Such dominance is non-existent

Assuming a radically different

rhetorical stance, Christianity eliminates the dominant
aspect of the logos that is found in Greek dialogue.

In

its stead, it creates a rhetoric in which the logos
produces full reciprocity between author and reader.
In his text Biblical Religion and the Search for
Ultimate Reality, Paul Tillich explains this fundamental
concept of Christian logos, the basic concept that
distinguishes it from its Greek counterpart:
Man is asked to listen, but he is left free to
decline. He is not supposed to be overpowered by
the word, as in sorcery, where the word is used
as a physical cause, or in magic, where the word
is used as a psychic cause, or in suggestive
talk, where the word is used as an emotional
cause. These uses of the word are possible,
but they eliminate the essence of the word, its
quality as the bearer of meaning.
(BE 32)
Success of the Christian logos is totally dependent upon
the will and receptivity of the individual.

Specifically,

its success is radically contingent upon the individual.
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The Biblical text appeals directly to the human intellect,
to that part of the individual that seeks to understand
himself in relation to his universe and his creator.
Through a dialogic interchange with the author, the reader
can hope to find meaning for his personal life.

He may not

fully conclude his ontological search, but he can at least
ease some of his concerns about his being.
Though not provocative in the sexual sense, the
Christian logos is highly provocative as God, producer <pf
the text, seeks to inspire, to move his readers to an
understanding of world, Creator, and self.

Robert McMahon

addresses this issue in Augustine/s Prayerful Ascent.
Analyzing the roles of the players involved in the
rhetorical triangle of God/Logos/Christian, he writes:
Interpreting Scripture involves seeking God's
voluntas, the intention or desire that stands at
the origin of his words, as of all communication.
That search is to be conducted by means of the
voluntas of Moses, the inspired scriptor of
Genesis, and these related voluntates are
approached through the verba of the sacred text.
Interpreting Scripture, thus, clearly involves a
return to origins: movement from material signs
to the divine voluntas at the origin of the text.
fAPA 131)
Voluntas, in its rigidly defined state, is selfishness or
self-loving.

As McMahon applies it, however, it becomes

the intention or desire of the writer to effect meaning
through his text.

In either its pejorative or non-

pejorative sense, voluntas (for vain reasons of self
perpetuation or for more honorable reasons of perpetuation
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of knowledge) is essential in the writing process.

But, on

the opposite side of the text, the reader also must exhibit
voluntas, a desire to gain meaning.

It is personal

voluntas that incites the individual to probe the text,
sacred or secular, so as to glean understanding.
This activity, exegesis of the Christian text and
hermeneutics of the secular text, affirms the absent
presences of writer, speaker, and reader.

And those absent

presences,

as they operate in and through the New

Testament,

will be my focus for the remainder

chapter.

of this

To understand and to ground their origins, we

first must look to that which precedes the Christian text.
The Old Testament, a preamble to the New, lays the
foundation

for the spiritual and literaryoperation of the

absent presence in the New Testament.

As the Old Testament

describes Jehovah or Yahweh, God who is pure spirit, it
also foreshadows his spirit which would take on
physicality.

Conceived of a virgin, this spirit-made-flesh

would be both presence and speech (pneuma):
So shall my word be that goeth forth out of my
mouth; it shall not return unto me void, but it
shall accomplish that which I please, and it
shall prosper in the thing whereto I sent it.
(Isaiah 55:11)
This dual activity of God's Word (both presence and speech)
required a means whereby it could accomplish its task of
establishing direct communication and thus restoring
relationship between God and man.

In order for this
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physical/audible sign of God's Word in his created world to
become known to mankind, a medium necessarily had to be
provided through which God's spirit could be made manifest.
The New Testament becomes that medium.

It is the textual

"stage*' through which God places himself, in the form of
Jesus, as a literary character within the history of
creation.
The Old Testament provides us with only limited
examples of man interacting with God's text, his word.
Even then the rhetorical triangle is skewed, picturing God
as the omniscient/omnipotent/omnipresent Jehovah and man as
his tentative interlocutor who seldom dares to pose a
question to his Deity.

And when he does dare, as with Job,

he fears possible annihilation.

Although conversations are

recorded between God and Adam, God and Abraham, God and
Moses, God and Job, and God and the prophets, the tenor of
the rhetorical situations is that of the powerful speaker
addressing the powerless listener.

In the Old Testament,

we see virtually no empowerment of the listener.
Repeatedly, God's word passes through his spokesmen to his
chosen people without permanently transforming hearts of
rebelliousness into a people of faith.

The Israelite

nation follows God's text of obedience for a time; then
they stray into flagrant disobedience, blatantly
disregarding the words of Jehovah.

Because of their

stubborn, "stiff-necked" ways, their communication with God
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is broken and one-sided

(Exodus 32:9, 33:3, 34:9 and

Deuteronomy 9:6, 13; 10:16).

Obstinately refusing to

follow God, they deprive themselves of the potential power
that is theirs as Jehovah's

chosen people if they would

only adhere to his word.
A foreshadowing of the
empowerment of the listener

Christianrhetorical
begins to

emerge in the Greek

texts of Plato (especially Phaedrus and The RepublicT r
becoming even more evident in Aristotle's On Rhetoric.

As

these texts suggest the absent presence within the
hegemonic relationship between speaker and listener, they
span the gulf between the Old and New Testaments.

Not only

do they highlight man's growing contemplation of himself as
an integral player within his personal world, but (as my
second chapter details) they also point to the emergence of
an absent presence within the rhetorical text between
author and reader.
The rhetorical and philosophical concerns of Greek
society did not die with the advent of Christianity.
the contrary.

Quite

Early Christian writers took the existing

modes of thought and practice and adapted them to their
tenets of belief.

A case can certainly be made that early

Christian writers infused existing Greek philosophy with
their revealed insights, irrevocably wedding the two.

As

Richard Kroner argues in Speculation and Revelation in the
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Aae of Christian Philosophy. "Philosophy and religion are
intimately related" because both focus on
the same ultimate issues: God, man, and the
universe. Consequently, no matter how devious
their approach, philosophy and religion in the
past either have overlapped or have been opposed
in respect to the same ultimate goals. Complete
union is impossible, but like Hero and Leander,
they also cannot resist embracing.
(SE 13)
And the texts that arise from philosophy and religion also
"embrace" or overlap, each influencing the other either
negatively or positively.

Judeo-Christian treatises often

reflect or question ideas of Greek thought just as Greek
writings frequently suggest or contradict some concerns of
Judeo-Christian beliefs.

A given text is not created in

isolation; neither does it' exist in isolation.
David Klemm, in "The Autonomous Text, the
Hermeneutical Self, and Divine Rhetoric," comments on this
quality of the written word:
The text is not reducible to the thoughts
inscribed within, nor to the materiality of the
individual object. Every text engrafts other
texts and is in turn grafted onto other texts.
("AT" 6)
If an author has read previous texts and if his text is
subsequently read, ideas between those texts conflate or
contradict, confirm or deny.
Bible.

The same is true for the

Most Christians generally accept that "all

scripture is given by inspiration" (2 Timothy 3:16),
although theological views do differ on exactly how this
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inspiration came to man who lived and wrote in a decidedly
Greek intellectual milieu.
The authorial task would necessarily be formidable.
Not only would these writers have to situate God in
history, they would also have to verify his being.

Unlike

Plato who could develop an abstract philosophy that defies
proof, these writers (especially those of the New
Testament) were commissioned to present God not as a shadow
but as a reality— a living, breathing, omniscient,
omnipotent, omnipresent, spiritual essence who interacts
with his creation.

Platonic philosophy had, without

universal success, attempted to answer the questions: "What
is true?" and "What is real?"

The closest this

philosophical enterprise came to resolving the issues of
truth and being was to outline a complex program of True
Being through which only a privileged few, namely
philosophers who devoted their lives to the pursuit of
knowledge, might ever achieve the source of ultimate truth
and discernible reality

(Republic^.

The difficulty with Plato's theory of True Being is
that it depicts truth, being, and reality as highly
nebulous concepts, existing only in the minds of
philosophers.

New Testament writers could not espouse such

theoretical beliefs because they were writing for the
understanding and the acceptance of all— not the
privileged, educated few.

They thus confronted the
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enigmatic task of textually proving a spirituality, of
proving beyond doubt (at least to those who would be
receptive) the reality of God.

To do this, their text

necessarily had to affirm the existence of God through the
death of Jesus, the power of the Spirit as it supplants the
powerlessness of the Christian.

Such is the mystery and

paradox of Western literature that is "structured in terms
of dichotomies or polarities:

good vs. evil, being vs.

nothingness, presence vs. absence, truth vs. error"
(Johnson vii) and illusion vs. reality.

New Testament

writers necessarily had to address the question of illusion
or reality if they were to convince their readers of the
existence of their God.

Therein lay their monumental task.

Like Plato before them, the New Testament writers would
have to confront the question: "What is real?"

But unlike

him, they would have to validate their answer.

In doing

so, they necessarily would, as Ong writes in The Presence
of the Word, "encounter a paradox" (171).

According to

Ong, this paradox results from the binary operation of the
objective and subjective senses.
Aristotle's writings suggest that he was aware of
these binary operations:

a student of scientific and

empirical knowledge, he heralds happiness, an arbitrarily
subjective emotion, as the ultimate goal of human action
(Rhetoric 1.5).

Aristotle may have sought to rationalize

the paradox between the objective and the subjective, the

99
physical and the spiritual, even though his extant texts do
not fully substantiate such an assumption.

He, like Plato,

focused his attention on language in the field of
philosophy— on rhetoric, on that "faculty of observing the
possibly persuasive concerning anything at all" (Gellrich
243).

As a result, his corpus also lacks a verbal program

that offers proof to the questioning individual that he can
hope to find a practical knowledge of self in his relation
to world and Other.
Proof, as Aristotle's empirical training would have
taught him, generally arises from objective observation,
but "spiritual proof" defies objective observation, thus
making the term itself an oxymoron.

Because of the highly

subjective nature of anything that is spiritual, anything
that is beyond tactile determination, the New Testament
writers sought to accomplish that which Plato and Aristotle
could not:

to overcome the paradox between the objective

and the subjective.

In affirming the subjective through

the objective, they set out to prove the existence of a
spiritual God through the physical life, death, and
resurrection of his Son.

Scripture in the King James text

provides neither a definition nor a discussion of "real."
Cruden's Complete Concordance does not even list the word
"real" as occurring in the King James version of the Bible.
The New International Version, which is offered as a
closer translation of the original Hebrew, Aramaic and
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Greek texts, does include "real," most notably in words
that Jesus uses to describe himself.

The original Greek

word alethes, which means "real, true, truth, actual," can
be found in two verses in the gospel of John that relate to
transubstantiation, the physical assuming the spiritual and
vice versa:
Jesus said to them, 'I tell you the truth,
it is not Moses who has given you the bread from
heaven, but it is my Father who gives you the
true bread from heaven. For the bread of heaven
is he who comes down from heaven and gives life
to the world.
(HIV John 6:32-33)
and
For my flesh is real food, and my blood is
real drink.
(HIV John 6:55)
Writers of New Testament scripture view the reality of God
asa given:

the words of Jesus are life-sustaining, the

"true bread from heaven," and his blood is real blood that
coursed through the veins of the one who spoke to them.
In pondering this issue and seeking to allay all doubt
concerning the Godhead, Augustine determines:
But God is without doubt a substance, or
perhaps essence would be a better term, which the
Greeks call
ousia. For
just as wisdom is so
called from
being wise,
and knowledge is so
called from
knowing, so
essence is so called from
being [esse].
(Trinity v.ii)
Through the process of deductive reasoning, Augustine seeks
to rationalize the existence of God:

God is because

humanity observes and personally validates the effects of
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his being.

Unlike the passage quoted in Chapter 2 where

Burke analogizes being and essence through the Easter
Bunny, Augustine grounds God, giving his being verifiable
substance, ousia.

That substance manifests itself through

the lives of those who respond to his Word, allowing it to
make and shape their reality.

For writers of the New

Testament, for Augustine three centuries later, and for
individuals today, reality is that which they witness or
experience; it is that which personally impacts their
lives.

Reality is thus personal and subjective, but it can

be grounded objectively.
In The Presence of the Word. Ong outlines a method for
determining those grounds; he explains how an individual
might know that which is "real.'1 While it parallels the
one used by writers of the New Testament, Ong's method also
echoes Augustine's discussion of ousia, a verifiable
essence:
When I say real, something existing outside my
own consciousness of it, something out there and
in this sense objective, I do not actually mean
existing with no relationship to me. Because my
concept of reality is tied up with the sense of
touch, it is also tied up with my sense of my own
being.
'Real' means, in this way, not just
something out there but something that I am
involved in and that is involved in me (or, by
extension, something that I could be involved in
or that could be involved in me). The objective
reality of something is in this way measured by
one's own subjective awareness (as caught in the
sense of touch), not merely by something out
there but rather by something out there
interacting with something in here.
(EW 171)
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If we define real, then, as that which can be proved both
objectively (impersonally existing outside the individual
consciousness) and subjectively (personally affecting the
individual consciousness), the New Testament writers
proceeded to prove the reality of God both objectively and
subjectively.

The four gospels record the life, death, and

resurrection of Jesus, the Christ, objectively placing him
in a historical context.

The remainder of the New

Testament successively records the residual effects
resulting from that life, death, and resurrection.
Although these residual effects are highly subjective, they
are recorded as unmistakably life-altering events for those
who encountered the Living Word.
We cannot overlook the fact that the New Testament
writers who recorded these events lived in a particular
part of the world during a particular time with particular
social mores, particular philosophical and spiritual
questions, and particular rhetorical styles.

Although

early Christians may have engaged in a refutation rather
than a corroboration of Greek beliefs, an inescapable
infusion of philosophical Greek overtones finds its way
into Scripture.

This recognizable infusion does not

necessarily dilute the accepted tenets of Christianity, but
it does affirm that Scripture is the physical product of a
particular time in history, a time that witnessed the
movement from esoteric philosophy to applied religion, the
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movement from an oral to a textually scripted culture.
Inherent in that move was the potential for the concrete,
physical, and audible logos (dabhar) to supplant the
abstract, universal logos.
Kroner recognizes an obvious distinction between the
abstract and the concrete, between "ancient speculation and
Christian revelation'1 (SB 15)/ but he also argues that
"undoubtedly there is a striking kinship evident in the
speculative idealism of Plato and the revealed faith of
Christianity" (SB 24).

He even describes Plato's republic

as religious in character.

"Such a community is, according

to our language, no longer a state; it is what we call a
church" (SB 26).

Because Plato's ideal state is "a picture

of the 'best life' that man could and should love," Kroner
determines that the philosopher's community, though devoid
of faith and revelation, has an "unmistakably religious
character" (SB 25).
Kroner concludes that the objectives of church and
ideal state are similar:

the pursuit of wisdom, truth,

highest good, and happiness.

What distinguishes the two is

that one functions through faith and revelation and the
other through intellect and speculation.

Even if Kroner

does not succeed in convincing us that Plato's ideal state
is a church, part of his argument is valid:

at least one

aspect of Plato's idealism is worked out in Christian
thought.

Specifically, Christianity proposed the solution
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to Plato's conundrum of man, his creator, and the role of
each in the universe.

Christianity moved man from Plato's

confusing, enigmatic world of shadow to Jehovah's faithcentered, revelatory world of concreteness, a concretenesswith-God-in-it.

By incarnating himself as the Word in the

form of physical man, God enabled man to validate not only
his own existence but the existence of a Prime Mover, the
instigator and preserver of creation.
The action culminating in God's incarnation was
necessarily complex and would involve all three persons of
the Trinity:

God the Father, the omnipresent spirituality?

God the Son, his omniscient physical presence in the form
of man; and God the Spirit, his omnipresent absent presence
who is presumed available to all of mankind.

This same-

but-different quality of God confuses many who seek to
understand the Trinity.
in this struggle.

Augustine is numbered among those

Attempting to explain it in terms of

himself, he says:
For I am, and I know, and I will.
I am a knowing
and a willing being; I know that I am and that I
will; and I will to be and to know.
In these
three functions, therefore, let him who can see
how integral a life is; for there is one life,
one mind, one essence. Finally, the distinction
does not separate the things, and yet it is a
distinction.
(Confessions XIII.xi)
Through his training in philosophical analysis, Augustine
could, at least occasionally in moments of divine
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inspiration, come to terms with those seemingly
inexplicable, faith-demanding aspects of Christianity.
Many fundamental purveyors of Christian doctrine after
the time of Augustine, however, came to doubt the
usefulness of Greek philosophy; they even came to fear the
consequences of the same philosophical musings that had
aided Aristotle in his understanding of Scripture.

Some

•'Christian philosophers disdained Greek speculation
altogether.

This speculation finally acknowledged that it

could not establish any sure knowledge out of itself"
(Kroner, Sfi 103).

Doing a tremendous injustice to

theological hermeneutics, those vehement critics of
philosophical speculation failed to recognize that "the New
Testament was not only written in a Hellenistic atmosphere,
but [that it] was definitely influenced by Greek ideas and
concepts" (Kroner, Sg 20).

We need to look no farther than

to the most prolific writer of the New Testament to find
the greatest evidence for this fact.

Saul, whose Christian

name was Paul, the writer of thirteen of the twenty-seven
books of the New Testament, typifies the amalgamation of
the cultures of his time.

This amalgamation necessarily

influenced Paul's reception of God's words to him while
subsequently determining his presentation of God's words to
his readers.
A Roman citizen by virtue of his birthplace, Saul, a
Hebrew, spent his early years in the Greek city of Tarsus,
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which "was the home of a philosophical school, a university
town, where the intellectual atmosphere was colored by
Greek thought"

( Zondervan

828).

Although there are no

records showing that Paul, who was a tent-maker by
profession, received a formal education while in Tarsus, we
can assume that he was at least exposed to the concept of
higher education.

We do know, however, that he studied

Hebrew "at the feet of Gamaliel," the most prominent
Pharisee of first-century Judaism (Acts 22:3).
The Interpreter's Bible further describes Gamaliel as
a personification of the elder statesman. His
counsel is one of wise restraint. Do nothing for
the time being. Wait. See what happens.
If the
[Christian] movement is bad, God will destroy it.
If it is good, no one will be able to destroy it.
He is a perfect instance of the moderating
influence of the judicial mind.
Gamaliel and his kind might be called wellbalanced people. They see both sides of a
situation. They are able to stand apart from it
and look at it with dispassion.
(86 )
According to this description, Gamaliel was a practitioner
of the dissoi logoi, a common Greek exercise in which the
rhetor sought to understand and then argue both sides of an
issue.

As a Jewish Pharisee, Gamaliel may not have argued

the case for Christianity, but his wait-and-see attitude
suggests that he inculcated the practice of the dissoi
logoi among his students, not the least of whom was Saul.
If indeed Saul was instructed in this skill, we might view
his Damascus Road experience as a logical movement into the
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more convincing argument.

Rather than a "sudden"

revelation, his conversion experience might have been the
rational culmination of a long period of philosophical and
spiritual debate between Christianity and Judaism.
In Saul's day, Gamaliel and his Pharisaical sect
performed similarly to the Greek philosophers of Socrates'
day.

They lived their lives in search for the truth

concerning God, man, and world.

Instead of debating in the

Forum or the Acropolis, though, they conversed in the
Temple (Z 298, 627-31).

If Saul, the Greek, studied in

this philosophical milieu, then we must conclude that Paul,
the Christian, incorporates a similar mode of thinking into
his New Testament epistles.

But Paul radically departs

from pure philosophy, overlaying its speculation with what
he describes as revealed faith, a faith that he argues was
indisputably and personally revealed to him on the Damascus
road (Acts 9).

As Paul records his experience, which is

his personal validation of God-in-the-world, he employs the
rhetorical techniques of his Greek-centered society.
In his brief but informative text Rhetoric and the New
Testament f Burton L. Mack convincingly places all of the
writings of Paul, and of the entire New Testament, in the
historical context of the classical Greco-Roman world.
Mack's thesis is that the Christian text follows many of
the rhetorical practices that were developed in the
philosophical era of the Hellenistic period.

As he focuses
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on specific passages from the New Testament, analyzing
their content and structure according to Greek rhetorical
paradigms, Mack shows how all of the New Testament writers
were unabashed practitioners of persuasion.
Although these Christian writers may have blurred the
distinguishing parameters of judicial, deliberative, or
epideictic speeches as outlined by Aristotle, Mack observes
that they nevertheless retain the vestiges of Greek
rhetoric:
Early Christian rhetoric was a distinctively
mixed bag in which every form of rhetorical issue
and strategy was frequently brought to bear
simultaneously in an essentially extravagant
persuasion.
Thus the occurrence of traditional
patterns of argumentation may not always be a
firm basis upon which to judge the intention of a
speech. . . . In general, early Christian
rhetoric was deliberative in the sense that
every aspect of the new persuasion (including the
imagination of founder figures and founding
events, beliefs, behavior, and the adjudications
of social issues) had to be approached as a
matter of policy that would determine the future
of (membership in) the community.

(ENT 35)
Like Plato, the Judeo-Christian world disdained sophistic
eloquence, condemning the "eloquent orator" (Isaiah 3:3)
and re-educating the "eloquent man" Apollos "in the way of
the Lord" (Acts 18:24).

The "way of the Lord," what Mack

refers to as Christian "policy," is presented clearly and
logically (albeit sometimes parabolically) in order to
appeal to the masses of interested listeners, to those
willing interlocutors who would be receptive to the Word.
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The clear and logical presentation certainly harks
back to Plato and Aristotle, but Christian policy radically
broadens the scope of its rhetorical audience, claiming to
speak to every man, to each individually, in his specific
circumstance or situation.

Additionally, it assumes the

character of an applied philosophy, one that addresses man
in his personal world and shows him in relation to his
creator.

Christian philosophy thus positions itself as the

answer to Plato's questions concerning man, creator, and
universe.

It would seem, then, that those critics who

disavow the link between philosophy and religion ignore New
Testament textual evidences that cannot otherwise be
explained, and they also overlook a substantive link that
can be found in the last book of the Old Testament, the
book that bridges the gap between Judaism and Christianity.
Malachi (5th century B.C.), the author of the book
which bears his name, was a contemporary of Socrates,
although it cannot be established that the two actually
met.

Nevertheless, Malachi's writing suggests that he was

well-acquainted with the style of his Greek counterpart.
His book is presented in the Socratic method, a dialectic
between the speaker, God, and his interlocutor, Malachi,
who represents the nation of Israel.

The book seeks to

establish a dialogue, a dialogue of faith and commitment
between God and his disillusioned and repetitively "stiff
necked" and errant people.

Of those who had recently
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returned from Babylonian captivity, only the faithful
remnant, the few who "feared the Lord spoke often to one
another" of God's call to commitment (Malachi 3:16).

But

even these faithful few were not yet ready to hear the Word
because the kairos, the right time, had not yet come.

They

were not yet prepared to meet God in their world and
establish a personal relationship with him.
From Malachi's writing in the Old Testament to the
time of Matthew's writing in the New Testament, roughly 435
years lapsed during which God was, as far as Scripture
indicates, silent.

Writers of The Bible and History refer

to these years as the "intertestamental period" (155).
Ironically, it was the period during which man first became
notably vocal in his search for understanding of himself,
his creator, and his world— the ontological search for
ultimate meaning and reality.

Greek learning reached its

pinnacle during this time, expanding its influence beyond
Greece to the rest of the civilized world, and especially
to Rome.

Historians and theologians alike recognize that

"the full impact of Hellenism [was] felt among the Jews"
during this "intertestamental period" (BH 165).

And it was

in the Roman province of Palestine (or Judah, in the Old
Testament) that God chose to break his silence and propel
his Word into the midst of humanity.
The idea of the divine Logos breaking the
silence of God is very profound.
It means that
the divine abyss in itself is without word, form,
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object, and voice.
It is the infinite silence of
the eternal.
But out of this divine silence, the
Logos breaks forth and opens up what is hidden in
this silence. He reveals the divine ground.
(Tillich, H£I 22)
According to Tillich's analysis, this "divine ground" is
that which also grounds humanity; it is that which answers
the ontological ruminations of mankind.

The Greek concept

of the universal "logos" could not adequately encompass the
paradoxical ramifications of the eternal Logos.

The term,

therefore, underwent a necessary transformation since
"Logos is a universal principle, whereas Jesus is a
concrete reality.

His is a concrete personal life

described by this term.
paradox of Christianity:

This is expressed in the great
the Logos became flesh" fHCT 15).

The abstract logos thus manifest itself through the
concrete Jesus Christ.

This complicated intrusion of God

into his world set into motion the essential mediation that
had been lacking between man and his creator.

Through his

Mediator, the Christ who is his Word, God invites man to
engage in a dialogic exchange, an exchange that will
necessarily demand something from the listener/reader.
According to Augustine in his Enchiridionf that demand
is belief in the "statement that 'the Word became flesh and
dwelt among us,' so that we should then believe in 'the
only Son of God the Father Almighty, born of the Holy
Spirit and Mary the Virgin.'"

As Augustine continues his

handbook to the Christian, he argues that such a demand is
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not too difficult if man realizes that when the “Word was
made flesh, the flesh being [was] assumed by the Divinity,
not [that] the Divinity being [was] changed into flesh”
(Enchiridion X).

In a unique way God imparted his Spirit

into human form, thus creating physical, spiritual, and
verbal mediation between himself and man.

In its

proclamation of an interceding logos which "became flesh,"
Christian theology parts company with Greek philosophy.
The Logos is no longer a matter of speculation; it is a
matter of revelation.

As a result of this period of

kairos, Greek philosophy and its ancient world begin a
downward spiral which will lead to their demise.
The revealed Christ, the Incarnate Word, does not
specifically operate as a character in the Old Testament,
although subtle suggestions are made of His existence
(along with that of the Holy Spirit) as early as Genesis
1:26:

"And God said, Let us make man in our image, after

our likeness."

The pronoun "our" suggests that the Trinity

existed before recorded time and that all three (God the
Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit) were present
during the creation of world and man:

"In the beginning

was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was
God.

The same was in the beginning with God" (John 1:1-2).

Gerard Loughlin likewise argues, "Precisely as the figure
who meets us in the New Testament, Jesus the Christ is
already prefigured in the Old" ("MP" 100).
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In his Confessions

f

Augustine ponders this complex

issue, this "enigma11 of the Trinity.

He comes to exclaim

in revelatory insight:
See now, how the Trinity appears to me in an
enigma. And thou art the Trinity, 0 my God,
since thou, 0 Father— in the beginning of our
wisdom, that is, in thy wisdom born of thee,
equal and coeternal with thee, that is, thy Son—
created the heaven and the earth.
(XIII.v)
Augustine, the philosopher/teacher/theologian admits that
the concept of a Triune God is confusing, but he argues
that understanding is made possible through the wisdom that
God gives to man if he willingly enters into a rhetorical
exchange with his creator.

The implication is that

knowledge begets greater knowledge as man submerges himself
in dialogue with God.

Knowledge of God, universe, and self

increases through a kind of hermeneutical spiral as man
submits his intellect to the wisdom of God.
Like

the poet in Yeats' "The Tower," man ascends to

ever-enlightening levels of understanding; but unlike the
poet who finds "decay" and "dull decrepitude" or "worse
evil" at the top, the Christian finds hope for eternity.
As he continues to engage God's text, which is the New
Testament, man will learn that the Son, the one who becomes
the Word in the New Testament, is further described as the
head of creation, the one who "made the worlds" (Hebrews
1 :2 ):
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For by him were all things created, that are in
heaven, and that are in earth, visible and
invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions,
or principalities, or powers— all things were
created by him and for him.
(Colossians 1:16)
As John continues his account of creation in the first book
of his gospel, he likewise credits Christ, the Incarnate
Word of God, as the sculptor of the universe and the life
therein:

"All things were made by him; and without him was

not anything made that was made" (1:3).

Jesus Christ, the

Word, the eternal Logos, then assumes the unique role of
both Creator and created as we view him as the one who not
only made the worlds but who then becomes an integral
player, if you will, within the story of his own creation,
specifically within the New Testament story of his personal
relationship with mankind.
Scripture then becomes "a moment in God's own reading
of his own life.

It is because the Bible is in this sense

God's own reading of himself and his action, God's reading
of his own story, his dealings with the world" (Loughlin
104).

God's Word is thus two-fold:

it is a rhetorical

text that unites God (author) to his reader (Christian),
and it is also God's Son, a character within that text.
The rhetorical triangle (author, reader, text) thus
branches out into another triangle, the literary triangle
comprised of author, text, and character.

As a character

who has enabled the writer to present his message (Jesus
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willingly died on the cross so that God's story could be
told), the eternal Word likewise empowers the text, whose
consequent purpose is to empower the willing interlocutor,
the Christian who embraces the Word.
This embracing the Word is a significant departure
from the stance in the Old Testament which repeatedly warns
that man could not approach God; he could not look upon the
face of God.

"And he said, Thou canst not see my face, for

there shall no man see me and live" (Exodus 33:20).

If man

does encounter God in the Old Testament, God's presence is
camouflaged.

When God gives the ten commandments on Mt.

Sinai, Moses meets him in a cloud which shields the
presence of Jehovah:

"Lo, I come unto thee in a thick

cloud, that the people may hear when I speak with thee"
(Exodus 19:9).

Later when the Israelites wander through

the wilderness, God's presence is as a pillar of cloud by
day and a pillar of fire by night (Nehemiah 9:19).
With the advent of Christianity, man not only can look
upon the absent, but very real presence of God, but he can
also converse with him:

the Word speaking the words of God

directly to man.
The New Testament goes even farther than the
Old in what it makes of the word.
It presents
the word of God as even more the center of its
teaching, announcing that the Word was made flesh
and dwelt, a Person, among us. As is the case in
no other religion, the Word is here the proper
name of a person, the Son of God, himself God.
(Ong, m
13)
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Christ as teacher of God's Word, like Plato and Cicero,
lived in a predominantly oral culture, and the New
Testament as a written text grew out of his oral
performance.

Because of this unlikely orator, who wore the

practical cloak and girdle of a carpenter rather than the
luxurious mantle of a philosopher, God's 435-year silence
was broken.

Speaking simply but convincingly, he

established a new order of communication between God and
man; in so doing, he also created an additional element,
the absent presence of himself, to effect communication
between writer and reader.
God supplanted his silence of four centuries with his
absent presence, first in the form of Jesus, the Christ,
and later in the form of the Holy Spirit.

Absent presence

is not the same as full presence (parousia).

For God to be

fully present would be for him to negate his own existence
as the great nI Am" which was before, and now, and evermore
(Revelations 1:18).

Altizer explains why God's presence on

earth is not parousia.

He argues that God

cannot be totally present, and cannot be finally
present, for to be finally and totally present
would be to cease to be before and above.
Moreover, it is the transcendent identity of God
which realizes itself in consciousness as the God
who is beyond, who is wholly other, and wholly
other and beyond every possible form of identity
or consciousness.
(IE 52)
Man's finitude prevents him from identifying with God "who
is wholly other."

Another means had to be implemented
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through which man might penetrate the infinitude of God.
That means was the Christ, God-in-the-world.

Ong analyzes

this juncture in history, a juncture establishing
innovative, and eminently personal, textual communication:
God entered into human history in a special
fashion at the precise time when psychological
structures assured that his entrance would have
greatest opportunity to endure and flower. To
assure maximum presence through history, the Word
came in the ripeness of time, when a sense of the
oral was still dominant and when at the same time
the alphabet could give divine revelation among
men a new kind of endurance and stability.
(m
190-91)
God thus burst into the world in the form of a babe, Jesus,
who would grow into a man, the Christ, the incarnated Son
of God.

While on earth, Christ sought to establish

"personal presence" with all of mankind (Ong, £W 113).
Because full presence (parousia) is predicated upon sound,
upon the speech-act, personal interaction was made
possible.

As Ong comments, "the word has immediate

religious significance" (EW 113), but it also has farreaching societal significance, allowing person-to-Other
spiritual transcendence between Creator/created and personto-person intellectual transcendence between
created/created.
A.I. McFayden addresses this idea in "The Call to
Discipleship."

Inherent in the Christian concept,

"disciple" is a to/for mandate:

the individual is a

disciple to Christ and a disciple for others.

That is, he
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subscribes to the words of the Master and then shares those
words to willing listeners.

This vertical and horizontal

matrix of communication was made possible through the
advent of Christianity, and it is operational when anyone
reads the text of another then interprets that reading for
others.

McFayden refers to this as "the meeting point,"

and it was instigated by the Christ.

Because Christ

represents "the meeting point between God and humanity," he
became
the person in whom God's Word and obedient human
response are conjoined.
In this he is an
individual but at once more than an individual,
the mediating point between all humankind and
God. As such he is turned towards all humankind
becoming not only the mediation of our relation
to God but of our relations to one another.
("CD" 477)
The Word of God, like many texts, is a tool of ontological
mediation— between writer/reader, between reader/other, and
between reader/other.

Hall reminds us that mediation, all

mediation, results from the pneumatic, or Christian, world
view.

Unlike the psychic world-view (spirit in a closed

cosmic structure) envisioned by the Greeks, the pneumatic
world-view recognizes spirit as the "breath of speech" (WS
31).

Neither static, closed, nor rigidly silent, this

pneumatic view empowers the individual to move along, to
mediate within, and to assume at least limited control over
his life.
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According to Hall, this "positing of the pneumatic
world-picture then provided the necessary conceptual
context for spirit, in its dynamic and temporal
transcendence, to appear in the world in its full
existential actuality and power" (i*[£ 30).

In this "new"

pneumatic context, the advent of the Word (both text and
person) provided humanity with an actualized method for
"presenting themselves to one another in their words and
deeds"

73).

The Greeks, Hall continues, could not accomplish this
feat of Christianity because they lacked "a pneumatically
qualified world-picture" and thus
were not able to acknowledge or embrace this
incipient presence of spirit. Lacking such a
picture, temporality and contingency were
terrifying; indeed it is no wonder that the
Greeks sought to flee into eternity, necessity,
fate, stasis, and silent contemplation.
(WS 73)
Failing to recognize spirit as a temporality, failing to
place it in a historical context, failing to see it as an
individual's contingency, the Greeks could not comprehend
their own reality.

Not necessarily a fault with their

intellect, they, we might conclude, were simply born too
early.

Their era predated the interstitial elements that

would collide and permanently impact humanity.

As the

historical (birth of Jesus), the linguistic (printed
medium), and the spiritual (the embraced concept of the
Christ) converged in time, within its linear construct,
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humanity was given a dynamic, spiritual, and transcendent
part to play.

Without pushing the comparison too far, the

Word of God as text became the individual's script; it
became his prescriptive handbook for relationships.

Though

far removed from the rhetorical handbooks of Greek culture,
it is in some ways analogous because it, too, is a
handbook— a spiritual handbook.
Enter another character in the biblical text; the Holy
Spirit who becomes the viable and powerfully absent
presence of God the Father, the presence that transcends
the limitations of time and space, reaching across textual
boundaries as he speaks not only to men of first-century
Palestine but also to men of the current age.

Mould

describes the advent of the Holy Spirit as the most
"mystical religious experience connected with the origin of
Christianity" fEBH 529).

Certainly it was a mystical

experience, but I suggest that transcendence, rather than
mysticism, better describes the rhetorical relationship
that the Holy Spirit effects between Christian and Christ,
between believing reader and text.
Although I have argued that the Holy Spirit, like the
Christ, is prefigured in the Old Testament, it is only with
the death of Christ that the perpetual and pervasive
essence of the Trinity is released into the world to
confront mankind personally and individually.

Conversely,

it is only by the agency of the Holy Spirit that one can
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call God by name.

God-to-man through the Holy Spirit and

man-to-God through the Holy Spirit is the rhetorical
construct that firmly establishes the pneumatic worldpicture in Western thought.
John writes in his gospel that the text of God in his
world follows a particular sequence:

God as Jehovah in the

Old Testament, then God as Christ in the New Testament, who
subsequently releases God as Holy Spirit who is confined by
neither time nor space (John 7:39).

When the redemptive

mission of the physical presence of God is instituted with
the death, burial, and resurrection of Christ, God does not
end his communication with man.

Rather, he continues the

personal communication initiated by Christ, further
developing his text through the Holy Spirit.

After the

ascension of Christ, God reads himself as a discernible,
albeit spiritual presence, who continues to move and to
speak in his world.

“For though I am absent in the flesh,

yet am I with you in the spirit" (Colossians 2:5).
Although these are the words of Paul to the church in
Colossi, they typify the operation of the absent presence
of God.

His voice may no longer be as audible as it was

through the spoken words of Jesus, but Scripture asserts
that it is just as powerful— perhaps even more so because
of the omnipresent quality of the Holy Spirit.
Addressing this issue of the pervasive power of the
Spirit who would come after him, Jesus said, "He that
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believeth on me, the works that I do shall he do also; and
greater works than these shall he do, because I go unto my
Father" (John 14:12).

The "greater works" would be made

possible through the number of individuals who could hear
and respond to the absent present of God through the Word
and the Spirit.

No longer would the message be limited to

the voice of one individual, Jesus Christ, who enlisted a
few followers to share his message.

In a death-defying act

of total abandonment, the physical Christ committed his
final, and most convincing, deed of love.

He sacrificed

his life so that humanity could embrace a radically
different world-view, so that they would no longer be
"denied their ontological rights" of "novelty and
contingency" (Hall 19).

Still, and always, fully human,

they, too, would be fully spirit— capable of transcendence,
a transcendence which allows ideas to prompt, even to
change, the spirit that is self.
But without a recorded text and without a pervading
spiritual presence to reach the willing receptors, the
redemptive message of God was not fully operational.

That

was to happen with the loosing of the Holy Spirit and its
subsequent operation through the printed text.

With the

New Testament dispensation of God's Spirit, Jehovah
fulfills the Old Testament promise of the "new covenant"
that he henceforth will "write in their hearts" (Jeremiah
31:31, 33).

This covenant involves listener, text, and

123
speaker (now the Holy Spirit) who empowers the recipient of
his Word.
As it appealed to first-century individuals to embrace
this covenant, Christianity created an irrevocable break
with Platonic philosophy.

Essentially it reversed Plato's

concept of being, which argues that reality is not
experienced through the senses, but that it exists through
the immaterial reality of another realm.

In his scheme of

being Plato describes the soul as the tri-partite lifeforce of mortal man.

Although Plato views the soul as

immortal, as once having had access to True Being, he
suggests that the possibility for reunion, for regaining
immortality, is ambiguous.

Certainly the common throng

cannot aspire to reunite with True Being, but perhaps those
philosophers who spend their lives in search of the truth
have at least a vague hope for restoring that broken
relationship which was caused by their mortal existence.
Hope for mortals becoming immortal is bleak at best within
Plato's realm of True Being.
Conversely, the possibility of immortality is the
nexus of Christian thought, primarily because the Christian
concept of soul is radically different from that which is
espoused by pagan philosophers who preceded Christianity.
For the Christian, the soul is that which makes the mortal
immortal.

Augustine describes it as the "inner man," that
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space where ”1 turned my thoughts into myself" and "sought
my God" (Confessions X. vi).

Tillich further explains:

The soul is the inner realm, in contrast to Greek
philosophy in which it is the power of life. The
discovery of soul in this sense is one of the
most important consequences of Christianity.
In
includes the world as the sum of all appearances.
In contrast to the Greeks, where the soul is a
part of all things, the world now becomes an
object. The world is an appearance for the soul,
which is the only real thing.
(HC2 113)
In Christianity, then, the soul, the part of man that
communicates with God through his Word, is the only "real"
part of existence, the only part that exists beyond mortal
time.

But even more significant in Christian belief, that

immortality is possible for everyone.

Through

communication with its creator, the Christian soul becomes
that which allows the biblical rhetorical and literary
triangles to engage completely.

The soul is that part of

man which enters into dialogue with the Word, through the
Spirit.
This is not a mystical, purely emotional interchange,
although the activity may temporarily assume
characteristics of mysticism or emotionalism.

Rather, it

is a transcendent encounter in which the finitude of man
meets the infinitude of God.
affects the individual.

Such an encounter discernibly

It is the "something out there" of

God which personally and discernibly interacts with the
"something in here" of the individual (Ong, £32 171).
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Paul's life-changing encounter on the Damascus Road
explains such an experience.

A Jewish zealot who was en

route to Damascus to persecute Christians, Saul was
personally confronted by God's Spirit.

As concrete,

objective evidence of the spiritual, Saul saw "a light from
heaven" and heard the voice of Jesus, a voice that so
interfered with his personal being that his life was
forever altered.

Saul, who aimed to destroy Christianity,

became Paul, who sought to perpetuate Christianity.
Ultimately, this permanent life-change was the objective
"proof" that appealed to Paul's listeners, both Jew and
Greek.
The movement from non-believer to believer, however,
is not always so clearly defined.

Early Christian

theologians struggled to understand what happens in the
transition.

Tillich paraphrases the words of priest-

philosopher Augustine who labored to satisfy those who
questioned this spiritual process:
soul, transcend yourself.

"After going into your

This means that in your soul

there is something which transcends your soul, something
immutable, namely, the divine ground" CHCT 113).

By

willingly engaging in communication with the eternal Logos,
by transcending himself, man has the potential for
dispelling the Greek notion of aporia, that state of being
which is "without a way" (Tillich, SB 6).

Christianity

thus appeals to the intellect, to the will of the
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individual who can choose either to accept or to reject the
triangular relationship between God, Word, and self.
Even so, textual communication and subsequent
understanding are not automatic; they are not achieved
through some kind of spiritual trance or by "magical"
osmosis.

Rather, they necessitate ability on the part of

the reader.

If the writer has followed prescribed rules of

grammar and syntax, if he has written with his voluntas,
and if he has created a sound and meaningful body of ideas,
then the reader must come equally prepared to the table of
discourse.

In the words of Frei, he must have "an ability

to use it [language] appropriately in specific texts."

He

then explains how the reader might accomplish this:
To understand concepts is to have the ability
both to explicate and to apply them, without
necessarily resorting to a theory that would
indicate how to couple the two. In the case of
the Bible, this finally cannot be done without
learning how to use the Bible, including its
narratives, within the church and as its canon.
("NCMR" 160)
Conceptualizing, explication, application— not simply
esoteric knowledge is necessary for understanding a text.
Frei suggests that any meaningful textual relationship, but
especially that which is engendered through the Bible, is
the result of work from either position on the rhetorical
triangle.
If the individual accepts the relationship and enters
into the Christian "way," which is discourse with God
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through his absent presence of the Holy Spirit, he enters
into a rhetorical exchange.

In order for that exchange to

be successful, the reader (listener) necessarily becomes an
active participant.

"It is a communication that requires

interpretation and partnership between speaker and
listener.

It is a relationship that provides communion

through mutuality" (Zelechow 166).

This mutuality does not

imply that the Christian is equal to God, but it does
suggest that his relationship with God is a reciprocal one.
As a "joint-heir" with Christ (Romans 8:17), the reader who
embraces the notion of a living/dying/buried/resurrected
Jesus enters into a "person-to-person relationship [that]
is actual through the word.

One is related to a person in

speaking to him, and one remains in relation to him only if
he answers" (Tillich, SE 31).
This dynamic premise of God speaking to man and man
responding in turn is that which fuels the triangular
operation of God, Word, and man.

In oneself as Another, a

text that examines the speaking subject in its quest for
selfhood, Paul Ricoeur comments on the kind of reciprocity
that is involved.

Without positing a Christian stance,

Ricoeur comments that
the idea of God is in me as the very mark of the
author upon his work, a mark that assures the
resemblance between us. I then have to confess
that 'I perceive this likeness . . . by the same
faculty through which I perceive myself.'
(QA 9)
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This perception, which arises from the innate spirituality
that is within man, is the result of momentary
transcendence, a transcendence that is mediated through the
Christian logos (dabhar).
According to Karl Barth in Dogmatics in Outline, this
transcendence occurs
at the point where the divine reason, the divine
Logos, sets up His law in the region of man's
understanding, to which law human, creaturely
reason must accommodate itself. When that
happens, man comes to knowledge? for when God
sets up His law in man's thought, in his
seeing and hearing and feeling, the revelation of
the truth is also reached about man and his
reason, the revelation of man is reached, who
cannot bring about of himself what is brought
about simply by God himself.
(DO 24)
Christianity thus posits faith as the element that is
missing in the Greek equation of God, man, and universe.
Barth argues that faith is a conscious and rational
"decision,11 one that creates an "event" between God and man
(DO 28).

This meeting place between God and man is that

moment of transcendence in which at least partial
understanding of God, man, and universe becomes possible.
Because man cannot come to knowledge of himself through his
own finite analysis, he must willingly and consciously look
outside himself for any hope of quieting his questions
about his being, his creator, and his place within the
universe.
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Tillich applies the idea of spiritual/intellectual
transcendence more universally, arguing that if man engages
in any ontological questioning, he automatically aligns
himself with his Creator.

As one questions, he admits

(consciously or unconsciously) the existence of a power
greater than he is, of a mind infinitely more knowledgeable
than his own (BE 11-14).

The Christian, even the

uneducated and inarticulate one, becomes philosopher,
though perhaps involuntarily, because he is engaged in the
same kind of ruminations that occupied Plato.

But unlike

his renowned predecessor, the Christian has the rhetorical
and literary schemes fully in place to assist him.

By

willingly aligning himself with the Holy Spirit, God's
absent presence, he can hope to gain personal, and
potentially beneficial, understanding through the Bible,
the word of God.

As the character of Jesus speaks from

that text, the Word then filters through the mind of the
individual, where it is hermeneutically processed as
precepts for life— and for the world beyond.
The Christian refers to this hermeneutical activity as
the "priesthood of the believer."

Within this spiritual

situation, the Holy Spirit empowers the Christian
individually through the Word of God, giving him the skills
of discernment and interpretation.
complete.

The process is never

With each reading of the text, with each

encounter with the Word, the individual presumably has
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lived, has experienced, and has matured so that he is
neither intellectually nor spiritually the same person who
previously engaged in the rhetorical exchange.
words of the Greek philosopher Heraclitus:

In the

"One cannot

step twice into the same river, nor can one grasp any
mortal substance in a stable condition, but it scatters and
again gathers; it forms and dissolves, and approaches and
departs" (LI).

Understanding, then, is progressive; for

the Christian, it is the progressive revelation of God,
which is made possible through spiritual dialogue.
In Philosophical Hermeneutics, Hans-Georg Gadamer
provides a contemporary assessment of the Christian's
dialogic encounter with God's Word.

When he enters into

the triangular relationship with God and Word, the text
does not simply speak its word, always the same,
in lifeless rigidity, but gives ever new answers
to the person who questions it and poses ever new
questions to him who answers it. To understand a
text is to come to understand oneself in a kind
of dialogue.
(EH 57)
This argument does not refute the New Testament description
of

God's Word, of "Jesus Christ [who is] the same

yesterday, and today, and forever" (Hebrews 13:8).

Rather,

it affirms that spiritual and intellectual quality of
humanity that allows growth and understanding; it is the
same quality that enables the finitude of man to encounter
the infinitude of God.

And the rhetorical triangle of God,

man, and text provides the matrix for the encounter.

While
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participating in this rhetorical grid, the reader
additionally "meets" the primary character, the Word of God
who speaks to him from within that literary text.
A similar activity occurs in any aesthetic activity, a
premise that I will elucidate in the next three chapters.
As I move from the sonnet-sequence of Sidney, to the
sonnets of Shakespeare, and through selected poems of
Dickinson, I do so on the assumption that

the Bible,

especially the New Testament, establishes the literary
precedent for Western aesthetic literature.

Implicit in

that precedent is that the reader, comprised of spirit and
intellect, is capable of responding to the words of the
writer as they are verbalized through the characters in his
text.

The next

certainly there

three chapters will highlight
exist numerous others) of

some (and

the variations of

this activity that dominates the reading process.

Chapter 4
The Absent Presence
in
Sidney's Astrophil and Stella

The movement from the spiritual arena in which man
"meets11 God through his son Jesus, who is the Word, to the
aesthetic world of poetry in which man most frequently
encounters himself in a word, may seem to be a confusing,
if not an insurmountable, leap.

But if aesthetics is, as

Immanuel Kant suggests in his Critique of Judgement, man's
attempt to bridge the gap between the spiritual and the
material, between the physically absent and the verifiably
present, then the step from the New Testament to poetry may
not be so great after all.

Defining the term "aesthetic

idea," Kant explains that it
is a representation of the imagination, annexed
to a given concept, with which, in the free
employment of imagination, such a multiplicity of
partial representations are bound up, that no
expression indicating a definite concept can be
found for it— one which on that account allows a
concept to be supplemented in thought by much
that is indefinable in words, and the feeling of
which quickens the cognitive faculties, and with
language, as a mere thing of the letter, binds up
the spirit (soul) also.
(CJ 179)
Aesthetics, much like spirituality, is individually
conceptualized, exacting different intellectual and
emotional responses from those who enter its realm.
132
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Though sometimes "indefinable/1 aesthetic meaning,
according to Kant, can be discerned through the "cognitive
faculties" of the seeking individual.
cognition into two distinct categories:

Kant organizes
that which is a

priori (that which comes from experience) and that which is
a posteriori (that which is not experiential but can
nevertheless be known).

Kant proposes that aesthetics

falls under his latter premise:

one can come to knowledge

through the reading of a text, through textual, or
aesthetic, experience.

Similar to the spiritual sojourner

who seeks to understand self in relation to God and world,
the aesthetic habitud embarks upon a quest in the mind.
This quest, which occurs through the aesthetics of poetry,
is perhaps an individual's greatest effort to understand
the infinitude of the spirituality that comprises the human
soul in terms of the finitude of the material world that
can be sensorily determined.

Any understanding that occurs

between poet and text, and subsequently reader and text, is
accomplished through the language of the writer.
Transforming ideas into a language of metaphor and
symbol, the poet, through his poetry, allows both himself
and his readers to translate that which often seems beyond
translation into at least a brief glimmer, a momentary
space, an epiphanic vision of understanding.

As it enables

the poet to probe the "otherness" of that-which-is-not-I
and place it in relation to the "thisness" of self, it
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subsequently allows the reader to comprehend that which is
absent in terms of that which is present.

The process and

the language may be different, but the purpose of the
poet's journey is the same as that of the philosopher and
the theologian:

to contemplate self, world, and creator in

all their complexities.

Poetry then, like philosophy and

religion, is an ontological journey; it is a search for
understanding the core of human existence.

In "An Essay on

Art," Jacques Maritain goes even farther in his assessment,
stating that poetry is ontology because "it realizes in act
one of the fundamental aspects of the ontological likeness
of our soul with God" (87).
The writings of any number of poets could substantiate
the ontological premise of poetry.

But in an attempt to

show this idea through the operation of the absent
presence, which is totally "other," I delineated several
common denominators as a means of limiting my field of
poets to Sir Philip Sidney, William Shakespeare, and Emily
Dickinson.

Although numerous differences inarguably

separate them as singular geniuses whose art makes them
unique, their poetry and underlying poetic philosophies
share unmistakable similarities.
for a small circle of friends:

Each of the three wrote
Sidney penned his poems for

the entertainment of his courtly acquaintances; Shakespeare
wrote his sonnet sequence for his immediate friends; and
Dickinson apparently intended for her poems, which she
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carefully arranged in personally crafted fascicles, to be
read only by her family and few friends.

Seemingly none of

the three wrote for publication; they each envisioned a
small, personal audience with whom they could share
intimate musings of their inner beings.

The imperative of

Sidney's Muse to "looke in thy heart and write" applies to
the personae of each.
The remainder of this study will develop from the
premise that even Sidney and Shakespeare, who may not have
had vocabularies fully sufficient to explain what they
recognized as the inner voice, nevertheless specifically
recount the musings of that inner being.

Anne Ferry's book

The "Inward" Language provides a thorough analysis of the
difficulty that sixteenth-century writers faced as they
struggled to verbalize the inward state in terms of the
outward self.

She cautions us to remember that we quite

readily take for granted references that apply to the
workings of the mind; as post-Freudians, we are cognitively
conditioned to understand even subtle allusions to that
inner being which truly defines the individual.

Ferry

argues,
These [references] are so embedded in our
language that we use them concurrently or
interchangeably, without remembering their
different origins, or troubling about their
possible inconsistencies or their conflicting
implications. The reason for their often
unquestioned acceptance is, I believe, that they
are all associated with our now deeply held
belief in the existence of an inner life or a
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real self, phrases so familiar, so rooted inour
view of human nature, that we
have virtually
ceased to think of them as metaphors.
(IL 7)
Although

great strides were made in the

psyche between

the Renaissance writings

study of the human
of Sidney and

Shakespeare and the nineteenth-century writings of
Dickinson, even she did not share our Freudian vantage.
Because of Freud and his successors, we have an extensive
vocabulary that conditions us to analyze and then to
express the psychological operations of the inner man.
Ferry's argument is convincing— to a point.

Focusing

on psychoanalytic theory, she ignores the role that
literacy played in these cognitive operations.

To refer

again to Ong and The Presence of the Word, literacy
fostered, or at least significantly enabled, an individual
sense of interiority.

Ong asserts quite emphatically that

"formal logic was invented in an alphabetic culture"

( PW

45), noting that "Aristotle's Art of Rhetoric could not
come into being without writing" (PW 26-27).

We might also

conclude that the same assertion applies to Psalms,
Augustine's Confessionsf Dante's Infernof or any aesthetic
text that provokes self-examination.
Ong argues that the written word, especially the
poetic text, or what he calls "verse," empowers the
individual to interiorize thoughts, a process which then
allows communication with the inner self:
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Verse grows more directly dependent on writing
than oratory does, probably because verse is the
sort of thing that invites exact repetition more
than does an oration. Writing expedites
repetition for the many who have not mastered the
extraordinary skills of the oral epic singer.
But in implementing repetition for those without
such skills, writing also changes the basic
nature of repetition from the thematic to the
verbatim.
( m 27)
This movement from the "thematic to the verbatim" results
in individualism, which is an interiorizing of the self.
Applying Ong's argument to spiritual and aesthetic worlds,
it is the text, the printed word, that allows individual
meditation.

Because of reading, of taking another's

thoughts into the being of self, any provocative work
(Psalms, Augustine's Confessions. Dante's Inferno, poetry)
creates a textual "reality" for the reader.
I suggest that this premise is especially true for any
aesthetic text which recounts a poet-lover and his absent
beloved.

Through such a literary encounter, the inner

being of the reader can allow absence (of a lover or an
author) to become an absent presence that might
intellectually and emotionally act upon her present.
Because of the written words that allow the reader to take
the aesthetic experience into the self, she can interiorize
the thoughts of the writer who is other.

Certainly some

writers are more skilled at this than others.

I will argue

that Sidney, Shakespeare, and Dickinson do not simply allow
their readers to interiorize; they demand it.
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Crucial to the argument hereinafter set forth is that
the personae of all three are poet-lovers.

And love is key

to understanding their work? in a causal relationship, it
is the inspiration that yields the poetry.

It was Plato's

love of knowledge (philosophia) that drove him to seek a
verbal plane of greater knowledge with his like-minded
interlocutors? and, in a similar manner, the Biblical text
represents God's love for his creation, prompting him to
incarnate himself through his Son, the Word, who is
paradoxically both the character in and the text of the New
Testament.

The relationship between love and the texts of

Plato, God, and poet-lover is that of cause-and-effect.
Love may not create the text, but it is the animating
factor in the writing process? it incites voluntas.

Love

also operates from the opposite side of the text,
compelling the reader to enter into dialogue with the
author through the printed word.

If we are willing to

recognize, as George Steiner does in Real Presences f that
"Eros and the aesthetic experience are close kindred," then
we can begin to ferret out the element that controls the
absent presence of poetic expression (RP 182-83).
Commenting on this subject in his study of Emily
Dickinson's poetry, Inder Nath Kher further argues that
love is the force which empowers that "aesthetic
experience" (Steiner, RP 182) and thus enables the reader's
imagination to embark upon a poetic journey with the writer
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of the text.
nature.

Love, as Kher defines it, is antinomical in

Much like Heraclitus, who viewed all of life as

comprised of endless opposites, Kher sees a creative
tension operating in and through love, which is both the
spiritual and physical life-force of humanity:
Love is energy? it is imagination to which alone
all forms are possible.
It is inclusive of the
contradictory postures of self-other, living in
death and dying into life.
It generates the
opposing moods of happiness and woe, pleasure and
pain, remembering and forgetting, freedom and
bondage.
It is sensuous,
it is spiritual.
It is
fleeting, it is abiding.
It is speech, it is
silence.
It is ignorance, it is wisdom.
It is
water, it is fire.
It is dark, it is light.
It
is absence, it is presence.
(LA 136)
The emotional stress operating within a poetry of love is
that which yields the absent presence.

Though comprised of

opposites, absence versus presence, the two paradoxical
elements (ek-demeo and en-demeo) affirm the other.

One

exists only in oppositional relation to the other.
Although overtones of deconstruction necessarily
emerge in such an assessment, I do not presume a strictly
deconstructionist stance.

Rather, I simply suggest that

much of Western literature relies upon oppositional
elements as one means of establishing communication between
writer and reader.

Lexically conjoined terms, such as

"absence" and "presence," are linguistic opposites, but, as
Derrida suggests, they are not strictly an either/or,
neither/nor pairing.

Rather, the opposing terms create a
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reciprocal relationship, with the first term sharing
commensurately with the second.
The terms "present" and "absent" do not preclude each
other; on the contrary, each heralds the other.

Commenting

on the term "absence," Susan Handelman cautions us to
remember that "absence does not equal nonexistence" (98).
Rather, absence is the otherness of presence.

Only through

absence of the reader does the writer create the text, and
only through the absence of the beloved does the poet
create the absent presence within that text.
A recurring theme in the next three chapters is the
erotic opposition that paradoxically allows unity between
the poet and the absent reader through the poetic medium
that depicts a poet-lover who seeks solace through the
absent presence of a departed beloved.

The opposition that

arises from the contradictory elements of love that was yet
still is produces rhetorical unity between
writer/reader/text while subsequently, though perhaps only
temporarily, reconciling absence and presence into an
absent presence.
If we view love as a positive force (agape or caritas)
that yields equally positive rhetorical reactions, we can
observe that love is multi-dimensional in the aesthetic
world, operating sequentially and on several levels.
first overture of love is, according to Sidney, that
between Creator and poet.

As a further means of

The
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establishing communication with mankind, God makes the
poet, in the words of the Renaissance humanist, "the first
light-giver" (Defense 606).

As God "gifts" the poet with

discernment, he arms humanity with an aesthetic means for
coming to partial understanding of that which comprises the
emotional and intellectual life of humanity.

The poet then

uses his gift as the creative means through which he
presumes to establish a relationship with his reader.

Such

a relationship derives from, and is fostered by, love.
A.C. Hamilton recognizes, in Sir Philip Sidney:

A

Study of His Life, this love of writer for reader "is
experienced in the act of giving [the drama] poetic form"
(85).

The final performance of love, the one that

completes the triangular loving relationship, is that of
the reader as she encounters the text.

As with any loving

relationship, she must make herself vulnerable to the text.
She must be willing to sacrifice her preconceived notions
of self/world/creator and be wooed by the inscribed words
on the printed page.

She must listen to the voice of the

persona who speaks from the text.

These players from each

point of the triangular relationship necessarily depend
upon the others in order to produce meaning, in order to
create understanding.
The writers who create rhetorical exchanges
incorporate "voices" whereby their words can find
believable expression.

Host frequently, as with Sidney,
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Shakespeare, and Dickinson, textual voices come through
their personae, all of whom are poet-lovers.

As Sidney's

Astrophil, Shakespeare's older poet, and Dickinson's female
counterpart relate their tales of lost or distant love, as
they expose their internal struggles with self in relation
to lover, each poet-lover also shares his or her views of
poetry and art.

Shakespeare and Dickinson may not have

written critical texts comparable to Sidney's Defense f but
they did insert critical remarks into their poetry.

Taken

cumulatively, these comments about poetry and poet help us
to determine their philosophies of art.

All three describe

the transcending power of words; through words, their
disappointing relationships are transformed into something
worthwhile.

Specifically, emotional turmoil that is

brought about by absence of the beloved prompts artistic
endeavor which, in turn, results in works of art that
"speak11 from the pages and across the centuries to their
readers.
Yet each poet-lover also recognizes the inability of
words to bridge completely the gap between the actual and
the recreated experience.

If we consider both the literary

and the rhetorical perspectives, we note that dual gaps
exist for these poets.

The first is both literary and

rhetorical as the author struggles to translate verbally to
the reader that which was formerly fully present (either a
physical or imaginative experience) into a textually
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dynamic absent presence.

In creating personae, these three

writers especially succeed in developing textual presences
who act to motivate, to control, and to give meaning to the
composition of the poetry.

Each persona then ••speaks" that

(or another) meaning to the reader.
The second gap, which is rhetorical, occurs during the
reader's subsequent perusal of the text as she attempts to
decipher the nuances of the author's language, recognizing
all the while that the hermeneutic possibilities preclude
any prospect of total union with the writer.

This study of

the sonnet sequences of Sidney and Shakespeare and of
selected poetry of Dickinson will necessarily be highly
selective, focusing on those sonnets and poems that suggest
most substantially the operation of the absent presence on
either of these two levels— that of author as he or she
creates the literary text and that of reader as she
rhetorically enters into dialogue with the text.
My premise is that dual absent presences are the
primary means by which these two gaps may be at least
partially bridged.

Inherent in these absent presences that

operate in and through a text is the idea of transcendence.
As George Steiner proposes in his book Real Presences.
"This essay [too] argues a wager on transcendence.

It

argues that there is in the art-act and its reception, that
there is in the experience of meaningful form, a
presumption of presence" (214).

And that presence assumes
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a kind of spirituality, a kind of God-likeness, because it
enables one intellect, one human mind, to comprehend and
share in that which was experienced or conceptualized by
another individual.
This ability separates rational man from irrational
animal and places him on a spiritual plane of intellectual
and emotional discernment.

In the words of Steiner, it

then would seem
that any coherent understanding of what language
is and how language performs, that any coherent
account of the capacity of human speech to
communicate meaning and feeling is, in the final
analysis, underwritten by the assumption of God's
presence.
I will put forward the argument that
the experience of aesthetic meaning in
particular, that of literature, of the arts, of
musical form, infers the necessary possibility of
this 'real presence.'
(EE 3)
Such a critical assumption, however, does not require that
the poet must necessarily postulate metaphysical ideas
concerning the divine nature of poetry and the poet.

Nor

does it require a belief in God, an absent presence which
is wholly Other. Rather, it suggests the rudimentary level
at which the poet recognizes the power of words to
communicate meaningfully with a reader.
In her book Poetry as Epitaph, Karen Mills-Courts
argues that the poet, perhaps more consciously than other
writers, struggles to affirm presence because it is in
presence that meaning is gleaned from the written word.
She says that poetry is "the most powerful attempt to
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incarnate voice, meaning, intelligibility, even 'Truth,' in
language.

Poets, more than any other writers, need to

secure presence in their work" (£E 3).

Although that

presence, according to Mills-Courts, simultaneously heralds
loss through its written expression, it nevertheless holds
the potential for yielding an instant of symbolically
embodied meaning to the reader.

Beginning with Sidney,

then moving to Shakespeare and finally to Dickinson, I will
attempt to show that these three poets, who may be
separated by religious beliefs, by gender, or by centuries,
nevertheless share a critical tenet that underlies their
poetry:

they each rely significantly on the literary and

rhetorical operations of absent presences to create and
then to perpetuate meaning through their work.
Having provided prefatory information that outlines
the critical landscape from which this chapter will
develop, I now turn to the Protestant humanist Sidney who
provides a logical transition into poet and poetry.

Indeed

his personal and poetic views underscore the paradox of
Western thought: Christian orthodox commingled with pagan
1
Greek.
Believed to have translated at least portions of
The Rhetoric, Sidney processed his ideas of moving the
reader to action (energeia), of imitating that which is in
nature (mimesis), and of seeing the "poet as maker" through
2
Aristotle's Poetics.

Though he might have been an

accomplished scholar of rhetoric and philosophy, Sidney
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could never get very far away from his Calvinist teachings
of Providence at work in man's world.

He recognized his

role of poet as that which was made possible by the divine
Creator and thus "could never have supported, for instance,
the verbal effort to divinize the self" (Doherty xxv).
Because of the Edenic fall, man as poet is forever
fallible.

His mind, which is God-like with creativity and

discernment, may imagine perfect communication of ideas,
but his verbal ability to express those ideas somehow
always falls short of perfection.
Sidney laments in his Defense of Poesy that "our
erected wit maketh us know what perfection is, and yet our
infected will keepeth us from reaching unto it" (D£ 608).
Because of his "erected wit," which encompasses his dual
ability to perceive man in relation to his world and then
to express that relationship through his manipulation of
language articulated by metaphor and symbol, the poet is
potentially capable of expressing that perfect truth of
man's being, that truth of man in relation to self, world,
and creator.

However, a discernible breach exists between

wit and will, between gnosis and praxis.

The poet may know

some of the truths of his existence, but he does not always
succeed in imparting those truths to his audience.

This

breakdown frequently results from lack of presence— from
his Creator who is teacher and from his reader who is
interpreter.

Although he may seek plenitude (connoting
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presence)# the poet's “infected will#*1 which implies a lack
in both perception and verbal expression# inhibits his
incarnation of exact or full presence (parousia).
Mills-Courts argues that a verifiable presence# a
presence which is almost "spiritual," dominates Sidney's
poetic process.

She likens it

to the 'cleared' vision that enables David's
divinity. The poet's 'golden' world is not a
truth delivered by the voice of God# but the
expression of the 'truth' that God has already
created and that already resides within. The
poet is not possessed by God, but through God's
grace he is in possession of an 'erected wit,'
which clears the muddiness of the 'infected will'
and 'invents' images superior to the world
humankind has wrecked with its Fall.
(EE 26 )
As Mills-Courts recognizes, Sidney does not credit the poet
with creating "truth."

Only God is creator.

That same

God# however, provides the poet with the mental perception
and the verbal ability to translate that truth to humanity.
If we apply this analysis to Sidney's Astrophil and Stella,
it would seem then that the poet in the persona of
Astrophil does not create presence in lieu of absence;
rather, he "invents" an absent presence, thus replicating
Stella's presence through artistry.
Not just an imitation, this replicated absent presence
is duplication— the best, albeit inexact, duplication that
the poet can make possible with an "infected will."
Kimbrough rightly argues, "The poet is a maker; he
imitates.

He takes the stuff of life, molds it, and

Robert
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projects it as art" (SPS 52) in an attempt to duplicate the
*
3
life experience through verbal reenactment.

According to

Sidney's own assessment in his Defense, that duplication
(which is artistic imitation) has merit; precisely, it has
power to affect the reader in a manner similar to that of
the actual experience:

"For that feigned example hath as

much force to teach as a true example (for as for [sic] to
move, it is clear, since the feigned may be tuned to the
highest key of passion)" (BE 611).

The poet, through his

erected wit, can elicit passion in his readers.

But

something is lost in the process; an absence results, since
duplication through language necessarily implies loss and
reduction of full presence.
To restate Kenneth Burke's premise of the reductive
quality of language, Sidney and other poets undoubtedly
seek for vocabularies that will be faithful
reflections of reality. To this end, they must
develop vocabularies that are selections of
reality. And any selection of reality must, in
certain circumstances, function as a deflection
of reality.
(GM 59)
Reflection - selection - deflection results in what Sidney
refers to as "another nature" which comes from "the vigor
of his own invention."

Especially for the Renaissance poet

Sidney, who lacked a vocabulary that could express the
reality of the inner man, "Invention" was not optional; it
was necessary in order to approach and decipher those Godgiven truths.
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Invention, which comes through the poetic process, is
thus closely aligned to Aristotle's concept of mimesis.
According to Richard McKeon's assessment of Aristotle's
theory, poetry is mimesis.

It is

an imitation of things as they are or ought to
be, and each kind of poetry produces its proper
pleasure; but it is also a whole, complete in
itself, with a beginning, middle, and end and
with all the organic unity of a living creature.
("ACL" 212)
But S.K. Heninger, in his preface to The Poet as Maker.
argues that Sidney takes Aristotle's position a notable
step farther.
As its distinctive feature, poetry no longer
reflects heavenly beauty or echoes cosmic
harmony— it isn't rhyming and versing that make a
poet, Sidney insists. Instead, poetry becomes a
depictive art, an activity that produces images,
a narrative with semantic content.

(PM x)
We thus see a significant literary progression from
Aristotle to Sidney as poetry moves from pure pleasure that
is elicited through Aristotle's mimesis to artistic
depiction of inherent truth, the idea which embodies
Sidney's use of "Invention."
Basically, then, Sidney's "Invention" is, as Kimbrough
describes, "the discovery or uncovering of a truth that
exists in nature or beyond nature" fSPS 61).

These truths,

which for Sidney comprise the Christian Logos, are already
operational; they were put in place by the Creator.

The

poet's role is to discover and translate those truths to
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his readers.

For Sidney, Invention becomes the means

whereby the poet might fashion "things either better then
Nature bringeth forth, or, quite anew, forms such as never
were in Nature" (£)£ 607).

Tempering this Aristotelian

argument with his Christian beliefs, Sidney argues that the
moral mandate of the poet is to "teacheth and moveth to
virtue" (EE 616).

For him, the poet is the noblest

teacher, ranking higher than the philosopher, the
historian, and the scientist; and the poem is the preferred
instrument of learning, performing more effectively than
philosophy, history, or science.

As a result of the poet's

efforts, poetry, that noblest vehicle for learning, exposes
through artistic representation the manifold truths in
reality.

However, because poetic reality is inhabited by

absence and reduced by language, its relation to reality is
necessarily the same-but-different.

This same-but-

different aspect is that which defines aesthetics, and it
is the focus of the remainder of this study as I analyze
the poet's attempts to express the spiritual, his emotions,
through the material, his words.
Through the creative act, the poet produces an
aesthetic "reality" which allows the reader to implicate
herself in that which the poet describes.
may even be reproduced as fiction.

This "reality"

When the poet

undertakes this reproduction, he reifies reality through
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the printed word, a process that Sidney outlines in Sonnet
45:
Stella oft sees the verie face of wo
Painted in my beclowded stormie face:
But cannot skill to pitie my disgrace,
Not though thereof the cause her selfe she know:
Yet hearing late a fable, which did show
Of Lovers never knowne, a grievous case,
Pitie thereof gate in her breast such place,
That from that sea deriv'd teares spring did
flow.
Alas, if Fancy drawn by imag'd things,
Though false, yet with free scope more grace doth
breed
Then servants wracke, where new doubts honor
brings
Then think my deare, that you in me do reed
Of lovers ruine some sad Tragedie:
I am not I, pitie the tale of me.
Prior to this sonnet, Sidney has described, through his
persona Astrophil, love and suffering that are real.

(At

least they are punctuated as "real" in the poetic drama.)
But the beloved Stella is moved neither by Astrophil's
pronouncements of love nor by his remonstrations of
suffering.

Almost accidentally the poet-lover discovers

something that might make Stella sympathetic to his plight.
Observing that his beloved heard and was moved by a
"fable" that parallels his situation with her, he
recognizes that fiction affects her in a way that
disclosure of his true feelings has not.

Although he may

not understand how and does not attempt to explain why, he
realizes that the fiction, the "fable" that duplicates his
feelings for Stella, has greater emotive power than his
personal story.

He thus justifies using the fiction of
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"Lovers never knowne" to further his erotic cause.

This

fiction, which applies universally, is the same as his
reality— a lover rebuffed by his beloved— but it is
necessarily different because of its fictive recreation.
He proposes ambivalently that "I am not I," but he seems to
suggest that "I am emotionally the same as the I in the
recreated fiction."
Implicit in the poet's fictive recreation is the
rhetorical death-to-life concept of putting the words to
paper so that they may "live" again in the mind of a future
reader.

Theodore Spencer contends in "The Poetry of Sir

Philip Sidney" that something else is at work in the love
sonnets of Sidney's personae:

through a life-in-death

experience, the poet-lover discovers himself:
But there is one constant fact which is true of
all poets and at all times; the discovery of
oneself depends on an act of submission. For the
poet, as for the human being, to lose one's life
is to find it.
In our time this fact has been
widely recognized, though it has been expressed
in widely differing terms.
In a minor way it is
what Pound means when he calls his poems
'Personae'; it is what Housman discovered when he
spoke through the mouth of the Shropshire Lad.
It is the fact that lies behind the search of
W.B. Yeats for the anti-mask— the discovery of
the self by contemplation of its opposite; it is
what T.s. Eliot expresses by his theory of
'objective co-relative' and by his requirements
that poetry should be as 'impersonal as
possible.'
In the sixteenth century this saving loss of
personality, this discovery of self through
submission to an 'order,' could be accomplished
to a considerable extent through convention.
Convention is to the poet in an age of belief
what the persona is to the poet in an age of
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bewilderment. By submission to either the poet
acquires authority; he feels that he is speaking
for, is representing, something more important
than himself— or, in the case of the persona, he
is at least representing something different from
his own naked and relatively insignificant ego?
in both cases he has taken the first step toward
universality.
("PSPS'* 46)
This is a lengthy quote, but it is important because it
clearly and specifically explains what Astrophil, Sidney's
poet-lover, does within the sequence;

he discovers his

artistic self through the absent presence of his beloved.
Through his painful, and frequently retrogressive, coming
to terms with the loss of Stella's present presence, he
gradually acquires authority over the creation which houses
her absent presence as it interacts with his persona.

The

result is poetic power, a discernible artistic self, that
reaches out from the text to the reader.
Contrary to Thomas Roche's vilification of Astrophil
in "Astrophil and Stella:

A Radical Reading," the poet-

lover 's "infernal heroics" do not "mask a basic
childishness, which he transfers immediately by making his
idol Stella into a child to be whipped into shape"
207).

( "AStRR"

From his truly radical point of view, Roche sees no

redeeming qualities in Astrophil.

The best that he can say

about him is that "He teaches morality by negative example"
("&S:RR" 188).

I disagree.

As Sidney partners himself

with his persona, he moves his reader from a negative to a
positive state, from an actual to a fictional world.
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In so doing, Sidney uses Astrophil's emotional
transference from fact to fiction, a kind of aesthetic
transcendence, as the basis for his personal defense of
poetry from his own Renaissance critics.

Kimbrough

paraphrases Sidney's argument, saying that
Poetry is made; it is a fiction.
Because fiction
is projected from the mind of the poet, because
it is imaginative, the word has the connotation
of 'not true.' But fiction only stands for life,
is a reading of life, and can be lifelike; it
does not pretend to be life.
(SPS 49)
Poetry is not life because it is comprised of words,
whereas life is comprised of living, dying, loving, hating
humanity; but poetic words allow a "reading of life" that
can duplicate the emotions that arise from all of that
emotionally throbbing life.
And Astrophil, the poet-lover, who has failed to
excite passion in his real-life situation with Stella,
decides to chance the fiction.

He wagers that Stella's

reading of his "lifelike" fiction may sway her in a way
that he cannot.

As she reads his text, she may find

something to move her that even he did not envision:
Looke on againe, the faire text better trie:
What blushing notes doest thou in margine see?
What sighes stolne out, or kild before full
borne?
Hast thou found such and such like arguments?
Or art thou else to comfort me forsworne?
Well, how so thou interpret the contents,
I am resolv'd thy errour to maintaine,
Rather then by more truth to get more paine.
(Sonnet 67)
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Astrophil encourages Stella to read his story; in so doing,
he seeks an alternate way of wooing her.

Astrophil thus

proposes to Stella a reciprocal relationship, one in which
he empowers her to interpret his words.

In the process,

the poet-lover establishes parameters for his proposed
rhetorical relationship.

Sidney, through his persona,

relies on a textual operation that functions similarly to
Plato's concept of Idea.
•A reductive rendering of that theory of Forms is that
it allows for an archetypal correlation between phenomenal
realities and their corresponding invented representations
fThe Republic V).

Sidney attributes this action to the

poet, a kind of Renaissance philosopher.

As the poet-

lover, who is foremost the poet, translates that which is
into his poetry, he limits the borders of interpretation,
artistically corresponding the actual (the phenomenal
reality) with its most exact metaphor or symbol (the
invented representation).

Relying on this process,

Astrophil implores Stella to engage herself with his absent
presence, hoping that she might understand and then respond
in kind to his feelings for her.

Even if she misinterprets

his fictive efforts, even if he does not succeed in
establishing exact boundaries for her interpretation, he is
willing to take his chances on the fable.
determines her "errour to raaintaine."

If he must, he

Realizing that her

misinterpretation of his fable can be no worse than the
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"truth" of their actual relationship, which she deems non
existent, he goes with the fiction.

So he gambles with the

persuasive power of the artistic word, only to be
disappointed again.
Gary Waller analyzes this triangular relationship
between writer/text/reader in English Poetry of the
Sixteenth Century.

He argues that the role of the reader

is crucial, if not the most important element, within the
rhetorical triangle.

"It is the reader's cognitive

processes that create the reading, not the author's
intentions" (EPSC 57).

Certainly textual understanding is

dependent upon a reader; however, the reader operates in
conjunction with the other two equally significant elements
in the rhetorical triangle.

Like Wimsatt and Beardsley in

"The Intentional Fallacy," I disregard as fallacy the idea
that a reader/critic needs to determine the author's
intentions in order to understand and find meaning from a
poem.

They state "that the design or intention of the

author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for
judging the success of a work of literary art."

Since a

poem is "embodied in language," whose syntax and semantics
can be artfully manipulated by a writer but can never be
exactly recovered by the reader, "the work is measured
against something outside the author" ("IF" 3, 5, 10).
Addressing that "something" in "The Affective
Fallacy," Wimsatt and Beardsley ultimately conclude that
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the cognitive and affective effects of poetry upon the
reader are inseparable:
Poetry is characteristically a discourse about
both emotions and objects, or about the emotive
quality of objects. The emotions correlative to
the objects of poetry become a part of the matter
dealt with— not communicated to the reader like
an infection or disease, not inflicted
mechanically like a bullet or knife wound, not
administered like a poison, not simply expressed
as by expletives or grimaces or rhythms, but
presented in their objects and contemplated as a
pattern of knowledge. Poetry is a way of fixing
emotions.
(»AF» 38)
To extend Wimsatt and Beardsley's metaphor:

unlike the

pathologist who can dissect a body to determine the
specific cause of death, the reader cannot similarly
isolate the various elements within a poem to determine the
specific cause of a reader's response to it.

Rather, a

combination of factors effect the reader's reaction:

a

language that is manipulated by the writer, a culture that
is different both in time and locale, and a personal and
differing lifetime of experience that the reader brings to
the text.

Because of appropriate articulation in the

writing process and equally appropriate interpretation in
the reading process, an individual's response to a
particular text is sometimes one of almost inexplicable
intimacy.
In such rhetorically intimate encounters, Waller
posits that a unique relationship develops between
writer/reader/text.

In a life-imitating-art comparison, he
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suggests, and here I agree, that Sidney's sonnets demand
intimacy with their readers.

Like Astrophil's fiction to

Stella which evoked "Pitie for lovers never knowne,"
Sidney's sonnets are
poems which require an unusually active
involvement from their readers, and which produce
meanings only within the changing encounters
between poem and readers. The poet offers
himself to an audience of sympathetic listeners
as a mirror less of his experiences than of
theirs.
Sidney's poems work upon their readers,
suggesting, manipulating, but never compelling,
meanings.
(BESS 147-48)
Like Plato who required a willing interlocutor to probe the
wellspring of knowledge, the poet similarly requires a
willing reader to "complete" the composition of his text,
to provide meaning.

To understand why Astrophil fails to

convince Stella to respond to his love for her, we might
consider a contrasting relationship, one in which the lover
successfully convinces his lady to respond in kind.

Such a

lover is Othello, the "noble Moor" who woos the "gentle
Desdemona."
As Othello defends his method for winning the hand of
Desdemona, he admits to using a method similar to that used
by Astrophil:

he tells a story.

Othello's tale differs

from Astrophil's in that his is explicitly biographical,
recounting his heroic adventures on the battlefield.

As

author of his own story, however, he has the power to
embellish the facts, to fashion them in order to achieve
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his desired purpose, which is the same as Astrophil's fable
to Stella.

Like Astrophil, he is driven by eros or

cupiditas; he wants to consummate his love for Desdemona.
Where Astrophil fails, however, Othello succeeds.
In answering the Duke's charges against his winning of
Desdemona's hand, Othello recounts the means by which he
persuaded her of his love.

Speaking to Brabantio, he says,

perhaps with exaggerated modesty:
Rude am I in my speech,
And little blest with the soft phrase of peace.
For since these arms of mine had seven years'
pith
Till now some nine moons wasted, they have used
Their dearest action in the tented field.
And little of this great world can I speak,
More than pertains to feats of broil and battle,
And therefore little shall I grace my cause
In speaking for myself. Yet, by your gracious
patience,
I will a round unvarnished tale deliver
Of my whole course of love— what drugs, what
charms,
What conjuration and what mighty magic—
For such proceeding I am charged withal—
I won his daughter.
(Othello I.iii.81-93)
Like Astrophil, Othello uses neither drugs, nor charms, nor
conjuration, nor magic to win Desdemona; again like
Astrophil, he uses only his words.
succeed and Astrophil fail?

So why does Othello

Why does he persuade Desdemona

"To fall in love with what she feared to look on I"— a
"rude" Moor who is ignorant of the ways of polite society?
The answer lies in Desdemona herself, the willing
interlocutor who listens to his story and then responds
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positively to the power of his words.

He tells Brabantio,

"She'd come again, and with a greedy ear/ Devour up my
discourse” (I.iii.149-50.).

She thus becomes a reciprocal

partner in the rhetorical exchange, incorporating the
discourse into her inner being.

Her initial response, for

him to teach his story to one of his friends who loved her,
was not the one that Othello wanted:
She thanked me,
And bade me, if I had a friend that loved her,
I should but teach him how to tell my story
And that would woo her. Upon this hint I spake.
She loved me for the dangers I had passed,
And I loved her that she did pity them.
This only is the witchcraft I have used.
(Othello I.iii.163-69)
Ultimately, though, she allows his words to seduce her, to
bring her into the relationship he desires.
In this context, I do not use "seduce" in the
pejorative sense.

On the contrary, I suggest that Othello

merely manipulates his words in much the way that Ross
Chambers argues in Story and Situation:

Narrative

Seduction and the Power of Fiction:
• If such power can be called the power of
seduction, it is because seduction is, by
definition, a phenomenon of persuasion; it cannot
rely on force or institutional authority
('power'), for it is, precisely, a means of
achieving mastery in the absence of such means of
control.
It is the instrument available to the
situationally weak against the situationally
strong.
(212)
Textual seduction, as described by Chambers, parallels
Warnock's rhetorical "dance" (cited in Chapter 2) in which
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•’the reader's resistance and the writer's enticements, and
vice-versa are parts of the dance" ("RKB" 73).

The partner

who issues the invitation to the rhetorical dance is the
writer? depending upon his literary expertise and his
socio-political knowledge, he can be either the stronger or
the weaker partner.

In the Othello/Desdemona relationship,

Othello is the weaker party, but he has a significant
advantage:

his words.

Situationally weak because he is an

outsider who is unskilled in Venetian romance, Othello
employs words, and only words, to weave a tale of love in
order to persuade Desdemona to accept his marriage
proposal.

Since his words are his own, he fashions them so

as to elicit a particular emotional response from his
listener Desdemona.
Proof of his rhetorical manipulation is that Desdemona
believes his words and loves him for the valor portrayed
therein.

His text successfully elicits a reaction;

communication is established between lover and beloved.
Responding positively to the power of words, Desdemona
willingly places herself in a position to be persuaded by
them, something that Stella refuses to do.

Thinking

himself safely ensconced in the marriage-bed, Othello
gloats to his friend about the success of his love-quest.
During this brief interlude of confidence in Desdemona's
fidelity, Othello credits the oral word with the honorable
"seduction" of his wife.

Such is never realized by
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Astrophil.

Because of his erotic frustrations, Sidney's

poet-lover fails to extricate himself from his emotional
attachment to Stella.
In Renaissance Minds and Their Fictions. Ronald Levao
addresses this dilemma:
The only true release would be through actual
seduction, but Astrophil returns repeatedly to
the realization that his poetry is not persuading
Stella. No matter how sweetly he utters forth
the conceits of the mind, Astrophil's goal
remains irrevocably distant.
(171)
Astrophil's tactic is the same as Othello's, and his words
are no less persuasive.

The difference seems not to' lie in

the words of the poet-lover, but in the attitude of the
perceptor herself, Stella.

Levao correctly recognizes

Stella's role when he says, "Perhaps the fault lies with
the hearer" (RMTF 171).

Because she chooses not to partner

herself with Astrophil's implicitly persuasive words,
Stella is unmoved by his erotic entreaties.
Stella is not, as A.C. Hamilton accurately notes in
"Sidney's Astrophil and Stella as a Sonnet Sequence," an
"ideal reader."

Because her response is not that which

Astrophil desires, Hamilton rightly concludes that he, as
poet-lover, chooses to modify his approach.
Frustrated as both poet and lover, he is forced
to abandon his passive role.
Paradoxically, the limited success of
Astrophil's courtship precipitates a crisis for
him both as poet and as lover.
In his opening
program, he had assumed that Stella would be an
ideal reader who would take pleasure in reading
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of his pain, and knowing his pain would pity him,
and through love would offer him her favor.
Unfortunately, she is not properly programmed:
she turns out to be an increasingly perverse
woman, balking at each step of his literary
ladder.
("S&SSS" 215)
Iquestion Hamilton's
the word

use of “perverse" to describe Stella;

inaccurately and harshly characterizes one who

seems to be a respectable, married woman of the Renaissance
court whose primary fault is the spurning of her would-be
suitor.

I do agree, however, with his assessment that her

refusal "precipitates a crisis for him both as poet and
lover."

Crises, especially when viewed in retrospect, are

not always bad.

They can, as they do for Astrophil, incite

personal and professional change, an idea that I will
develop more fully later.
Although Stella may not be "perverse," she is an
unwilling "reader" of Astrophil's words.

She hears, she

even "sees" (understands), but she does not respond in the
way he would have her do, as my later discussion of the
Eighth Song will suggest.

Because her personal

circumstances and objectives are in sharp contrast to those
of Astrophil, their dialogic relationship disintegrates.
Astrophil's poetry, his fiction, fails him in his personal
time of need.
Waller addresses this poetic failure in his discussion
of sixteenth-century poetry.

He accurately notes that

"poetry's ability to move its readers is not predictable or
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automatic; man may not be moved at all, or may not
translate vision into praxis" (EPSC 55).

Stella's ultimate

refusal to be moved by Astrophil's provocative narrative of
"Lovers never knowne" and Desdemona's gradual willingness
to be wooed by Othello's equally seductive story represent
two opposing roles assumed by readers of texts:

the reader

who refuses to enter into reciprocal relationship with the
author through the written word and the one who agreeably
partners herself with the author and the text.
For author, text, and reader to consummate a
relationship, the reader must, like Desdemona, be swept
along by the seduction, by the persuasive wooing, of the
word.

Waller describes this activity as the rhetorical

relationship between writer/text/reader, an activity which,
if it is to succeed, requires active participation from the
reader.

He argues,
When we read, we temporarily adopt a new 'self,'
one suggested by the poem and our experience of
reading it. The play between that flickering
self, the self with which we started to read the
poem, and the reconstituted self we have when we
finish reading the poem is, it has been
suggested, part of the essential value of reading
poetry— perhaps even of reading in general.
(EESC 55)

Something tangible occurs when a reader willingly embraces
the words of another.

She becomes something that she was

not before? her inner being is altered into a
"reconstituted self" as she intellectually and emotionally
assimilates the drama recounted by the writer.
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Paul Ricoeur says this tangible something is
understanding of the words in the text.

Expressing

Waller's explanation another way in The Conflict of
Interpretationsf Ricoeur says "to understand, for a finite
being, is to be transported into another life" fCl 5).
Ricoeur's "another life" and Waller's "reconstituted self"
are hermeneutic renderings of the same idea.

Any

understanding that comes from a textual experience is the
direct result of the reader partnering herself with the
writer through his words; the process is like unto that
faith relationship between the Christian and his God.
Just as Karl Barth argues that the Christian's
rational decision to believe in God creates a dialogic
event between himself and God, so the reader's willful act
to partner herself with writer and text is a kind of goodfaith gesture (JDQ 28).

The result is a-brief interlude of

transcendence as the reader "temporarily adopts a new
'self'" in her perusal of the text.

For at least a while,

she encounters the "other" who penned the text (the absent
presence of the author) and the "other" who speaks to her
from the words on the printed page (the absent presence of
the character or persona who is central to the text).
This temporary union comes about through rhetorical
and literary factors working in unison, not the least of
which is the persona.

The persona does not have to be a

character within the action (although he or she may be),
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but his (or her) presence does dominate the text.

As one

of the early British writers to create a persona who is
sustained throughout a text, Sidney successfully
incorporates a relatively innovative literary technique in
his sonnet sequence.

Ferry recognizes that

Sidney is viewed as crucial in this development
for his invention of Astrophil as the first
persona in English poetry who controls 'with
recognizable voice and attitudes' the whole
sequence, as Petrarch's poet-lover shapes his
poems to Laura.
(XL 14)
Although Ferry fails to acknowledge that Chaucer previously
introduced a sustained narrator in his Canterbury Tales,
she justifiably credits Sidney for presenting a text with a
perceptibly singular voice operating within the narrative.
Something which we take for granted, a solid presence
emerging and a discernible voice speaking from a text, is
that which most notably distinguishes Sidney's sonnetsequence from the sonnets of his peers, Wyatt and Surrey.
Not incidentally because of its incipience and
relative simplicity, the persona of Astrophil seems to be a
logical subject for a study of the workings of the absent
presence.

Unencumbered by the stream-of-consciousness

thought processes of more modern personae, Astrophil's
musings of the heart and mind are rather straightforward,
thus facilitating our analytical task.

That is not to

suggest that as both persona and character Astrophil is
simple or that his actions are simplistic.

Indeed, his wit
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tends to disarm, even on occasion to confuse, the reader.
The vacillations in the emotions that denote his character
serve to represent a lover who is totally human, driven by
the combined complexities of the intellectual and sexual
desires of the personality.
These vacillations and sometimes confusing emotional
gyrations may be explained through Bakhtin's idea of
"architectonics,11 which he discusses in Art and
Answerabi1ity.

Although the term is rather fluid, subject

to Bakhtin's own revisions in his various essays, it can
lend some credence to the concept of the absent presences
that operate within and through the relationships of
author/text/reader.

If we view architectonics as the

aesthetic wholeness that comprises a text, then we might
begin to see how that text comes into being.

Bakhtin

argues:
Every word in narrative literature expresses a
reaction to another reaction, the author's
reaction to the reaction of the hero; that is
every concept, image, and object lives on two
planes, is rendered meaningful in two valuecontexts— in the context of the hero and in
that of the author.
fAA xxxi-xxxii)
Astrophil's narrative may develop within the mind of the
persona who is also hero (the central character), but it is
Sidney who provides the energia that creates the thrust of
the story.

The witty contradictions and resulting

confusions, according to Bakhtin's analysis, suggest the
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interplay between author and hero, between Sidney and
Astrophil.

They allow us, as readers, to see an individual

in process, an individual whose identity we can help to
formulate.

From the rhetorical perspective, Astrophil is a

present possibility who is defined by the absences that
surround him.
Specifically, he is crafted through the combined
efforts of writer and reader, absences that reach from both
sides of the text in order to fashion a meaningful whole.
The poet, operating from his position within the rhetorical
triangle, commands discernible presence.

Fashioned through

the poet's energia, this authorial presence, according to
Kimbrough, comprises
artistic integrity. The literary ethos of the
writer becomes the ethos of the work, the basis
of its delight, the force of its persuasion, and
the means of its instruction. Because of the
doctrine of imitation, the work is not the
writer; the work belongs equally to the writer
and the reader since it is the marriage of
art and nature.
fSPS 55)
All three positions of written discourse
(writer/text/reader) thus mutually engage to produce
meaning.

The rhetorical triangle is alluded to by Plato,

articulated by Aristotle, and put into play through God's
Word.

And the reading of Sidney's Astrophil and Stella

suggests that a text is also filtered through and subtly
fashioned by the personal experiences of the individual who
explores the text.
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Sidney, the student of classical rhetoric,
incorporates a myriad of factors to effect successful
communication between writer and reader.

For Sidney, the

rupture between wit and will, the need for Invention and
energia, the recognition of the Christian Logos, the
application of the Platonic Idea, and the absence of the
reader all fuse into the integrated whole which is the
meaningful text.

One rhetorical or literary entity cannot

adequately be considered apart from the whole, because each
is contingent upon the other.

Ake Bergvall addresses this

rhetorical issue in The "Enabling of Judgment."
The thought that the poetical text should be
considered in isolation, like a well-wrought urn
or like a centripetal galaxy of signifiers, would
have been unthinkable to a Sidney, a Spenser or a
Shakespeare.
Equally foreign to them would have
been the notion that their poetry was the
spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings, the
self-expression of the poet. Nor would they have
understood the more extreme exponents of
reception theory that claim interpretative
omnipotence for the reader. The ontology of
Elizabethan poetics, as far as it is rhetorically
oriented, resides not in the sender, the
receiver, or the message, but in the process of
communication which they together represent.
(19)
The responsibility of the sender (the writer) is great.
His success, however, is in great part determined by the
response of the reader.

It is through manipulating the

language and establishing subtle parameters of
interpretation that the writer can hope to "meet” the
reader in that textual instant of shared understanding.

A
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persona, such as Sidney's Astrophil, is crucial to
establishing such an aesthetic encounter.
As Wolfgang Iser assesses in The Act of Reading.
"grasping11 a text and appropriating meaning is neither
automatic nor assured for the reader.

He describes a

process of communication, a process through which the
reader might come to a greater understanding of self,
world, and creator.

The process is often unpredictable, as

the reader fluctuates between comprehension and confusion.
But in order to be ultimately productive through the
encounter, the reader must subject herself to "a dialectic
of protension and retention, conveying a future horizon yet
to be occupied, along with a past (and continually fading)
horizon already filled" (&B 112).

The benefits, according

to Iser, outweigh the frustrations because the text can
eventually become a subtle tool of instruction or behavior
modification for the reader herself.

He suggests that

every reading moment sends out stimuli into the
memory, and what is recalled can activate the
perspectives in such a way that they continually
modify and so individualize one another. Our
example shows that reading does not merely flow
forward, but that recalled segments also have a
retroactive effect, with the present transforming
the past.
(£S 115)
The "stimuli" to which Iser refers come primarily through
the perspectives of characters within the narrative.
Through the language, the actions, and the reactions of the
different characters, the reader might glean what Iser
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calls "configurative meaning" — not plenitude, but at least
partial understanding of self, world, and creator (&B 112).
Astrophil is not Sidney's only character in the
sequence, but he is the one whom the reader personally
encounters through the text.

Sonnet 14 alludes to a

nameless, apparently well-meaning, friend who questions
Astrophil's motives for pursuing Stella, but we readers are
not privileged with his acquaintance.

The only other

character whom we "see" is, of course, Stella, but we must
look at her through the eyes of Astrophil.

Waller warns

that
We should not forget how firmly Astrophil and
Stella is encoded within a male-dominated
discourse.
Stella is, like other Petrarchan
mistresses, reduced to a disconnected set of
characteristics, acknowledged only as she is
manipulated by or impinges on her lover's
consciousness. She is entirely the product of
her poet-lover's desires.
Sidney's sonnets
provide a theatre of desire in which the man has
all the active roles, and in which the woman is
silent or merely iconic, most present when she
refuses him or is absent.
fEPSC 146)
The operative statement in this passage is "most present
when she refuses him or is absent."

Since Stella, in the

"real" arena of Sidney's recreated world of poetry, refuses
Astrophil's various appeals,
another world to find

the poet-lover reaches into

solace for his pain.

He retreats

into his aesthetic world in order to make meaning out of
what appears to be a meaningless, non-existent
relationship.

He finds comfort in words, words that like a

172
two-edged sword have both the power to destroy and the
power to heal.

Recognizing that his words of persuasive

endearment to Stella were the cause of his beleaguered
state, he bemoans "unhappie word*1 because "to my selfe my
selfe did give the blow" (Sonnet 33).

Astrophil thus

assumes full responsibility for his situation.

In doing

so, he ultimately will be able to reconcile himself to
Stella's absence.
Although he does not succeed in changing the external
conditions (Stella's refusal), he does, before the
conclusion of the sequence, alter the internal struggle,
allowing his "erected wit" to supersede his "infected
will."

This recognition, however, does not come easily.

He has to endure Stella's disdain; he has to come to terms
with her public rejection of him.

Wishing to be granted

the intimacy she gives her dog (the famous lap-dog sonnet
59), Astrophil slowly and painfully begins to comfort
himself through her absence.

He imagines a world in which

absence becomes the catalyst whereby Stella welcomes his
erotic advances.

He thus begins to "rewrite" his story of

hoped-for love:
But when the ruggedst step of Fortunes race
Makes me fall from her sight, then sweetly she
With words, wherein the Muses treasures be,
Shewes love and pitie to my absent case.
Now I wit-beaten long by hardest Fate,
So dull am, that I cannot looke into
The ground of this fierce Love and lovely hate:
Then some good body tell me how I do,
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Whose presence, absence, absence presence is;
Blist in my curse, and cursed in my blisse.
(Sonnet 60)
The prospect is not perfect because he recognizes that
absence is a curse.

Conversely, though, he admits that his

curse is also his bliss.

Somehow, and he does not seem to

be fully cognizant yet of how, Stella's absence will effect
something that is either positive or productive.
Of course, for the poet-lover that will become the
text, the artistic recreation of that which was hoped-for.
It is at this juncture in Sidney's sonnet sequence that we
see the blurring of the relationship between absent
presence as that which inspires the text and absent
presence as that which becomes a character in the
narrative.

Steiner succinctly explains this process.

According to his analysis,
The word 'character' does not mean the actual
marker on the page. . . . But it is, very
exactly, the quantum leap between the character
as letter and character as presence, and as a
presence often far richer, more exigent of
exploring assent, far more lasting than our
own, which makes the point.
(EE 212)
The character of Stella, then, becomes more than a sixletter name; she becomes a viable presence, one who can
impact the poet-lover's writing and subsequently command
the reader's attention.
Ultimately through his artistic endeavor as poetlover, Astrophil comes to view his detoured relationship
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with Stella as that which fuels his artistry:
Wit, and thou my Vertue art" (#64).

"Thou art my

Addressing his absent

presence, Stella, who is both audience and player in his
text, Astrophil comments on the correlation between life
(the actual) and art (the recreated).

Whether truly

experienced (a priori) or "experienced" in the imagination
(a posteriori), the physical and spiritual arenas of
humanity provide the breeding ground for artistic
creativity.

It is the "stuff" of life itself that

comprises art.
Most critics of Sidney overlook what seem to be his
deliberate associations between Stella/art/wit, and
Stella/Virtue/art.

Inclusion of the pronoun "my" suggests

a sequential relationship within the two sets of nouns:
Stella, through Astrophil's wit, becomes the poet-lover's
art; and Stella, because of that art, becomes the poetlover rs greatest virtue.

This sonnet, along with Sonnet

33, seems to negate Kalstone's argument that "Always the
victim, Astrophil appears to be involved in perpetual
conflict, perpetual motion.

He moves, a witty commentator,

among personified virtues and public demands"

( SP:CI

150).

Astrophil is in "perpetual conflict, perpetual motion," but
he is not a victim, especially if we consider a critical
line in Sonnet 33:
blow."

"But to my selfe my selfe did give the

Astrophil does not share with his readers precisely

how he gave the blow. However, we have to infer that he
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takes responsibility for his actions, that he chooses to
make himself vulnerable through pursuit of love for Stella.
If Astrophil were fully victimized by Stella, he as poetlover would have become ineffectual and powerless.

He

would not have been able to use Stella's absence to empower
the written word.

Astrophil may not have been able to

persuade Stella in her present presence to succumb to his
erotic overtures, but he is fully in control of Stella's
absent presence.

As poet-lover, as commander of the

written word, he can use the detoured relationship to
create a text that speaks the universal language of love in
its various dimensions— lust, desire, excitement,
deprivation, pain, loss, and possibly even emotional
regeneration through the written word.
That regeneration does not come without a struggle, a
death-in-life and life-in-death struggle that finds
expression through the written word.

Just as the emotional

upheaval disrupts Astrophil's sense of well-being, so the
rhetorical disruption frustrates the reader.

Astrophil's

personal struggle epitomizes the operation of the
hermeneutic spiral, the struggle of the reader as she seeks
to glean meaning from a text.

The reader thinks she has

given meaning and "life” to a passage, only to find that
meaning "killed" in subsequent sonnets.

But the "killing"

of one idea is supplanted by the "life" of another— a
process that has the potential for continuing ad infinitum.
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Kalstone describes this roller-coaster process that unites
persona and reader:
Astrophil's role is one of sustained alertness
and questioning in exercises of varied
sensibility. We never are allowed to rest with
an attitude, a gesture; for the next sonnet may
exactly contradict an expressed view or remind us
that a particular experience is momentary or that
a newly discovered truth leads only to further
complexities. Our delight depends . . . firmly
upon the persona the poet creates for us— that
of questioning critic.
fSPrCI 131-32)
As a willing and an active participant in the rhetorical
process, the reader likewise finds herself in the death-inlife and life-in-death struggles that are experienced by
the persona.

She translates his aesthetically created

experiences into meaning for herself.
Centuries ahead of his time as rhetorical theorist and
literary critic, Sidney alludes to that issue which
Kalstone addresses:

the frequently painful process of

coming to knowledge.

Through his persona Astrophil,

Sidney explains how experience is translated into poetry.
The poetic duplication always falls short of the actual
drama because the printed words necessarily herald the
"death" of the experience.

Nevertheless, the experience

demands utterance by the poet-lover:
Stella, the fulnesse of my thoughts of thee
Cannot be staid within my panting breast,
But they do swell and struggle forth of me,
Till that in words thy figure be exprest.
And yet as soone as they so formed be,
According to my Lord Loves owne behest:
With sad eyes I their weake proportion see,
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To portrait that which in this world is best.
So that I cannot chuse but write my mind,
And cannot chuse but put out what I write,
While these poore babes their death in birth do
find.
(Sonnet 50)
Because of the reductive quality of language (both written
and spoken, according to Derrida), Astrophil laments that
his words are only a "weake proportion" of Stella and of
his love for her.

He recognizes that a part of the

experience of real feelings, a part of the vitality of real
emotions, necessarily dies when that experience is
"birthed" upon the printed page.

Just as absence denotes

cleavage between lover and his unrequited beloved, so the
printed word creates cleavage between writer and reader of
the text.
This cleavage, however, may not
negatively.

If it is applied to the

always operate
reader in

her search

for understanding self/world/creator, cleavage may be that
which prompts a greater search for knowledge.

As Ong,

in

Interfaces of the Word, argues:
Alienation, cleavage, is not all bad. To
understand other things and themselves, to grow,
human beings need not only proximity but also
distance, even from themselves. Out of
alienation, and only out of alienation, certain
greater unities can come.
(IE 47)
Ong suggests that the "greater" unity is selfhood, a sense
of human consciousness that enables the individual to find
value in self, even in a self that has suffered rejection.
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The recognition of "otherness," of something that is not me
brings greater understanding of who I am.
will prompt Astrophil to exclaim:

It is that which

"That in my woes for

thee thou art my joy,/ And in my joyes for thee my only
annoy" (Sonnet 108).
relationship:

Again, we see a sequential

thee/art/joy which is in antinomical

relationship to joyes/thee/annoy.

Stella, having finally

become his art, is now his joy; and it is only because of
his joy of that art that he continues to allow those
annoying thoughts of her to intrude into his imagination.
The crisis has yielded a greater knowledge of self.
The willful process is much like the one that William
Butler Yeats employs to create the emotional impact for his
poetry.

Repeatedly, Yeats proposed to Maud Gonne,

apparently realizing all the while that she would refuse.
Those refusals created material for the poet-lover,
material that Yeats creatively manipulated to enact the
emotional drama for his Beloved poems.

The poet-lover's

emotional suffering thus becomes, in the words of Yeats, a
choice:

"The intellect of man is forced to choose/

Perfection of the life, or of the work" ("The Choice").
This principle seems to be that from which Astrophil finds
a modicum of solace.

He begins to see a light that is

flickering, but a light that is nevertheless visible, at
the end of his emotional tunnel of darkness.

It is "That

presence, which doth give darke hearts a living light"
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(Sonnet 77).

But the presence that will give light to his

dark heart, and to the similarly dark hearts of his readers
(what Plato calls his like-minded interlocutors), is the
absent presence of Stella.

No longer just a "marker on the

page," Stella, through the artistic prowess of her poetlover, has made what Steiner calls that "quantum leap" (EE
212) from absence to artistic presence— a leap into the
absent presence of aesthetics.

Because Astrophil submits,

albeit painfully and reticently, to the death pains of
love, he succeeds in birthing at least the hope for
artistic pleasure.
The emotional journey to that possibility for pleasure
is neither quick nor easy.

Astrophil will vacillate

between hope and despair for the rest of the sequence.

I

concur with Kalstone who says that he must participate in a
"ceremony of grief"
process differently.

( SP:CI

177), but I assess that grieving

Rather than creating a permanent

slough of despondency, the grieving frees him from the
shackles of the absent "other."

Sonnet 69 suggests the

beginning of this process:
Gone is the winter of my miserie,
My spring appeares, o see what here doth grow.
For Stella hath with words where faith doth
shine,
Of her high heart giv'n me the monarchie:
I, I, o I may say, that she is mine.
In an ironically positive way, Stella's words of refusal
have empowered the poet-lover.

They have returned to him
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the "monarchie" of his verbal talent, his poetic
expression, where he can reconstruct the tale of love, even
saying "that she is mine" if he so chooses.

In the form of

the absent presence, Stella becomes his to do with as he
wills.
Such an analysis is one that Sidney himself might have
embraced because he, too, envisioned poetry as an
epistemological journey— both for the poet and for the
reader of poetry.

Asserting that the poet, as "right

popular philosopher," is to "teach and delight" the reader,
Sidney advocates a process that will lead to "the most high
and excellent truth" fDefense 608, 611, 615).

Since

poetry, according to Sidney, leads to truth, the poetic
experience between poet and reader becomes one of intimate
mutuality.

Potentially, poetry can address every aspect of

being— self, world, creator.

Since the common denominator

for all three is love of knowledge, the poet becomes
philosopher.

As the poet-lover/philosopher attempts to

probe his inner being, as he strives to analyze his
physical surroundings, and as he seeks to understand the
Other who masterminded all that is, he begins his aesthetic
movement toward universal knowledge.
In this respect, poetry becomes
a valid branch of learning, for it is a mode of
growth. Through the practice of Art, Imitation,
and Exercise, the poet's wit is sharpened; and,
as it is sharpened, it becomes a more effective
tool for the discovery of the essential
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relationships and qualities of nature which are
hidden beneath the 'second nature' of everyday
reality. Through this ever-building process,
each succeeding imitation becomes 'better'— more
engaging and revealing.
(Kimbrough, £E£ 54-55)
Applying the principles set forth in the Defense. Kimbrough
argues that the poet is divinely gifted with the "Art";
inherent in that divine gift is an "erected wit" that
enables him to comprehend and translate experience for his
readers.

Through his diligence and hard work, through

"Imitation" of other poets, he can hone that gift.

But it

is primarily through "Exercise," primarily through
subjecting himself to emotional growth which comes through
the joy and the pain of life itself, that he can complete
the poetic process.
In the final section of the sonnet sequence (Sonnets
74-108), Astrophil plots his painful "Exercise."

The

journey is one of wild emotional swings that range from his
tentative hope for a consummated relationship to a sudden
exhilaration, which is countered by harsh disappointment.
But because of feelings that cannot be killed by memory,
Astrophil allows the final frustration to be tempered by
love, a love that begins in cupiditas (#72) but ends in
caritas (#107).

The Second Song, continuing through

Sonnets 73 and 74, suggests Sidney's borrowing from Ovid,
but, as Mary Chan reminds us in "The Strife of Love in a

Pream and Sidney's Second Song in Astrophil and Stellaf»
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the two lovers reach dramatically different conclusions.
Having stolen a kiss from the sleeping Stella (Sonnet 74),
Astrophil is bolstered by the possibility that the desire
of his heart is within his grasp.

In a blazon that pays

tribute to her sensuality, he recognizes "That presence,
which doth give darke hearts a living light" (Sonnet 77).
Even that unresponsive presence, which sleeps through his
kiss, sparks an ember of hope.

It will be that same

presence, which he eventually translates into her absent
presence, that will sustain him through her final refusal.
Unlike Ovid's story of Priapus and Lotis, Astrophil's love
is not foiled by the harsh braying of a donkey; his love
begins a transformation of the self.
The fifth and eighth songs are crucial to the sonnetsequence because they reveal the inadequacy of words to
express the complex emotions of love.

The fifth song is

too long to quote in its entirety, but particular lines are
necessary to explain the process that enables the poetlover to move from total despair into artistic confidence.
While favour fed my hope, delight with hope was
brought,
Thought waited on delight, and speech did follow
thought,
Then grew my tongue and pen records unto thy
glory;
I thought all words were lost, that were not
spent of thee:
I thought each place was darke but where thy
lights would be,
And all eares worse then deafe, that heard not
out thy storie.
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But now that hope is lost, unkindness kils
delight,
Yet thought and speech do live, though
metamorphosd quite.
•

•

•

•

•

•

I thinke now of thy faults, who late thought
of thy praise,
That speech falles now to blame, which did thy
honour raise,
The same key op'n can, which can locke up
a treasure.
(1-6, 13-14, 16-18)
In retrospect, Astrophil describes how he has moved up the
emotional ladder from hope to delight.

Prodded by thoughts

of possibility, he formerly recorded Stella's "glory."
Realizing "now that hope is lost," his writing proceeds
differently.
Because his perspective necessarily has changed,
because he has no legitimate claim on Stella, he must
"metamorphose" his "thought and speech."

That

metamorphosis, another Ovidian influence,4 is effected
through his art— through the recreation of the Astrophil
and Stella drama.

Placing himself in the position of

power, he proclaims that "The same key op'n can, which can
locke up a treasure."

The "key" that he holds is that

which was given to "the first light-giver" (Sidney, J3E
606).

It is the key that enables the poet-lover to probe

the inner workings of human emotions and then, through his
art, to share his findings with others who may likewise
seek to understand the complexities of life— and of love.
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The eighth song, however, recognizes that the art of
the written word yields incomplete understanding.

Because

it is only a duplication, only an artistic translation of
the actual experience, it necessarily is incomplete.

The

poet-lover, then, must solicit the assistance of love in
order to replicate presence.

He must temper her absent

presence with his love:
But when their tongues could not speake,
Love it selfe did silence breake;
Love did set his lips asunder,
Thus to speake in love and wonder.
(11. 25-28)
When the discourse is controlled by love, not simply by
ravenous lust, the seemingly impossible occurs:
lovingly responds!

Stella

Speaking for the first time in the

sequence, Stella admits that indeed she does love
Astrophil.

However, as the more sensible of the two, she

recognizes that her marriage to another makes their union
impossible.

Therefore, she forever dashes his hopes for a

relationship.
She further admonishes him to refrain from using terms
of endearment for her in public; calling her "Deere" would
cause her to blush, potentially revealing her feelings for
him:
Therefore, Deere, this no more move,
Least though I leave not thy love,
Which too deep in me is framed,
I should blush when thou art named.
(11. 97-100)
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Stella thus permanently removes her physical presence from
him; Astrophil honors her request and no longer refers to
her as "Deere."

In "Leaving him so passion rent," she

exemplifies the power of words.

Hers were so brutally

incisive that they pierce even his artistic talent,
necessitating a mending of the near-fatal wound.
admits "That therewith my song is broken" (#104).

Astrophil
His song

is not dead; it is simply in need of repair, in need of
redirection.

This redirection comes through his

translating the actual presence of Stella into her absent
presence which will inhabit his poetry.
That translation is not easy because he retains the
pain from the rejection.
traytour absence."

In Sonnet 88, he commands: "Out

He admonishes her absent presence to

leave, to give him some relief, but it does not.

And the

reason that it does not leave is that he is in control of
it and does not really want it to depart.

Granted he is

miserable, but Stella's absent presence helps to assuage
that self-imposed misery.

Through it, he manages to

reclaim the former passion.

Then incorporating that

passion into his poetry, he artistically captures those
emotions that continue to fuel his love:

"That living thus

in blackest winter night,/ I feele the flames of hottest
sommer day" (Sonnet 89).

He may be in the blackest night

of rejection, but focusing on Stella's absent presence
sparks the flames of his desire.

Her absent presence,
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which he perpetuates through his memory, thus becomes an
anodyne to his injured being.
bitter.

The medicine, however, is

It causes him to wonder "What inke is blacke

inough to paint my wo?" (Sonnet 93)

And before he finds

the effective ink, before he rewrites his tale of love, he
necessarily must experience the grief; he must undergo a
difficult process.

It is admittedly painful, but the

artistic rendering of the experience serves to assuage his
emotional hurt:

"Only with paines my paines thus eased

be,/ That all thy hurts in my harts wracke I reede;/ I cry
thy sighs; my deere, thy teares I bleede" (Sonnet 93).
Through artistic reversal, in which he imagines Stella
sharing his pain and hurt, Astrophil finds comfort in
retributive musings.

Thus begins the process through which

he "kills" the would-be experience with the real Stella and
"births" the artistic experience with her absent presence.
He must come to accept that "0 absent presence Stella is
not here" (Sonnet 106).

This is the first step to healing,

the first movement toward regeneration.

Stella is not, and

never again will be, with him in full presence.
After making this pivotal admission, Astrophil turns
to that which can comfort him— his art.

He makes a

significant move to reclaim that which Stella almost
managed to take from him.

In Sonnet 107, he admits to the

sovereign place which Stella retains in his heart, but he
commands her to submit that sovereignty to him:
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Stella since thou so right a Princesse art
Of all the powers which life bestowes on me,
That ere by them ought undertaken be,
They first resort unto that soveraigne part;
Sweete for a while give respite to my hart,
Which pants as though it still should leape
to thee:
And on my thoughts give thy Lieftenancy
To this great cause, which needs both use and
art.
And as a Queene, who from her presence sends
Whom she imployes, dismisse from thee my wit,
Till it have wrought what thy owne will attends.
These are the last of Astrophil's words that are directed
specifically to Stella, and the message is clear:

he once

again intends to control his "wit" and his "will."
Astrophil, the poet-lover, thus echoes the words of his
maker Sidney.

If he is not master of his "erected wit," he

cannot hope to rise above his "infected will."
Astrophil's struggle for mastery continues.

He pleads

with Stella to "dismisse from thee my wit," but he
recognizes that Stella, who is now an absent presence,
intrudes with her "owne will."

We must remember, however,

that he now furnishes her with that will.

As poet-lover,

Astrophil controls Stella's absent presence.
who allows her intrusion.

He is the one

At the conclusion of Sonnet 107,

Astrophil is not fully prepared to forego presence; he is
not yet ready to reconcile himself to Stella's absent
presence.

He has not yet committed himself to an artistic

duplication of Stella.
The sequence ends before we witness Astrophil's final
move toward the reclamation of all his poetic powers.
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However, the sequence itself indisputably proves his
success.

Having dutifully followed the instructions of his

Muse to "looke in Thy heart and write," the poet-lover ends
the beginning of his ontological journey.

When he removes

his gaze from Stella and focuses on his skill as a poet, he
begins the transition from lover to poet-lover.

The

concluding sonnet suggests that his hope for a relationship
with Stella has ended, but it also affirms that the future
for his poetic greatness is imminent.
Incorporating fire imagery, Astrophil describes the
process whereby his sorrow is purified into something
worthwhile.

Like the mythological phoenix that consumed

itself by fire, then rose from ashes into new life,
Astrophil likewise submits his love for Stella to the
purifying fire of art.

His love for Stella will not be

destroyed; it simply will assume a new life:
art.

the life of

He thus "rejoices in his love" because
That experience and its expression in poetry are
fused in the dramatic soliloquy: love is
experienced in the act of giving it poetic form.
The lover persuades us that he truly loves
because the poet does, so that the fact of loving
becomes 'real' through fiction.
(Hamilton, gP§ 14, 85)

Love continues to be the force that drives the poet-lover.
It is only because of the painful vacillations of that love
that he has a story to tell.

It is only from the

humiliating experience of rejected love that he has the
drama.

This recognition is what compels him to exclaim in
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the concluding lines:

"That in my woes for thee thou art

my joy,/ And in my joyes for thee my only annoy."
the woes, he would not have the joy.
he would not have his art.

Without

Without the refusal,

Without the absence, he would

not have the absent presence that creates and perpetuates
his art.

Because of love that was for the presence and

because of love that is for the absent presences of his
beloved and of his reader, the poet-lover creates his text.
In the introduction to his Visions of Presence in
Modern America, Nathan A. Scott adeptly summarizes the
poet's universal quest for presence:
The poetic world is rooted in the concrete
particularity of lived experience? and poetic
art, in its deepest aspect, is a way of loving
the concrete, the particular, the individual.
But, of course, to love is to enter the dimension
of what the French Catholic philosopher Gabriel
Marcel called presence; it is to approach a given
reality out of a sense of its having the
character of a Thou. . . . The intensity of
its love for the quiddities and haecceities of
experience conditions the poetic imagination, in
other words, to view whatever it contemplates as
ignited by the capacity for exchange, for
reciprocity:
it has the dimension of presence.
(2-3)
In a labor of love for his readers, Sidney, who speaks
through his persona Astrophil, textually examines the
"thisness" and the "whatness" of some of the inherent
truths of his universe.

Although those truths may be

complex and may be difficult for the finite mind of his
reader to comprehend, the task is not impossible.

As she

commensurately offers herself to a reciprocally loving
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exchange, which demands both her emotional and her
intellectual submission, Sidney's reader may enter that
"dimension of presence" which allows an interlude of
understanding.
Following a similar discussion, Theodore Spencer says
that part of Sidney's greatness is that he "challenges" his
reader into presence, almost forcing the reader into a "new
reality."
This reality, this depth and pungency, we
recognize as belonging not only to Sidney's
awareness, but— as happens with all great
poetry— as creative of a new awareness in
ourselves. The art, the exercise and imitation
which Sidney so assiduously practised . . .
resulted, in the best of the sonnets in Astrophil
and Stella, in poetry to which all lovers of
honesty and directness must continually return.
In this essential respect, it is Sidney . . . who
is the most central of English poets in the
generation that was soon to know Shakespeare.
("PSPS" 58)
And as we turn to Shakespeare, I will argue that he takes
up the artistic gauntlet thrown down by Sidney.

In his

version of a sonnet series, Shakespeare, like Sidney before
him and Dickinson after him, probes absence, presence, and
the determinable effects of an absent presence as manifest
through readers who come to a "new awareness of ourselves."
Dependent upon neither total agreement with the text nor
explicit identification with the persona, this "new
awareness" is the result of temporary partnering of the
self, who is reader, with the writer and his words.

Chapter 5
The Absent Presence
in
Shakespeare's Sonnets
Shakespeare's sonnets provide further substantiation
of the role of the persona in the literary triangle of
reader/writer/persona that originates from the rhetorical
triangle of reader/writer/text.

Focusing on the persona of

Will, I suggest that Shakespeare provides a different
example of a textually present, but physically absent,
presence that dominates the reading experience.
Specifically, his poet-lover, who also is his persona,
assumes a major, rather than a tentative, role within the
struggle of locating presence-in-absence.
Borrowing the words of Mary E. Hazard, who writes in
"Absent Presence and Present Absence:

Cross-Couple

Convention in Elizabethan Culture," Will is the "fictive
author" whose tale we read.

Will is not Shakespeare, just

as Astrophil is not Sidney, even though partial
correspondence between poet and poet-lover may be
discerned.

However, Will, a character fashioned and

empowered by Shakespeare, becomes a powerful player whose
presence dominates the text.

As

the fictive author [he] is freed to enact the
role of poet and to create the monumental
presence of his poem. All the while, by a subtle
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twist of the paradox of absent presence, the
historical creator of each cycle hovers as the
real author to be more or less identified with
the fictive sonneteer as the maker of the
monument. The ambiguity of the degree of
identification between the poet and his persona
defies resolution whether the trope enacts absent
presence, present absence, or some chiasmic
middle state between the two. Certain it is,
though, that the [text] is an enduring fullness
of presence.
("CCC" 4)
In disclosing his technique for translating absence into
presence, Will who is the “fictive sonneteer” shares a
close, albeit “ambiguous," kinship to his creator
Shakespeare.

The reader witnesses a fluctuating textual

interplay between creator and persona, akin

to that which

exists between Sidney and Astrophil.1

is not poet-

Poet

lover, but they function together within a dynamic
relationship that aesthetically acts upon the reader.
Joel Fineman's text Shakespeare's Perjured Eve offers
relevance to this and other issues that will be raised in
this chapter.

Regarding the dynamic relationship between

poet-lover and poet which incites a dynamism between text
and reader, Fineman comments:
Poetry has an energy, an energeia, and an
enargia, that animates poetic imitation. Poetry
is not simply a verisimilar imitation of the
real, nor is it a sermonizing rehearsal of the
ideal; it is instead a lively and an enlivening
representation of the real through the ideal.
(SEE 91)
My study presumes the opposite:

it argues for a

representation of the ideal, that which is desirable,
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through the real.

But, like Fineman, I, too, recognize a

force, an energy, that necessarily attends any
hermeneutically successful reading of a poem.

It is the

poet who provides the energeia, the Aristotelian term that
suggests actualization or "verisimilar imitation," but he
also must, according to Fineman, create enargia, a clarity
or vividness that also is necessary to engage a reader
successfully.

The reader's level of textual comprehension

is directly proportionate to the writer's rhetorical,
grammatical, literary, and creative skills (energeia
combined with enargia).

The two authorial "energies"

(which comprise the various skills of the writer)
determine, in great part, any meaning that is gleaned by
the reader.
We saw evidence of these aesthetic functions in
Sidney's Astrophil and Stella.

As Sidney incorporates both

energeia and enargia, he creates a text of multiple absent
presences.

On the rhetorical level Sidney, as author, is

absent from the text when the reader enters into dialogue
with him; conversely, the reader is likewise absent from
the poet when he creates the text.

On the literary level,

as depicted in the drama of Astrophil and Stella, the poetlover 's source of inspiration, whom he deems to be Stella
rather than God, is physically absent, but creatively
evident, as he put words to paper.

She, too (though not by

death), removes herself from the writer's physical presence
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before she can become a character in his drama.

As a means

of communicating this personal drama to his reader, the
poet Sidney allows his persona Astrophil to become his own
voice, both absent and assumed, in order to "speak" to the
one on the opposite side of the text.
I have argued in the previous chapter that Sidney's
poet-lover Astrophil has, by the end of the sonnet
sequence, successfully, albeit tentatively, empowered his
art.

Through an emotionally painful and- frequently

retrogressive process, he finally manages to follow the
mandate of his Muse to "looke in Thy heart and write."
Astrophil ostensibly begins with his looking outside
himself, specifically to Stella, for inspiration.

When she

physically (and permanently) removes herself from his
presence, he necessarily has to look elsewhere in order to
continue his poetic profession.

Forced to do so because of

the circumstances of a thwarted relationship, he looks into
himself, to his "heart," the emotional and artistic
cauldron of creativity that will enable him to craft her
absent presence into a viable entity within his poetry.
At the conclusion of the sequence, the reader senses
that the poet-lover, now as consummate artist but still
somewhat reticent persona, has begun to transcend his
actual situation with Stella.

Reconciling himself to move

beyond the personal failure, "using mine owne fiers might,"
he has tentatively resolved to control, even to restructure

195
if necessary, his emotional relationship with his beloved
Stella.

And he will do this through his words, the

artist's most powerful weapon "that works in me [to]
prevaile" (#108).

Recognizing himself as a player in the

struggle between emotions and art, Astrophil hands over the
personal relationship he desires with Stella and yields
himself to the artistic power that resides within.

He thus

moves rather quietly into his poetic world without Stella,
resigned to reclaim something worthwhile from the ashes of
their love.

And he will do this from his writer's

perspective in the rhetorical triangle of
writer/text/reader.
Although Shakespeare continues the sonnet tradition of
Petrarch and Sidney, he significantly reformulates it for
his own artistic purposes.

Commenting on Shakespeare's

variation of the convention, Fineman says
that Shakespeare's sonnets— both the sonnets to
the young man and the sonnets to the dark lady—
markedly distance themselves from the tradition
of idealizing poetry and poetic idealization that
they inherit and to which they regularly refer.
Shakespeare's young man sonnets
characteristically imply that the poetics of
praise they explicitly employ is somehow oldfashioned and exhausted.
(SEE 187-88)
Noting especially Fineman's assessment that Shakespeare
offers his sonnets as a refashioning of the tradition that
was "exhausted" and obsolete, we can observe some
distinctive differences between his persona and Astrophil.
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Although idealization may be a part of the relationship
between Will and his Fair Friend, it is not the whole of
the relationship.

Departing from tradition, Shakespeare

quite graphically relates the side that conflicts with the
ideal.

A major complication is in the form of the Dark

Lady who confuses not only Will but who also complicates
his relationship with the Fair Friend.
In the middle of this conflict and confusion is
Shakespeare's persona who, unlike Astrophil, exudes
authority rather than resignation.

Giving significantly

greater weight to the poet-lover's artistic power than does
Sidney, Shakespeare creates a persona who frequently
asserts that power grandiloquently, evidenced most
noticeably in the eternizing sonnets directed to Will's
Fair Friend:

"So long as men can breathe, or eyes can

see,/ So long lives this, and this gives life to thee"
(#18).

Shakespeare's poet-lover, with flamboyance and a

pre-Romantic idealism, presents his art as a tangible means
for defying "old time," the ravager of youth and beauty
(#19).

So long as the printed poem survives, Shakespeare's

persona asserts that his beloved will remain forever young
within the created text.

Hazard describes this dynamism as

"the presence of the book which is created from the pain of
nothingness and which materializes the paradoxes of absence
and presence" ("CCC" 5).

Through the gift of aesthetic

perpetuity, the poet reifies the paradox of present-though-
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absent.

That art (a poem) is the physical entity that the

artist leaves to his readers as evidence of artistic
immortality— both for his beloved and for himself.
Specifying that tendency to which Sidney alludes in
the concluding sonnet of his sequence, Shakespeare's Sonnet
19 compares the process to that of the "long-lived
phoenix."

Pitting the power of his pen against the

ravaging, debilitating effects of time, the poet-lover
writes:
Devouring Time, blunt thou the lion's paws,
And make the earth devour her own sweet brood.
Pluck the keen teeth from the fierce tiger's
jaws,
And burn the long-lived phoenix in her blood.
Make glad and sorry seasons as thou fleet'st,
And do whate'er thou wilt, swift-footed Time,
To the wide world and all her fading sweets,
But I forbid thee one most heinous crime,
Oh, carve not with thy hours my love's fair brow,
Nor draw no lines there with thine antique pen.
Him in thy course untainted do allow
For beauty's pattern to succeeding men.
Yet do thy worst, old time. Despite thy
wrong,
My love shall in my verse ever live young.
The poet-lover cannot halt the ravages of time in his
corporeal world any more than the mythical phoenix could
prevent his burning to ashes.

However, the poet, like his

mythical counterpart, has a means for combatting total
annihilation of the mortal self.

He has his words on the

printed page.
Circumventing boundaries of time and place, the words
of the poet are perpetually reborn in the minds of his
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readers.

Like the phoenix who repeatedly consumes itself

in fire, then rises from smoldering ashes to new life, the
words of the poet are consumed and put away by one reader
only to be given life by another.
continual flux.

The cycle is one of

Since flux connotes fluidity and vitality,

the text of the poet becomes his aesthetic and literary
means of countering mortality.

The phoenix is, as Stephen

Booth reminds us in his notes on Shakespeare's sonnets, "a
symbol of immortality" (S£ 162).

Although the poet's overt

premise may be to eternize his beloved, his fundamental
purpose, according to Jacques Maritain, is, much like the
mythical phoenix which eternizes itself, to beget "the
offspring of his [own] soul and his [own] spirit" (87).
Sidney may be credited for recognizing the poet as maker
(Defense 615), but Shakespeare is one of the first British
poets who daringly unleashes and unashamedly proclaims the
creative power of the artist.

Through his created matter,

which is the poem, the poet additionally creates
communication with his readers.
And it is through this aesthetic communication that
Shakespeare, more specifically than Sidney, explores the
role of the writer as creator.

In the triangular

relationships within the rhetorical situation joining
text/reader/writer and in the literary exercise engaging
reader/persona/creator, Shakespeare's persona commands a
remarkably vivid presence.

Using his persona Will who is
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poet-lover, Shakespeare focuses on the stance of the
writer/creator of a literary work as he manipulates his
•'voice" to elicit a response from his readers.

As a result

of this endeavor, the persona of Will becomes the primary
"character."
Not a character in the traditional sense of one who is
presented through direct exposition, he nevertheless is "a
distinct psychological entity" (Weiser, MS 45).

His story

(if we can presume to call it that) catalogs his emotional
responses to the changing relationships he experiences with
two significant others in his life, his Fair Friend and his
Dark Lady.

Presumably created neither to expose a life

that parallels that of the author nor to expound an
esoteric theory of human emotions, Shakespeare's persona
plots the realistic struggle of one who is seeking the
ideal but who is bombarded by the destructive tendencies
attending everyman.
Cautioning readers in their perusal of Shakespeare's
Sonnets. C. L. Barber argues that we should:
read the poems not as tantalizing clues [that
point to Shakespeare's personal life] but as
expressions of man's experience. When we do so,
we find that, though they do not tell a story,
they do express a personality. They are gestures
of love, concern, disappointment, anger or
disgust, profoundly and candidly conveyed.
("ESS" 6)
Human emotions and the inherent conflicts that emanate from
"man's experience" provide the material for Shakespeare's
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collection of sonnets.

The poet draws upon his social

milieu in the structuring of his art.

His persona may, in

part, be self-reflexive, but we should be ever-mindful that
the persona who speaks from the text is an aesthetic
creation who approximates psychic reality— replete with its
hope, its joy, its anger, its jealousy, and its
frustration.

Frequently paradoxical and illogical (at

times even ludicrous), these psychological confusions are
the elements which define human experience.
We also need to remember that a cultural practice of
Renaissance experience was that of intimate non-sexual,
male-to-male relationships.

G. Wilson Knight takes up this

discussion in The Mutual Flame where he asserts "that the
terms 'friend' and 'lover' were in Elizabethan England
interchangeable" (ME 24).

Developing from the premise that

Will's relationship with the Fair Friend is one of intense
passion, but not necessarily one of homosexual passion, I
will argue that the difficulties of Shakespeare's poetlover are similar, in kind, to those emanating from
traditional friend-to-friend relationships which are driven
by love.
Like W. Thomas MacCary, I disagree with Joseph
Pequigney's homosexual reading of the relationship between
Will and his Fair Friend.

2

In his review of Pequigney's

book, MacCary calls into question Pequigney's
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claims that Shakespeare claims that he had sexual
relations with another man which were satisfying,
gratifying, even purifying. This seems a gross
misinterpretation. Whatever the Sonnets
are . . . they are not a paean to the carnal
pleasures of homosexual passion.
(229)
Will's passion for the Fair Friend is real; it is the
catalyst for the creativity that allows him to become poetlover.

Certainly not all of Shakespeare's readers will be

poet-lovers, as is Will.

But presumably all of his readers

do experience intense, even passionate, friend-to-friend
relationships that bespeak the same kinds of problems as
those vocalized by Will.

These problems, what Barber

refers to as "gestures of love, concern, disappointment,
anger or disgust" ("ESS" 6), create a point of identity
between reader and players in the text.

Because

Shakespeare's readers should be able to relate (at least at
some rudimentary level) to these typically human "gestures"
set forth by the writer, they should likewise be able to
bridge the gap between text and reader as they witness the
musings of his persona Will.
This chapter will attempt to show how the writer uses
his very human persona to engage the reader.

The ensuing

relationship, made possible through the literary text,
branches off from the original rhetorical triangle of
text/writer/reader.

This literary triangle of

reader/persona/creator affirms the writer's skill as he
strives intellectually, spiritually, and emotionally to

202
"speak" to his readers.

Employing sound rhetorical,

creative, and literary principles (energeia and enargia),
he wields his art through a textual medium that will allow
him to communicate with his readers.

Through his aesthetic

endeavor, which is his poetry, he thus presumes to forge
rhetorical relationships with readers in perpetuity— or for
as long as "this [poem] with thee remains" (#74).
The Shakespearean passages that I employ to support my
premise will be from Stephen Booth's Shakespeare's Sonnets,
and I will rely heavily on the editorial comments made by
Booth in his definitive work on Shakespeare as sonneteer.
I readily concede that misinterpretation is potentially
inherent with any reading of a work which has the
complexity and magnitude of these 154 sonnets.
Referring to the problematic nature of Shakespeare's
sonnet-sequence, Robert Crosman says that it is "difficult
to read" ("MLNA" 476), while Knight recognizes that the
sequence raises one "difficult subject" after another fMF
34).

Booth clearly expresses, and provides partial

solution, for this rhetorical conundrum:
Is it not an editor's aim to make a modern
reader's experience of the text as like as
possible to that of the audience for which it was
written? Whenever an editor modernizes a text,
he risks distorting it; whenever 'the plain
reader' looks at an unmodemized Renaissance
text, he risks distorting it; since one of
them must stick his neck out, it should be the
one who is trained and paid to do it. No editor
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is likely to succeed perfectly in accommodating a
modern reader and a Renaissance text to one
another, but that is no reason to do nothing.
(££ 448)
As Booth warns, we must recognize from the start that we
who are modern readers of a Renaissance text will not
achieve plenitude; we will not even approximate the
understanding achieved by Shakespeare's contemporaries.
However, we still might engage in some level of meaningful
discourse.
We are once again reminded of Kenneth Burke's

h

Grammar of Motives, a text that emphasizes the reductive
quality of language, especially a language such as our
English which has significantly evolved through the
centuries.

Because the language of the British Renaissance

isdifferent, connotatively

and idiomatically, from that

which weknow and use, the applications that I
necessarily will risk distortion and reduction.

make
As much as

possible, though, I will rely on the erudite comments of
Booth to temper that distortion so that it does not
blatantly disregard the nuances of Shakespeare's language.
Inherent in my analysis is the assumption that
Shakespeare's sonnets are indeed a sequence, although some
scholars dispute such a premise.

One such critic is

Hallett Smith whose The Tension in the Lvre argues
otherwise.

Commenting on some of the differences that he
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feels separate Shakespeare from his British predecessors,
Smith writes:
In other collections of Elizabethan sonnets, most
of which can be called sequences with better
justification than this one can, the beautiful
person celebrated is a woman. . . . First of all,
the Fair Friend has one quality in common with
the heroines of Elizabethan sonnet cycles
addressed to women: he is beautiful.
But unlike
the ladies of the other sonneteers, he loves the
poet.
(TTL 15-16)
I concur with Smith here on every point but the first one
in which he argues that Shakespeare's work should not
really

be referred to as a sonnet sequence.

Although

Shakespeare may have written his sonnets over a period of
several years and although they may have been written
exclusively for friends rather than for the court, they
nevertheless fulfill the determining criterion for a sonnet
sequence:

they deal with a singular subject, specifically

with the subject of love. The 154 sonnets plot the

poet-

lover 's literary movement from love to ,rlovelc (lust) and
back to love.

Love, in its various contextual and

relational meanings, is thus the aesthetic theme that
unifies the whole.
Shakespeare deviates otherwise from the sonnet
sequence convention.

Unlike Petrarch's and Sidney's

sequences, both of which focus on a singular, recognizably
unattainable relationship between the poet-lover and his
beloved, Shakespeare relates, as Smith argues (TTL 15-16),
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two opposing relationships.

One is the ideal relationship,

which is realized, between Will his beloved Fair Friend?
the other is the physical relationship, which is
consummated, between Will and his Dark Lady.

Departing

from both Petrarch and Sidney, Shakespeare does not keep
the relationships of his poet-lover in abeyance; Will
interacts fully with both his beloved and his mistress.
Smith sees these two disparate relationships as one of
Shakespeare's weaknesses.

Arguing that the Renaissance

bard focuses on dual relationships which are staggered (and
I paraphrase) between an unrelated opening and an
irrelevant ending, Smith concludes that Shakespeare writes
a collection of "lyric poems, love poems associated in a
loose way with two traditions, the Petrarchan love sonnet
and the epigram tradition" fTTL 22).
I respectfully disagree.

Shakespeare does not, as

Smith would have us believe, treat two separate subjects
apart from an equally separate beginning and ending.

The

two relationships (Will and the Fair Friend/Will and the
Dark Lady) are important in Shakespeare's collection, but
they do not provide separate foci within the sequence.
Instead, they are the poet-lover's personal examples that
elucidate the focus, which is love.

As a preamble to the

virtues of love, the procreation sonnets accuse the friend
of narcissism and then instruct him to think of someone
other than himself.

Sonnet 10 contains what Booth
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describes as "the first point in the 1609 sequence where
the speaker implies close personal friendship between
himself and the young man he is addressing" (£§ 149).

The

poet, already concerned and loving, urges him to "Be, as
thy presence is, gracious and kind" (#10).

As the

persona's love for his Fair Friend grows to maturity, the
power of that love is progressively more evident.
Even the concluding Cupid sonnets, which are usually
viewed apart from the first 152, describe the power of
pure, virginal love.

I respectfully acknowledge Booth's

reminder that Sonnets 153 and 154 are versions of the
epigram, an extended conceit.

However, since Shakespeare's

two epigrams continue the subject of love, I think we dare
not dismiss them as inconsequential to the rest of the
sequence.
Michelle Burnham is one of the few critics who shares
my view of the concluding two sonnets.
Fair Man':

In "'Dark Lady and

The Love Triangle in Shakespeare's Sonnets and

Ulysses.» she writes:
Sonnets 153 and 154, dismissed by many critics as
poor imitations of a generic style, offer a
distanced and traditional perspective on the love
Shakespeare has presented so personally in the
preceding poems. In both sonnets, the poet is
seeking a cure for the passion he feels for his
mistress in the mythical waters of a seething
bath.
(47)
Burnham's essay, whose purpose is to show a correlation
between Shakespeare's poet/Dark Lady/Fair Man triangle and

207
Joyce's Leopold Bloom/Molly Bloom/Blazes Boylan triangle in
Ulvsses. goes in an entirely different direction from the
argument that I propose.

However, our assessments conflate

at the reading of Shakespeare's concluding sonnets.

Love,

which is described therein, has a regenerative quality that
can quench the "heart-inflaming brand" of even the lusty
Cupid, transforming his passion into "healthful" love.
Though some (even most) critics discount Sonnets 153 and
154, I counter that these sonnets show that the cupiditas
of Cupid is tamed by virginal caritas.

By including the

last two sonnets, Shakespeare brings love full circle.
Love in its manifold complexities, then, is the
singular subject that links the various sonnets, thus
suggesting the conclusion that cumulatively they can indeed
be viewed as a sonnet sequence.

The different segments

within the work suggest that the persona recognizes that
human experiences are frequently treacherous, subject to
inescapable detours of lust.

Quite matter-of-factly,

Shakespeare, through his literary sequence, exposes various
emotional junctures along the road of humanity.

The

journey that he describes begins in impassive instruction
(the procreation sonnets 1-17), then moves into an ideal
loving relationship (the Fair Friend sonnets 18-126), only
to be sidetracked by unabashed lust (the Dark Lady sonnets
127-152), which is quelled by the purity of selfless love
(the Cupid sonnets 153-54).

Shakespeare seems careful to
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avoid moral judgments and self-righteous comments, even in
the Dark Lady sonnets.

Weiser significantly notes that

"the speaker does not attack inconstancy itself; that
blemish is as basic to mankind as time is to physical
nature" (M£ 20).

Neither judge nor accuser because he

would be one of those judged and accused, the speaker
simply shares his quest to understand this particular
avenue of the human pilgrimage.
Shakespeare's sonnets develop through the persona's
involvement with the various kinds of love? the partitive
sections delineate the vacillations of emotions as he
visceraliy reacts to each kind.

Unlike Sidney, whose

sequence highlights the effects of Stella's absent presence
on Astrophil, Shakespeare focuses on the absent presence of
the writer as he communicates with his reader.

The absent

presences of the Fair Friend who inspires the lover as poet
and the Dark Lady who arouses the lover as man are clearly
evident as characters within the loosely woven narrative;
but they function primarily to elucidate the absent
presence of the poet-lover who is artist, verbally exposing
the many shades of what is referred to as "love."
The poet establishes the subject of his verse rather
clearly in Sonnet 76;
Oh know, sweet love, I always write of you,
And you and love are still my argument.
So all my best is dressing old words new,
Spending again what is already spent.
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For as the sun is daily new and old,
So my love still telling what is told.
(11. 9-14)
This passage reveals most of Shakespeare's referents to the
word "love."

The term of endearment "sweet love" seems to

suggest a person, namely "you" who is his Fair Friend.

He

is an integral player in the subject of "love" which
comprises Will's "argument."

As Booth rightly assesses,

Will's argument (or "topic") is "colored by the sexual
senses" (§£■> 265).

However, the narrator allows for

additional ramifications of the topic of love.
Incorporating the metaphor of changing clothes, Shakespeare
suggests that this is an age-old subject that changes while
being ever the same, one that fluctuates between constancy
and infidelity.

His story likewise will contrast changes

that separate ideal love (caritas) from common lust
(epithumia).

Most of humanity aspire to the first, but

they frequently succumb to the latter.

And even more

frequently, they tend to confuse one with the other,
referring to the disparate acts by the same verbal
expression "love."
G.B. Harrison's editorial punctuation, which differs
slightly from Booth's, provides a possible clue in Sonnet
151 that lends support to the contrasting meanings of the
word "love."

In this, the bawdiest of all the Dark Lady

sonnets, he places quotation marks around the word "love":
"No want of conscience hold it that I call/Her 'love' for
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whose dear love I rise and fall."

If we assume that

Harrison correctly punctuates the Shakespearean text, love
in this context is not love in its pure state.

Booth

supports such an assessment, commenting that "'rising and
falling7 is singularly appropriate to the poem7s theme of
involuntary lust? the point is that it is not a metaphor"
(529).

This kind of love, then, is not caritas; rather, it

is eros combined with epithumia.
uncontrolled lust.

It is unabashed and

This kind of love has no redeeming or

enduring quality; it lasts only for the moment of passion.
What Shakespeare7s persona seems to admit in this
sonnet (#76) is that this temporal "love" battles the ideal
love that is desired by Everyman.

Will suggests that, like

himself, each individual determines the outcome of the
emotional war within.

He can allow unbridled passion to

destroy that which is good, or he can temper that passion
and elevate the good.

Shakespeare thus reflects his

knowledge of both Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic teachings.
His sonnet sequence reveals a bipartite division of the
soul, man7s inner being.

That which is uncontrollably

passionate is the irrational side that determines emotions
and bodily drives— both which frequently (perhaps even
usually) defy explanation.

Opposite that confusion is the

rational side that houses the theoretical analysis and the
practical understanding— intellectual gifts presumably
granted the poet.

These analytic and perceptive skills
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then enable him to translate and conceptualize that
understanding into poetry.
Fineman prefers to link Shakespeare's classical
influence to the Neo-Platonists rather than to Aristotle.
Noting the difference in genders between the beloved and
the "loved," he argues that Shakespeare reflects
the Neo-Platonic tradition of the double Venus,
with the young man taken to be the image of
spiritual and intellectual desire as opposed to
the dark lady's embodiment of the material
corporeality of lust. This would give a proper
philosophic context to the different genders,
since for Renaissance Neo-Platonism, the love of
man for woman is more vulgarly appetitive than
that of man for man.

(SEE 57)
Shakespeare's persona does respond viscerally to a "double
Venus," to both of his "loves."

The Fair Friend who is his

beloved represents, as Fineman argues, the "spiritual and
intellectual desire" of the man who is poet, and the Dark
Lady who is his mistress represents, as Fineman argues, the
"material corporeality of lust" of that poet who is also
man.

Neither plenitude for the reader nor complete

integration for the poet, the split states (love/lust,
male/female, true/false) suggest brief, but powerful,
points of identity between reader and writer.
Whether Freudian, Aristotelian, or Neo-Platonic, or a
combination of numerous psychoanalytic theories,
Shakespeare comments on the dual natures of humanity.
Clearly Aristotelian, however, is the persona's rational

212
approach to both of his "loves."

Like Aristotle,

Shakespeare attempts to rationalize passion, even the
passion that causes the Fair Friend to yield to the
seduction of Will's mistress (Sonnet 42, which later will
be discussed in greater detail.)

Shakespeare departs

rather significantly from the Petrarchan-Sidneian model in
that he approaches love more rationally, much more
realistically, perhaps even more matter-of-factly than do
his predecessors in the sonnet tradition.
The sonnet-sequence tradition itself contributes to a
widening of the gap between writer and reader because this
literary convention is no longer in vogue.

This gap may

necessarily have widened through time, but it does not
preclude a relationship between reader and writer.

In his

text that explores the mind of Shakespeare's persona,
Weiser describes one means whereby Shakespeare bridges the
gaps of time and distance that separate reader/writer and
reader/persona.

He argues that Shakespeare creates a

persona of universal appeal, something that Sidney fails to
do with his Astrophil:
Neither does [Shakespeare] quite achieve an
autonomous, sharply defined character like
Sidney's Astrophel. The Shakespearean . . .
sonnets center on what occurs in the speaker's
mind. He has neither a local habitation nor a
name [other than the generic Will] and thus
becomes an Everyman confronting the most primary
sorts of human experience.
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This poetic Everyman serves no preconceived
morality but is content to demonstrate certain
qualities of thought and feeling.
(MG 14)
According to Weiser, then, because Will as a character
within his own script is not clearly defined, he becomes a
"poetic Everyman."

Because we cannot create a personality

profile for him, his experiences are offered as typical
experiences shared by those who read his text.

In their

typicality, they assume a kind of actuality about the
individual reader in her world.
Weiser recognizes this sense of credibility throughout
Shakespeare's sonnet sequence.

According to him, it

"enacts a process of tangible experience.

. . . The speaker

is not writing about time and change as abstract ideas but
primarily about his own response to those ideas" (MG 13).
To varying degrees, then, Will's journey is one that is
taken by all of humanity.

The reader observes him

viscerally reacting to two emotionally and physically
influential people in his life, his beloved Fair Friend and
his seductively enticing mistress.

Although the

circumstances may initially seem ludicrous, his responses
to the disparate individuals within those situations are
anything but far-fetched.

Rather than nebulous,

unbelievable reactions, his are plausible emotional
quandaries.
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In "Making Love Out of Nothing at All," Crosman
borrows the French term "autofiction" to describe how
Shakespeare's sonnets project something other than fiction.
He argues that since they have the "feel of ad hoc, of the
day-to-day repetitions, misdirections, and incompletions of
'real life' as opposed to fiction," they require a "generic
term" ("autofiction") to better describe what they
accomplish ("MLNA" 472).

Shakespeare's "story," though not

factual, narrates a view of reality since "we seem to be
living it as our own" ("MLNA" 473).

Will's confusions,

temptations, and emotions, at least temporarily, become
those of the reader as she relates to the text.
These multiple quandaries reflect life's paradox of
one who desires the ideal but who is enticed by that which
is less than ideal— the conflicting states that comprise
human nature.

Will describes this emotional paradox as one

breathlessly— and willingly— running into the clutches of
Hell:
Mad in pursuit, and in possession so,
Had, having, and in quest to have, extreme,
A bliss in proof, and proved, a very woe.
Before, a joy proposed, behind, a dream.
All this the world well knows, yet none knows
well
To shun the Heaven that leads men to this
Hell.
(#129)
Separated from his beloved when in the arms of his
mistress, the speaker admits here that his lust for her
adversely impacts his relationship with his Fair Friend.
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Lust, that imprudent affection which is counter-productive
to love, spiritually alienates the poet-lover from the
absent presence of his beloved.

If his love for the

beloved, both in his presence and through his absent
presence, is that which inspires Will's creativity, then
lust becomes that which impedes his art.

Nevertheless, he

periodically puts that mutually beneficient relationship
behind him and succumbs to illicit passion.
This passage is reminiscent of the Pauline admission,
"For that which I do I understand not? for what I would,
that do I not, but what I hate, that do I" (Romans 7:15).
Unlike his predecessor Sidney who incorporates spiritual
dogma into his poetic theory, Shakespeare does not overtly
espouse Christian beliefs.

His poetry, however, suggests a

working knowledge of Scripture.

Like the conundrum voiced

by Paul, Shakespeare's persona admits to a weakness of the
spirit, one that leads him "to this Hell," his carnality,
which is his relationship with the Dark Lady.

Periodically

unable to quell his sexual appetite, he submits to reckless
passion.

Through the persona of Will, the reader thus

witnesses the basic struggle of humanity:

the ongoing

battle between the antinomical life-giving sources of human
nature— the spiritual and the physical which are manifest
through ideal love (caritas) and common lust (a combination
of greed, which is epithumia, and intense sexual drive,
which is eros or cupiditas).
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The final section which is addressed to the Dark Lady
is the one that is the most often viewed as unbelievable,
perhaps even preposterous, as it explores Will's emotional
confusion in his relationship with his mistress.

Fineman

explains part of the reader's difficulty:
because the literary tradition of the sonnet as a
whole and the sonnets to the young man in
particular both regularly and regulatively assume
that love and praise self-consciously entail each
other, the sonnets addressed to the dark lady
present themselves as something strange— as
something more outspokenly peculiar, more
explicitly unusual, than anything we might
associate with the troubled tonalities sounded by
the epideictic sonnets addressed to the young
man.
fSPE 54)
Because the reader is thrust from a poetry of praise of the
young man to a poetry of dispraise for the Dark Lady, she
is understandably— at least initially— confused.

Confusion

can be abated if she keeps in mind that as in the Fair
Friend section, the focus of the Dark Lady section, too, is
on Will as he relates to his mistress and struggles with
her control over him.

As Smith argues, "The real subject

is not the Dark Lady/ but the poet's uncontrollable
feelings about her" (TTL 53).

Shakespeare's sequence

certainly raises more than one "real subject" about the
condition of human nature, but control, or the lack
thereof, is indeed a central issue.

Because of unabated

lust for the Dark Lady and a seemingly insatiable greed to

217
fulfill that lust, the poet-lover perceives himself and the
object of his affections differently in Sonnets 127-152.
In these sonnets, he plummets into the arms of the
Dark Lady as if he is powerless to stop himself, yet
knowing all the while the falsity of their relationship:
When my love swears that she is made of truth,
I do believe her though I know she lies,
That she might think me some untutored youth,
Unlearned in the world's false subtleties.
Therefore I lie with her and she with me,
And in our faults by lies we flattered be.
(#138)
Based solely on physical attraction and sexual
satisfaction, this relationship is awash with lies— his to
her, hers to him, and the two "lying" together.
Booth describes the rhetorical and syntactical means
whereby Shakespeare reflects the confusion inherent in such
a relationship:
The fact of impossible but undeniable fusion
manifests itself in puns (e.g. the various and
variously contradictory significances fused
together in the word lie), in syntaxes that
simultaneously indicate two distinct logical
relationships among parts of sentences. . . , in
the fact that every assertion in the poem is
demonstrably true and also a lie. . . , and
in the fact that every assertion in the poem
proudly reports a satisfactory relationship (the
tone is downright smug), and a desperate
one. . . . The poem as poem is like the
relationship it describes; every quality or
identity the poem has or presents is fused
with its opposite.
(SS. 477)
In this assessment of Sonnet 138, Booth describes the
genius of Shakespeare as sonneteer:

he manipulates the
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language so that it supports those emotional situations
which he describes.

Specifically in this sonnet,

Shakespeare crafts his language so that it reflects the
desperate condition of the poet-lover who struggles in his
relationship with the Dark Lady.

As he strives with the

emotional tension emanating from the destructive
relationship, he necessarily incorporates puns that reflect
the resulting negativity, the personal confusion that he
experiences.
Will's relationship with the Dark Lady, which is based
solely on lust, seems necessary to this sequence in order
to typify the struggle between lust and love.

Perpetuation

and immortality are not significant themes in the Dark Lady
section, as they were in the two previous sections; rather,
the unifying theme is momentary pleasure, the "love" that
is "Enjoyed no sooner but despised straight" (#129).

The

terms "enjoyed" and "despised" are polar opposites, terms
which connote Will's inherent struggle.

Booth explains the

warring dichotomy:
'To enjoy lust' is to exercise it, to take
sexual possession of the object lusted for. Here
one's understanding of 'Enjoyed' is necessarily
colored by the fact that 'to enjoy' was commonly
used specifically to mean 'to use sexually,' 'to
take sexual possession o f .' The word thus says
^made happy,' 'satisfied,' and, by synesis,
introduces the person 'enjoyed' as an extra
inferential object of both 'Enjoyed' and
'despised' (once lust is satisfied, the person
driven by it despised himself, the passion, and
the person desired and seized).
(S£ 444)
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Fulfilled lust# as Booth implies, is frequently more
destructive than unfulfilled lust.

It has the potential

for serious harm, especially to the poet-lover.

When the

poet-lover's rational thought-processes are overpowered by
the sexual energy that dominates such a relationship, even
his creativity suffers.
Laurence Lerner, in "Ovid and the Elizabethans,"
recognizes a strong Ovidian influence in the way that
Shakespeare and other Elizabethan writers depict
relationships controlled by lust:
Sex, generation and death are clearly the
areas of human metamorphosis, and these are the
themes of the Elizabethan epyllion. A story of
sexual love can include or (more probably) end
with happy fulfilment; it is more likely to
contain frustrated, sublimated or perverted sex.
This need not mean that the story itself is
perverted: it is the nature of narrative that
fulfilment can be implied through the treatment
of shortcomings and indirection.
(12 8 )
If, as Lerner notes, Will's feelings for his Dark Lady
cause him to be "frustrated," and if, as Booth suggests,
Will comes to despise himself because of his lustful
actions, he most probably will encounter difficulty in
writing.

The frustrations are evident in creative

"shortcomings and indirection"; the result is that he
weakens both his energeia and his enargia.

To write, a

poet must spend hours in solitude, hours in which he might
share ideas, thoughts, and experiences with a future
reader.

Despising the self correlates to despising those
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actions which define the self, which, for the poet-lover,
is the creative process.

And when the lustful

entanglements compromise the creative process, the work
itself is necessarily compromised.
Weiser comments on the way that poetic integrity (or
the lack thereof) is manifest in the poem.

He explains

that the intermittent clumsy style and frequently
uninspired diction in the Dark Lady section prove that the
poet-lover's artistic powers indeed are stymied because of
his relationship with the Dark Lady.

Analyzing Sonnet 138

("When my love swears that she is made of truth"), Weiser
comments that "The results of this shift [from Fair Friend
to Dark Lady] are felt in the unimaginative texture of the
poem's language.

Its diction is everywhere colloquial and

threadbare, while figurative expressions have been entirely
excluded" (MS 151).
I heartily agree that this sonnet exudes clumsiness as
it continues:

"I do believe her though I know she lies,/

That she might think me some untutored youth,/ Unlearned in
the world's false subtleties."

However, I do not think we

dare go so far as to say that "figurative expressions have
been entirely excluded" in the Dark Lady sonnets, to the
point that "their speaker is no longer in control of his
imaginative powers" (Weiser, M£ 184).

Indeed, Sonnet 130

("My mistress' eyes are nothing like the sun") abounds with
figurative language.

But I can agree that the texture and
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the diction are highly altered in most of the Dark Lady
sonnets.

Might not the poet-lover purposefully offer this

recognizable difference as the literary means to shore up
his argument that ideal love (caritas) is beautiful,
productive, and fertile while common lust (epithumia
combined with eros or cupiditas) is deceitful, destructive,
and barren?

The intermittent cessation of his creative

power might be, as Barber suggests, "the broken lines
by Eros" ("ESS" 26).

made

Will's poetic lines that depict

physical pleasure are offered in sharp contrast to the
fluid "line" that describes "the better part of me" (Sonnet
74), which is the burst of poetic genius that results from
his relationship with his Fair Friend.
Shakespeare is not the only British writer to explore
the harsh realities of lust fulfilled.

Chaucer certainly

does in Troilus and Criseyde as does Milton in Paradise
Lost.

Especially Milton's text graphically depicts the

extreme outcome of love gone awry— of love completely
subsumed by lust.

Milton's agenda, which was to "justify

the ways of God to men" (1.26), is markedly different
that of Shakespeare in his sonnets.

from

Avoiding theological

solutions, Shakespeare develops his sonnets from the
assumption that lust is an unavoidable expression of human
nature.

Will regularly encounters temptation— both from

the Dark Lady who would lead him astray sexually and from
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the Fair Friend whose actions with another could compromise
him spiritually.
Sonnet 32 introduces a rival poet who vies for the
patronage of Will's Fair Friend.

This rival, and perhaps

"better" poet, may be more skilled in the implementation of
his art, but he lacks something that Will views as
necessary to the artistic process:

his artistic endeavors

do not exemplify the love of poet for his beloved.

Since

this love is manifest in the words themselves, the reader
will recognize and share in the loving process as she
enters into the text.

Will repeatedly contends that his

poems to the Fair Friend will endure the test of time
because they are a witness of love rather than a mere
artistic exercise in what he refers to as poetic "style."
Shakespeare thus approaches the art of literary
creation in a bold manner, suggesting that an aesthetics of
love operates separately from theology and that the artist
functions independently from his Creator.

Continuing the

practice of Chaucer and Wyatt who significantly rely on
diction and metaphor to exhibit their poetic prowess,
Shakespeare creates a persona who differs from that of
Astrophil.

Whereas the poet-lover in Astrophil and Stella

begins to claim full control over his literary creation
only at the conclusion of the sequence, Will asserts his
power early in his work:

"All in war with Time for love of

you,/As he takes from you, I engraft you new" (#15).

Booth
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argues that Renaissance readers of Shakespeare's early text
might have had difficulty discerning his use of "engraft"
in this passage, since the word can mean both "writing
verse and urging the young man to marry" (SS 158).
However, as modern readers who have the advantage of
reading Shakespeare's work backwards, we can perceive the
meaning quite clearly in this couplet:

the poet professes

his literary ability to perpetuate the beauty and the youth
of his beloved Fair Friend through his written words.
Although ambiguous meanings can be gleaned from many
of Shakespeare's lines, as Anne Ferry argues in The
"Inward" Language, I would counter that those passages in
the sequence that relate to the power of the artist are the
most straightforward, the most unambiguous of the
collection.

Through his persona Will, Shakespeare lauds

the eternizing power of the artist.

His premise is that

the poet's talent with the written word can achieve what
mortality cannot:

a viable presence that speaks to a

reader centuries after the literary "death" of the persona
and the physical death of the writer.

Most probably it is

Sidney's allegiance to his Divine Maker that causes him to
tiptoe tentatively in this area that Shakespeare boldly
treads.

Unlike Sidney's Astrophil, Shakespeare's poet-

lover never yields submissively to his artistic ability.
Even as Will claims and maintains a powerful presence
within his poetic medium, however, a paradox is evident:
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he does not manage to control his personal relationships
with his Fair Friend, with his Dark Lady, or with the two
of them linked together with him in what seems to be at
least an emotional menage

k

trois.

This is the tension that dominates the sequence as it
points up the weakness and the vulnerability of the poetlover while it simultaneously reflects the inadequacy of
his language to express those human characteristics.
According to Waller:
Shakespeare's sonnets see the nature of the self
as intimately bound up with sexuality.
But
nowhere among earlier collections are the
extremes of erotic revelation offered in such
rawness and complexity or with such obsessive
anguish over the glorious failure of language to
constitute or reassure the vulnerable self. They
are a unique imaginative proving-ground where the
feelings about love and the language
traditionally used to capture them intermingle
with and contradict each other.
fEPSC 221)
The intermingling contradictions of self/other, Fair
Friend/Dark Lady, love/lust, vulnerability/recklessness,
poetic art/uninspired words pulsate throughout the
sequence.

These antinomical impulses dominate the text.

As we explore these in relation to Shakespeare's poet-lover
Will, we can begin to see the power that the writer of a
text grants to his created voice.
Will's self-admonishing plaint, "O let me true in love
but truly write” (Sonnet 21), may be, as Ferry says, a
"deliberate echo of the opening of Astrophil and Stella”
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(IL 170), but Shakespeare filters the echo through his own
perception of the poet-lover.

The primary difference is

that Astrophil has to be instructed by his Muse to "looke
in thy heart and write'1 (#1), while Will seems to suggest
that the power comes from himself.

Because his Muse is

either "sick" (#79), "tongue-tied" (#85), "resty" (#100),
or "truant" (#101), Will is compelled to find inspiration
elsewhere.

Early in the Fair Friend section, he leads us

to believe that his beloved assumes the role of Muse.
Sonnet 38 he instructs his friend:

In

"Be thou the tenth

Muse, ten times more in worth/ Than those old nine which
rhymers invocate."
Later sonnets, however, shift the source of poetic
power from the friend to the poet's own artistic genius as
the two (poet-lover and beloved) are spiritually meshed
together.

The poet claims, "You still shall live— such

virtue hath my pen" (#81).

Booth sees this as a pivotal

sonnet, one in which the speaker first realizes the
significance of his role in relationship to his Fair
Friend, recognizing and asserting his poetic ability as the
means through which that relationship might be perpetuated.
Paradoxically by giving that love away, specifically
by using his talent to write verse about his beloved, he
increases the value of that love:
Farewell, thou art too dear for my possessing,
And like enough thou know'st thy estimate.
The charter of thy worth gives thee releasing,
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My bonds in thee are all determinate.
For how do I hold thee but by thy granting?
(#87)
Shakespeare's persona here hints that the artist's paradox
is comparable to that which is experienced by the
Christian:

"He that findeth his life shall lose it? and he

that loseth his life for my sake shall find it" (Matthew
10:39).

As artist who "releases" his love to the printed

page and thereby increasing the "worth" of that love, he
necessarily must "lose" or give away that same love so that
others may share in that which is too "dear" for one
individual to hold selfishly to himself.
Much like Sidney's Astrophil, who presumes to couple
love with his "erected wit" in order to glean understanding
of self, world, and creator, Shakespeare's poet-lover also
links love with an art that might be beneficial to his
readers.

As Shakespeare's persona perpetuates his

relationship with his beloved through the poetic medium, he
leaves a trace of common human experience:

love that

produces something worthwhile, which here is a work of art.
He allows the love that is in his heart to produce the art
that subsequently offers an understanding of the individual
and his confusing world.
I disagree with Ferry who says that "Neither [Sidney
nor Shakespeare] can truly name what is in the heart; he
can only call it 'love,' which means everything and
nothing" (IL 208).

Shakespeare quite successfully defines
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love.

He plots and differentiates its various meanings,

showing the positive and negative results of each:

ideal

love is productive and fosters creativity; pure lust is
destructive and maligns creativity.

Under the umbrella of

love, Shakespeare relates a poet-lover who wields a power
that is greater than that of one who simply adheres to the
structure of a literary convention, which here is the
sonnet sequence.
Drawing from his own literary palette, Shakespeare
does not color within the prescribed lines of the sonnet
tradition.

Instead, he dares to explore unusual and,

perhaps to early seventeenth-century readers, shocking
possibilities.

Specifically, he relates two relationships,

one in which the beloved is his male friend and the other
in which the "loved'1 is his mistress.

He thus fashions a

work of art that exemplifies universal truths about complex
human relationships— relationships which can either soar in
love or languish in lust.

And in the midst of these truths

about man in his frequently confusing emotional world, he
recognizes and heralds the power of the poet— the power
that compensates for personal disappointments and tangled
relationships in the poet-lover's life.
In relating that life, Shakespeare significantly
departs from earlier sonnet-sequences:

Will's beloved does

not stand aloof and removed as do Laura and Stella, the
objects of Petrarch's and Astrophil's love.

Instead,
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Shakespeare depicts a reciprocally loving relationship? the
Fair Friend is the beloved young patron willingly
supporting Will, the older and wiser acclaimed artist.
Their relationship suggests overtones of the pederastic
convention of Greek society in which the primary goal was
to effect reciprocity between a wise mentor and his willing
interlocutor.

Several sonnets early in the middle section

affirm this reciprocity, which is mutuality of their love:
"Thou gav'st me thine [love and perhaps money], not to give
back again" (#22).

"Then happy I that love and am beloved/

Where I may not remove, nor be removed" (#25).

Especially

Sonnet 25 contains a bit of bravado in its claim that the
relationship will remain static in its bliss, because we
know that he and his beloved part for a time.
The separation and the beloved's ensuing indiscretion
cause their relationship to fluctuate with the passage of
Time, but here in Sonnet 22 the poet-lover unequivocally
establishes that his relationship with the young man is
mutually beneficial to each of them.

As such, their union

is grounded in reciprocal love; it is one that will grow
and mature in spite of the ravages of Time and the hurt of
deception.

This reciprocity, according to Barber, is

"expressed with an unparalleled fullness and intensity.

It

is love by identification rather than sexual possession"
("ESS" 18).

Because he is not above reproach, because he

too cannot resist temptation, Will identifies with his Fair
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Friend's infidelity.

As he sees the similitude in their

physical drives, he also recognizes their like-mindedness
in spirit.

Deeming their like-mindedness the more

important of the two because it unites rather than
separates, he refrains from judging his friend's
indiscretions.
Differing with J.W. Lever who, in "The Poet in
Absence," suggests that the sonnets of separation "show a
slackening of tension" (77), I suggest that they reveal a
heightening of tension.

This heightening, caused by

physical separation, enables emotional growth, which then
allows transcendence— for the poet-lover and for his
readers.

By distancing himself from his beloved Fair

Friend, he can more clearly assess their relationship.

The

result is that the poet-lover achieves a maturity not
previously indicated.

A new level of being, what Knight

refers to as some point of "higher integration" (ME 28), is
noted especially in the poet-lover's painful response to
his knowledge of the sexual commingling of his "two loves."
Even after the Fair Friend succumbs to the seduction
of Will's mistress, Will refuses to discard what he comes
to know is a meaningful relationship with his friend.
After the betrayal, we can envision his own words of an
earlier sonnet echoing in his brain:
And loathsome canker lives in sweetest bud.
Authorizing thy trespass with compare,
Myself corrupting salving thy amiss,
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Excusing thy sins more than thy sins are?
For to thy sensual fault I bring in sense—
Thy adverse party is thy advocate—
(#35)
In this complicated sonnet, the first to indicate a breach
in Will's relationship with his Fair Friend, Will assumes
the role of advocate rather than of accuser.

Although he

does not explain here the "sins" committed by the Fair
Friend, the reader senses that Will dismisses them as a
generally accepted imperfection of humanity— one that
certainly Will himself shares with his friend.

This

imperfection is as common to humanity as the cankerworm is
to the fragrant rose.

Just as the cankerworm "consumes the

bud from within’? (Booth, ££ 190), so the dalliance of lust
can erode love between individuals.

The Dark Lady sonnets

later will affirm that this flaw, which leads to the
friend's "sins," is epithumia, the unharnessed lust that
causes one reach out for that which he desires and does not
have— be it fame, financial gain, or a friend's mistress.
Because Will is human, he is hurt by his friend's
duplicitous actions.
In true Aristotelian fashion, Will seeks a logical
explanation, an acceptable and convincing means, to
overcome the betrayal.

Specifically, he tries to

rationalize the Fair Friend's sexual indiscretion with his
Dark Lady, depicting himself to be above the counter
productive reaches of jealousy:

"Loving offenders, thus I
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will excuse ye:/Thou dost love her, because thou know'st I
love her" (#42).

At this point in the sequence, we are not

convinced of his claim to be above jealousy; however, his
statement becomes more credible when he returns from a
three-year separation from his beloved.

That time of

absence from his beloved hones his artistic skill, as
evidenced in the later sonnets to his Fair Friend.
Barber comments on the intervening "tortuous sonnets,"
the ones that refer to Will's being wronged by his beloved
and his mistress:
Indeed, bitter as these sonnets are, they express
a response to the humiliation life has brought
which moves in the direction of art. Most men
would bury the event in silence, or else turn
injury into anger. Shakespeare turns injury into
poetry. The very act of writing about the
betrayal is a kind of acceptance of it.
("ESS" 23)
Having matured in his love, having reached a new level in
both his love and in his art, Will manages to forgive the
friend's sexual indiscretion and subsequently to allow that
indiscretion to become a statement within his art.

He then

seeks "To give full growth to that [love] which still doth
grow" (#115).

These sonnets are generally viewed as the

most successful in the series.
In them, he idealistically proclaims that neither
Time, nor separation, nor betrayal can kill that love which
is true.

Those adverse forces may temporarily affect such

a love, but they are powerless to quench it.

What happens
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to the poet-lover in the interim imposed by Time,
separation, or betrayal is that his love is refined to a
higher level of selflessness.

This is not an irrational

kind of selflessness that blinds Will to the truth about
his beloved; rather, it is a painfully honest selflessness
that allows him to see his beloved's imperfections while
recognizing that they pale through the lens of love.
writes;

He

"My love is strengthened, though more weak in

seeming?/ I love not less, though less the show appear"
(#102).

Having reached a new plateau in his love for his

friend, he can more critically assess their reciprocal love
for the other.
By making himself vulnerable to love, and thus
vulnerable to hurt, he grows as both poet and lover.

The

tension in this paradox of love is frequently that which
fuels the greatest artistic productivity.

Because of its

value to the poetic process, the poet (such as Will) must
be willing to experience love in all its confusing
possibilities.

The outcome of love, as with all human

relationships is, as Waller assesses, "unpredictable and
risky.

. . . And yet without vulnerability and contingency,

without the sense of being thrown into the world, . . .
there can be no growth" (EPSC 229).
Weiser's terms "vulnerability and contingency"
correlate to "novelty and contingency" in the argument made
by Hall in Word and Spirit.

Discussing the "historical
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consciousness," which emanates from the psychic world-view,
Hall writes that the:
future becomes present as that which has really
not yet happened, as an awesome realm of
possibility and contingency. The historical
sense of future brings with it a sense of reality
to novelty and contingency.
In this
consciousness, reality is no longer imagined to
be complete and self-contained, closed and fixed,
static and eternal. Now the world is pictured as
essentially open, developing, unfolding, from its
original creation to ever new creative
possibilities.
(H£ 31)
Separation from his beloved allows Will, the historically
conscious poet, to recognize that his relationship with his
beloved is not doomed by the indiscretion with the Dark
Lady.

Because he can perceive both the present and the

past while simultaneously envisioning the future, he can
assess that theirs is a relationship in flux.

Though it

may be "unpredictable and risky" (Weiser, MS 229), their
relationship is worth salvaging because it ultimately is
good and productive, opening up "to ever new creative
possibilities" (Hall,

31).

And it is through those

"creative possibilities," through his poetry, that Will
works to salvage his relationship with his Fair Friend.
This rescue process is not carried out while he looks
through rose-colored glasses.

On the contrary, he

critically examines his relationship with his beloved.

He

then employs "the skills of the perfumer, the alchemist,
[and] the flatterer" as the means whereby he will transform
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actuality into art; afterward, he supplies ’’the colors of
the dyer and the rhetorician," leaving his readers poetic
evidence of a relationship that is good in spite of its
precariousness (Ferry, XL 41).

Continuing the image of

"loathsome canker" first provided in Sonnet 35, Will
compares the Fair Friend's betrayal to "a canker in the
fragrant rose" (#95).

And, like the perfumer who distills

the "sweetest odors" (#54) from the petals of those
corrupted roses that fall off the vine, the poet-lover uses
his art to transform his imperfect beloved and his culpable
mistress into something worthwhile— either a poetry of
praise for that which is beautiful or a poetry of dispraise
for that which is unattractive or cankered.
For the poet-lover, this distilling process is his
art.

As he yields both to love and to art in order to

perpetuate his beloved, the poet-lover achieves another,
perhaps an even more desired end;
himself.

he likewise immortalizes

Barber comments on this process:
Loving by identifying with the person loved
can have a special scope for Shakespeare which it
does not have for people who are not poets,
because he can realize his friend's beauty and
value in words. To realize the relationship by
turning it into poetry gives a fulfillment which
actually is physical, in that the poem, as
utterance, is a physical act. That the writing
of a sonnet provides a kind of physical union
with the friend explains at least in part, I
think, the recurrent emphasis on the sonnets as
rescuing the beloved from death. . . . But the
sustaining reality in the theme of immortality is
that the poet, in the act of writing the poem,
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experiences a lover's sense of triumphing over
time by becoming one with great creating nature
as embodied in another being.
("ESS" 18-19)
Somewhat as perfume, which perpetuates the odor of the
living physical rose, the printed poem immortalizes the
relationship between the poet-lover and his beloved.
Additionally, the relationship between poet-lover and his
art is akin to the correspondence between a rose and its
distilled perfume:

the rose is a physical, concrete

presence whose qualities are transformed into an absent,
albeit intangible yet noticeably viable, presence of
fragrant ftimes.
It is through this distillation process, through a
kind of metamorphosis of the corporeal self into the
written word, that the artist textually confronts the
reader and thus perpetuates the authorial self.

R.S. White

does not directly address Shakespeare's Sonnets in his
essay "Metamorphosis by Love in Elizabethan Romance,
Romantic Comedy, and Shakespeare's Early. Comedies," but
some of his conclusions apply to them as well.

Crediting

Shakespeare with patterning emotional flux after Ovid's
Metamorphosis. White assesses the role of love in
Elizabethan writings:
love precipitates a transformation that is first
and foremost internal, a change of feelings so
drastic that it causes a noticeable alteration in
conduct. The change may be reflected externally,
either involuntarily in a change of shape or form
(on the model of Ovid's Metamorphosis^ f or
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voluntarily, as when a lover disguises himself in
order to place himself closer to his beloved. To
the sufferer, the process may be sudden or
gradual, conscious or unconscious, violent or
unobtrusive, welcome or terrifying, morally
acceptable or repulsive. Change caused by the
emotional shock of love holds equally a threat
and a hope. It shows that we are capable of
growth by adapting to new emotional pressures,
but the growth is at the expense of shedding an
old identity, painfully acquiring a new
dependence upon another person.
(15)
For Elizabethan writers, love is dynamic, effecting visible
changes in the individual.

White calls it a "magnetic and

mysterious force" which, if it is caritas rather than
cupiditas, can result in positive emotional growth for the
lover, or poet-lover.

Unfortunately, the positive will be

sustained only temporarily.
Shakespeare goes on to say that when (not if) the two
loving partners disappoint and betray the other, their
relationship will endure because it is bound by mutual
love:
That you were unkind befriends me now,
And for that sorrow which I then did feel
Needs must I under my transgression bow,
Unless my nerves were brass or hammered steel.
For if you were by my unkindness shaken,
As I by yours, y'have passed a hell of time,
And I, a tyrant, have no leisure taken
To weigh how once I suffered in your crime.
0 that our night of woe might have remembr'ed
My deepest sense, how hard true sorrow hits,
And soon to you as you to me then tend'red
The humble salve which wounded bosoms fits!
But that your trespass now becomes a fee?
Mine ransoms yours, and yours must ransom me.
(#120)
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This sonnet# which Booth describes as a "paradox of
beneficial ill" (S£ 404), incorporates a medical metaphor
to describe the potentially rejuvenative benefits of a love
which ultimately yields good.

The sonnet tells of two who

have each been wronged by the other.

Fortunately# however,

the "humble salve," which is the healing balm of selfless,
reciprocal love, enables forgiveness to discount the
trespasses.

In Sonnet 154, he will call this same salve

the "healthful remedy" that repairs even the most lustful
heart— that of Cupid himself.

Since the relationship

between Will and his beloved is one of reciprocity, one
that is grounded in love, Time may alter but it cannot
destroy the substance of their feelings.
To convince his reader of the validity of his words,
Shakespeare calls into play the Aristotelian principle of
the poet (speaker) whose ethos (character) is an integral
part of the rhetorical (artistic) process
2-3).

(Rhetoric 2.1.

Shakespeare's medium is art, rather than judicial

deliberation or pure persuasion, but the writer's role is
equivalently significant in aesthetic communication as in
other forms of rhetoric.

The artist's poetic "dialogue"

with the reader reflects not only the emotional tension
between the characters within the drama, but the text
likewise says something notable about the poet himself.
Fineman comments on this connection between
Shakespeare and Aristotle:
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As early as Aristotle, however, it is recognized
that the rhetorical magnification praise accords
its object also rebounds back upon itself,
drawing attention to itself and to its own
rhetorical procedure, drawing attention, that is
to say, to its own grandiloquent rhetoricity.

(SEE 5)
As Shakespeare's Will writes sonnets in praise of his male
beloved and sonnets in dispraise of his female lover, the
text necessarily "rebounds” back to the self who composes
those sonnets.

As Shakespeare's persona lauds the creative

power of the artist, he thus magnifies the true legacy of
the poet-lover, which is that "a man's [own] spirit can be
preserved in poetry" (Barber, "ESS" 19).

Through his

words, he can distill and fashion for perpetuity that which
he would have them know about himself, his beloved, his
mistress, and their complex interwoven relationships.

And

the knowledge that he shares with his readers is that which
is perceived, filtered, and then crafted through his
creative powers that lend a quality of immortality to that
which rises from the printed page.
In analyzing the concluding line of Sonnet 65 ("That
in black ink my love may still shine bright"), Weiser
argues that for the poet-lover, "belief in poetic
immortality is an act of faith.

The speaker has retained

that faith despite" (MG 71) the overwhelming disappointment
that accompanies his relationship with his Fair Friend.
Taking Weiser's faith-act analogy a step farther, I would
add that "belief in poetic immortality is an act of faith"
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for the beloved of whom the poet-lover writes and the
reader for (and to) whom the poet-lover writes.

As the

reader encounters both poet-lover and beloved through the
printed word, she affirms that both continue to live, at
least for a time, through the intellectual and emotional
responses that are elicited by the persona who "speaks"
from the text.
Sonnet 116, perhaps the one most easily recognized and
the one most frequently quoted from the sequence, expresses
the levels of love, art, and perpetuity that Will gains
through his literary journey into love:
Let me not to the marriage of true minds
Admit impediments. Love is not love
Which alters when it alteration finds,
Or bends with the remover to remove.
0 no, it is an ever-fixed mark
That looks on tempests and is never shaken;
It is the star to every wandering bark,
Whose worth's unknown, although his height be
taken.
Love's not time's fool, though rosy lips and
cheeks
Within his bending sickle's compass come.
Love alters not with his brief hours and weeks,
But bears it out ev'n to the edge of doom.
If this be error and upon me proved,
I never writ, nor no man ever loved.
Booth suggests that this is one of the few Shakespearean
sonnets that we might take at face value (S£ 389).

Weiser

more specifically argues that Shakespeare's "use of
negative definitions [of love] constitute an experiential
test by which to recognize false changing love" (HQ 79).
Capitalizing on Weiser's reference to "test," we can
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extrapolate that the poet provides the litmus paper, his
printed poem, whereby his readers might judge the quality
of love his persona exhibits through each of his
relationships.
As an additional benefit to the reader, she can then
apply these same principles to her own experiences,
allowing the writer of the aesthetic text to touch her
life, which is her reality, in a personal, tangible way.
In contemplating the art that reflects life, she
simultaneously reinforces the relationship between text,
writer, and self as reader.

Perhaps not an overtly

conscious act, the reader nevertheless affirms this
productive dialogue with the writer whenever she picks up a
text to read it.

As Booth suggests, the lines that she

reads may not even require explanation in order to effect a
result (£S 389).

Because words have an almost inexplicable

ability (what Gorgias called "magic") to empower their
"beholder" to interpret and apply those same words to her
personal life, they establish a corporeal link between
reader and writer.
An equally powerful link is the one between poet and
his text, between poet and the words that he leaves to his
readers.

The poet's words become his textual legacy to the

world? or, as Sidney would say, his poetry becomes his
"epitaph."

The concluding couplet of Shakespeare's Sonnet

116 ("If this be error and upon me proved,/ I never writ,
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nor no man ever loved") affirms not only the relationship
between the poet-lover and his beloved, but it also
provides evidence of the love between them.

Shakespeare

thus echoes Sidney's imperative "that while you live, you
live in love, and never get favor for lacking skill of a
sonnet" with its inherent promise "and, when you die, your
memory [will not] die from the earth for want of an
epitaph" (Defense 624).

Shakespeare's sonnet sequence

provides evidence that his poet-lover follows Sidney's
instruction to "live in love" so that he might use his
skill with words to carve his epitaph, which is the poetry
he leaves behind.
The chisel that the poet uses to carve such an epitaph
is necessarily paradoxical; in order to assess the
emotional fluctuations that threaten the rational
equilibrium of humanity, he necessarily must expose
humanity as it exists— the pure alongside the impure.
While Shakespeare plots Will's emotional journey in this
sequence, we see an individual who applies this test to his
own life as he struggles between ideal and sexual realms of
love.

Evidence of this struggle is manifest through the

conflicting, and more frequently ambiguous, ranges of
Will's emotions in the sequence.

Here in Sonnet 116, the

vision of love is that of the ideal relationship.
And feelings (pathos) become the emotional barometer
by which the reader might determine the force, the quality
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of love within the relationships that Will describes.

I

cannot agree with Katharine M. Wilson's thesis in
Shakespeare's Sugared Sonnets that Shakespeare presents his
collection of poems as a parody of the sonnet sequence
tradition.

(How can we possibly view Sonnet 116, one often

quoted in the exchange of marriage vows, as parody?)

She

argues that "he reduced the whole thing to the absurd" (SSS
82).

Striving (I feel rather unsuccessfully) to support

her own argument, Wilson says that "Shakespeare has taken
the sonnet talk seriously, and by playing with it made it
nonsense" (SSS 96).

Granted, parody can be found,

especially in many of the Dark Lady sonnets, but it does
not dominate every sonnet as Wilson would have us believe.
Neither does parody necessarily make that which is parodied
"nonsense."

Perhaps Wilson's emphasis on parody in

Shakespeare's sonnets might better be accepted if we
approach her thesis as one that ignores a problem in
semantics.
In his analysis, one that we can use to refute
Wilson's claim that the sonnets can be reduced to parody,
Fineman protests that semantically "parody" is the wrong
term to apply to many of Shakespeare's sonnets.

Fineman

offers an alternative expression to describe more
accurately what Shakespeare does in Sonnets 127-52.

He

substitutes the phrase "a poetry of praise paradox" fSPE
86) to denote the Dark Lady sonnets which most seem to mock
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the convention that they represent.

Less pejorative than

the term "parody," which can (though it does not always)
connote something as degrading as ribald mockery, Fineman's
terms more precisely suggest Shakespeare's possible motives
for writing the Fair Friend and the Dark Lady segments
within the sequence:
love.

to delineate the various levels of

Can we possibly conclude, then, that even the Dark

Lady sonnets are, as Wilson argues, "nonsense"?

Some, such

as Sonnet 130, quite obviously are sonnets of dispraise
(far from "nonsense") or, as Fineman says, poems of "praise
paradox."
In the famous blazon that begins "My mistress' eyes
are nothing like the sun" (#130), Shakespeare does indeed
seem to mock the laudatory descriptions that previous
sonneteers render of their beloveds, but Shakespeare makes
a very serious statement in the Dark Lady sonnets,
beginning with Sonnet 130.

Viewing the Dark Lady sonnets

cumulatively, the message seems unmistakably clear:
is common to humanity.

lust

Because it inhibits true

relationship and creative power, it would best be avoided.
But the poet-lover does not follow what his own work seems
to suggest.

As a result, he pays the price of twenty-six

Dark Lady sonnets that fail to expose a redeeming
relationship.

What he does is to implicate himself as one

guilty of lying and deceit:

"For I have sworn thee fair:

more perjured eye,/ To swear against the truth so foul a
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lie I" (#152)

He thus identifies himself with that which

the majority of the sonnets would have us believe he would
prefer to avoid.
The terms he uses to describe the Dark Lady suggest
that she is one whom a rational being ought to resist:

she

is "false" (#127), "Savage, extreme, rude, cruel, not to
trust" (#129), and "tyrannous" (#131).

Her sexuality and

seduction "torture" (#133) him into a kind of "Hell"
(#129).

They give him "pain" (#141), but he plays along

with her game of love, thus revealing the recognizable
power of the sexual appetite over the rational part of the
individual.

The contrast is blatant: the love of the Fair

Friend is virtue that empowers the poet, and "the moral
blackness of the Dark Lady is promiscuity" (Smith, TTL 51)
that inhibits the poet.

The destructive force of his lust

for the lady is thus pitted against the productive quality
of his love for his Fair Friend.

This conflict enables

Shakespeare's poet-lover to analyze those which are the
strongest, the most powerful, of all human drives— love and
its physical craving, lust.
If we were to dismiss all 154 of Shakespeare's sonnets
as an exercise in parody, which Wilson would have us do, I
fear that we would radically reduce the greatness of
Shakespeare's talent.

The questions that Will raises

throughout the sequence are legitimate concerns of all
rational creatures:

How can I perpetuate myself and thus
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combat the onslaught of Time?
relationship?

How do I maintain a loving

How do I rise above lustful liaisons?

How

do I redeem myself and restore my productivity once I
succumb to lust?

Shakespeare may sometimes proffer

solutions that initially seem ridiculously parodic, but his
questions demand serious consideration.
Russell Fraser agrees, but, in "Shakespeare at
Sonnets," he cautions readers not to expect to glean
immediate solutions to any of life's problems:
Shakespeare's questions have answers, but readers
who take thought won't speak them too
quickly. . . . His multilayered performances
don't preclude meaning, though; and the sonnets—
never mind how much trouble they give— aren't
conundrums.
But Shakespeare's meaning is
comprehensive like the life his poems describe.
(427)
Meaning resides in Shakespeare's Sonnets. but only if the
reader approaches them with the desire necessary to find
that meaning.

I would thus qualify Russell's assessment:

meaning is potentially comprehensive for the reader.

It

comes to the reader directly proportionate to the manner in
which she receives and processes those subjects that
Shakespeare discusses— time, change, and procreation.

As

she, the willing reader, "lovingly" analyzes the results of
positive love (caritas) and negative love (cupiditas) on
the regenerative, redemptive, procreative, epitaphic
aspects of life, she can hope to address similar situations
in her own reality.
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Shakespeare's sonnets do not suggest closure? the
sequence does not assure readers that virginal love will
forever assuage desires of lust.

Rather, the four

different sections highlight and magnify those which are
spiritually and physically significant aspects of the human
condition— the alternating states of love and lust.

As

Fineman observes, we witness the poet-lover in his ongoing
struggle "between his ego and his ego ideal" (SPE 25).

On

an ascending scale reminiscent of Plato's upward movement
to the Ideal, an ego must be versed in duty to community
and social continuity (procreation section), must be
instructed in pure love (Fair Friend section), must be
warned against lust (Dark Lady section), and must be shown
a better way (Cupid section).

As the sonnets depict an ego

struggling with his humanity, a struggle with which modern
readers might identify, Shakespeare provides a litmus test.
This litmus test allows the reader to assess the talent of
the poet-lover as his struggle becomes his poetry; it also
provides positive and negative guidelines to judge love,
the greatest of human emotions.
We may tend to be as confused at the ending of the
sonnet sequence as we were at the beginning, as we share in
Will's conundrum of human nature.

Because confusion is

inherent in the conflict between opposing forces within the
human condition, between the physical and the spiritual,
between lust and love, between the concrete and the
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abstract, between presence and absence, complete resolution
is impossible.

However, because confusion also provides,

as Heraclitus might say, the tension that leads to
understanding, we can be comforted by those brief moments
of discernment that come as we journey with the poet along
the textual highway of love.

In the words of Heraclitus:

"The counter-thrust brings together, and from tones at
variance comes perfect attunement, and all things come to
pass through conflict" (Fragments LXXV).

For the interim

allowed by the reading experience, the reader travels
alongside the absent presence of the author— accepting,
refuting, or ignoring the observations that he makes and
the premises that he offers.
Along the way, the writer temporarily asks his reader
to perceive through the "eyes" of his persona.

As she

responds affirmatively, they become passengers together in
the literary vehicle, which is Shakespeare's poetry.
Because of impassable gaps in language, in thought, and in
perception, the reader cannot hope to achieve Heraclitean
"perfect attunement" with all that the writer sets forth.
Nevertheless, as the reader engages the various literary
elements, one of which is the writer's persona, she will
allow herself at least to approach rhetorical nexus with
the writer.

Together, through the operation of the

persona, the writer and reader thus affirm the triangular
relationship that emanates from the original rhetorical
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triangle of text/writer/reader.

The separate literary

triangles (text/writer/empowerer, text/reader/character,
writer/reader/persona) fully overlay and expand the
original rhetorical triangle (text/writer/reader), which is
the basis for all communication.
Like the personae of Sidney and Shakespeare,
Dickinson's poet-lover offers a plenitude of meaningful
communication to her willing, responsive, and responsible
reader.

As this nineteenth-century writer necessarily, and

successfully, engages the triangular operations between
writer/text/reader, she further experiments with absences
in the communication process.

The result is that she

explodes the "circumference" of rhetorical and literary
boundaries, carrying her reader along with her into the
poetry of modernity.

Chapter 6
Emily Dickinson's Absent Presence
and
Some Concluding Remarks
Exploring the absent presence in Sidney's Astroohil
and Stella and following it through Shakespeare's Sonnets
might readily b e .acknowledged as a logical critical
endeavor.

Certain similarities pervade both writers and

their works.

Sidney and Shakespeare were near

contemporaries in the British Renaissance; each wrote in
the sonnet-sequence tradition; each created and sustained a
persona, a singular voice, who maintains a viable presence
in the sequence; and each heralds the power of love.
Sidney's Astrophil, toward the end of the sequence, begins
to recognize that he can use his art to transform and
redeem his unrequited love for the absent Stella.

Their

relationship may have failed, but his art ultimately will
triumph as future readers affirm his experience through the
written text.

For Will, too, love is fundamental.

It is

that which overcomes disappointment in relationships and
ensures perpetuity for both poet and beloved.
Although Sidney and Shakespeare elucidate the idea
differently, each sequence admits to a powerful absent
presence that motivates the writing and controls the
development of the poetic program.
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And although
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Shakespeare does not pen a critical treatise comparable to
Sidney's The Defense of Poetry, he does manipulate the
voice of his persona to interpolate some of his own views
of poet and poetic process.

Moving from the sonnet-

sequence of Sidney to that of Shakespeare thus suggests a
logical progression.

However, the transition from

Shakespeare and his Sonnets to Emily Dickinson and her
poetry may seem to be an unjustifiable leap.

As I continue

to develop the idea of the absent presence in this chapter
with selected poetry of Emily Dickinson, I will not call
upon my reader to "willingly suspend disbelief" in order to
accept my premise.

Rather, I will provide evidence to show

that the same absent presence that runs through the sonnetsequences of Sidney and Shakespeare similarly pervades a
large portion of Dickinson's poetry.
As with Astrophil and Will, Dickinson's poet-lover is
dually impelled by love:

love for her absent beloved

provides a subject for the poetry, and love for
communicating with her absent reader motivates the writing
of that poetry.

For Dickinson, even more than for Sidney

and Shakespeare, love at various levels (poetlover/beloved, poet-lover/reader, reader/poet, poet and
reader/written word) is powerful.

Love is that which

allows transcendence by text; it is that which enables at
least a temporary convergence between a reader and a writer
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who are separated by time and place.

Love is that which

fosters an absent presence out of an absence.
An obvious obstacle in including Dickinson and her
poetry in a study such as this in which author and selected
works are to be analyzed in one relatively brief chapter is
that her corpus is so extensive.

As it is compiled and

edited by Thomas H. Johnson, Dickinson's body of poetry is
comprised of 1775 poems.

Additionally, she leaves

substantial correspondence to family, friends, and
associates, affirming that she not only dutifully adhered
to, but masterfully performed, the accepted social custom
of maintaining epistolary communication with family and
friends.

Cumulatively, her poetry and correspondence point

to a complex author who seriously and thoughtfully fashions
her art, and just as seriously and thoughtfully composes
her every word to others.

Dickinson's letters are

important for any study of her poetry because they reveal
insights into both her personal life and her professional
concerns.
Perhaps even more significantly, her letters seem to
be a kind of creative training ground for the poet-inprocess.

Developing the thesis that "poems had become

letters to Dickinson and letters, poems," Paula Bennett, in
her essay "Spectral Presence in Emily Dickinson's Letters,"
questions Johnson's reasons for editing Dickinson's poetry
separately from her letters.

She suggests that, in doing
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so, he did the poet (and her readers) a tremendous
disservice in "splitting the poems from the letters"
("SPEDL" 76, 77).

I wholeheartedly agree.

Because we

cannot easily view the letters alongside the poetry, our
task of interpreting the poetry and assessing the
methodology of the poet Dickinson is made more difficult.
Judith Farr convincingly develops the idea that
Dickinson's poetry and letters are the same art.

Building

her argument on Dickinson's tendency to revise both poetry
and letters,
Dickinson:

Farr writes in The Passion of Emilv
"Dickinson usually made drafts of her letters,

which she clearly regarded as artistic efforts, like the
poems" (199).

Through this exercise in "Writing letters

that scan, enclosing poems in letters, composing poems that
are letters, revising and rerevising both, Dickinson did
not always sharply distinguish between the uses of her art"
(PEP 16).

If, for Dickinson, letters and poems are textual

outpourings of at least a similar art, any careful study of
Dickinson's poetry demands looking into her letters.
Hence, I will frequently refer to Johnson's Emilv
Dickinson:

Selected Letters.

We dare not take any of her letters at face value
because, as in her poetry, she frequently assumes poses,
creating a persona other than herself.

An early writing to

T.W. Higginson reveals the assumed self that she wants her
preceptor and professional advisor to see:
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I have a Brother and Sister— My Mother does not
care for thought— and Father, too busy with
Briefs— to notice what we do— He buys me many
Books— but begs me not to read them— because he
fears they joggle the Mind.
(25 April 1862)
No extant textual evidence

supports the claim that

Dickinson's mother did not

care for thought or that her

father gave her books then

implored her not to

for fear of the intellectual damage
Instead
each

readthem

they might cause.

of describing the actual relationship she had with

of her parents, she creates an alternative role for

herself as daughter.
assumed stance.

Dickinson thus experiments with an

Although she apparently aimed for

plausibility, she gambles (and "gambols") on pity as a ploy
that will subsequently elicit the desired emotive response
from her reader Higginson.

Providing a critical window

through which we can observe the poet's creative telos,
Dickinson's letters, at least in part, reveal the poet as
she designs and redesigns the textual absent presences that
she wants us, her readers, to see.
Poem 724 describes her thoughts on this ability to
create personae.

She compares it to the creation of life:

It's easy to invent a Life—
God does it— every Day—
Creation— but the Gambol
Of His Authority—
Later lines in the poem comment on creative omnipotence,
which allows God at will to "Proceed— inserting Here— a
Sun/There— leaving out a Man— ."

The Renaissance play
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between Sun and Son (of God), who is spiritually present
though physically absent, suggests that Dickinson is
capitalizing, albeit playfully in this poem, on the idea of
absent presence.

Extending the analogy to her personal

role in poetic inventiveness, the poet concludes that she,
the writer, like God, can also "invent a Life" of absent
presence— even for herself in her letters.

The image is

that of the poet who, again like God, methodically,
purposefully, willfully, and sometimes teasingly frames her
text.
Like Bennett and Farr, Paul J. Ferlazzo emphasizes the
critical importance of Dickinson's letters.

He argues in

Emily Dickinson that they are crucial to our understanding
her role as a poet who controls her writing in order to
control her audience:
Letters were, indeed, a form of magic by which
Emily Dickinson could control her friends, could
keep them at a suitable distance and in a certain
relationship to her. They were the power by
which she gained emotional and intellectual
support in return for the devotion she offered.
(127-28)
The key words in this passage are "magic," "control," and
"devotion."

These three elements constitute reciprocity

through the text:

Dickinson devotedly (or lovingly) uses

her "magic" (with language) to "control" (or guide) her
readers in and through the textual exchange.

The result

can be a powerful, and potentially meaningful, experience
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for the reader insofar as she responds in kind to the love,
the power, and the "magic" of Dickinson.
"Magic" (synonymous with Dickinson's "spectral") will
be a term that will surface periodically in the development
of this chapter.

At no time will it suggest a hocus-pocus,

sleight-of-hand activity; neither will it refer to
witchcraft or demonic activity.

Rather, it will always

indicate that virtually indescribable, hence "magical,"
quality of words which decidedly affects— emotionally,
intellectually, even physically— the individual who reads
or hears them.

"Magic," as I apply it to Dickinson's

poetry and her poetic program, is akin to the mysterious
essence that the Greek sophist Gorgias pointed to in his
defense of Helen:

"Speech is a powerful lord that with the

smallest and most invisible body accomplished almost
godlike works"

(Encomiumf

par. 8).

Richard Sewall, whose text is generally accepted as
the standard in Dickinson biography, does not use the term
"magic" in describing the power of Dickinson's words, but
his comment draws a parallel that further links her to
Gorgias.

Specifically, what he recognizes as her

materialistic view of language echoes the Gorgian concept
of the materiality of logos that enters the body through
the ear and works its power in the soul of the listener.
As Sewall distinguishes Dickinson's view of language from
the Romantic "notion of winged words, message-bearing

256
verses," he writes that she grants an "immediate, intimate
power of the word, of the 'jostling' syllable or the
malarial sentence" (LED 676).

Sewall employs an

interesting metaphor to describe the power of Dickinson's
words:

his "malarial sentence" suggests that words, like

malaria, invade the body though external stimuli.

If the

stinging of an anopheles mosquito results in chills, fever,
and sweating, the analogy is that the reading of the word
has comparable physical manifestations.
Gary Lee Stonum specifically addresses the element of
power in Dickinson's poetry.

His essay, "Emily Dickinson's

Calculated Sublime," suggests that Dickinson's sublimity is
conditional sublimity, one that is calculated so as to
emphasize power over "wildness and divine exaltation"
("EDCS" 102).

In this passage, Stonum substitutes

"wildness and divine exaltation" for sublimity; I could
substitute "magic."

If Stonum is correct, and I think that

he is, Dickinson always sublimates "magic" in favor of
power because it is the poet's power that creates textual
presence.

The "magic" can come if the artist's power is in

the text, but "magic" alone does not guarantee power; it
does not yield an absent presence.

Stonum explains that

"Power is a word Dickinson rarely fails to capitalize; it
belongs with presence, circumference, and a few others as
one of the central animating abstractions in her poetry"
("EDCS" 102).

Reserving Dickinson's "circumference" for a
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later discussion, I will focus here on the pairing of power
and presence.

If, as Sewall suggests in the previous

passage, Dickinson does view the written word as corporeal
substance, it is a substance of potential power and of
discernible presence.
A part of my thesis is that this corporeality of the
written word underscores Dickinson's writings— her poetry
and her prose.

For the nineteenth-century poet who focuses

on the small, the tiny, comparing herself to the wren and
the daisy, the even smaller word becomes her greatest ally;
it becomes her power.

First significantly exhibiting this

potential for verbal expression through her correspondence,
she found prose too limiting as a medium for her talent.
She needed a tiny medium, poetry, that would allow her
readers a widening of interpretations.

The "magic11 (which,

for Dickinson, is manifest through her poetry) resides in
her implicitly powerful words.
Through her poems, explicitly composed as works of
art, and her letters, incidentally shaped as works of art,
Dickinson finds poetry superior to prose in its ability to
work a verbal "spell" over an audience.

Because her

letters scan like verse, because they lyrically and
aesthetically speak to her reader, they are at least quasipoetic.

However, in heralding the affective quality of the

poetic word, she was not content that "They shut me up in
Prose" (#613).

Her poetic genius demanded that she enlarge
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both the scope of her writing and the sphere of her
audience.

Satisfied neither with the textual restrictions

of prose nor the numerical limitations of personal
acquaintances, she sought expression through poetic
metaphor intended for people whom she did not know.
Bennett argues that "Whether poetry or letters, her writing
was her word made flesh, concealing and revealing its
creator in the very act of revelation" ("BMCS" 95).

By

making incorporeal thought corporeal, by "concealing" her
real self while "revealing" her assumed self through an
absent presence, Dickinson sought to establish
communication with her reader.

Hers was an ambitious

aim.
The first lines of #441 characterize her aggressive
poetic aim:
wrote to Me."

"This is my letter to the World/ That never
Her poetry, all 1775 individual poems, and

her letters thus become her "letter to the World."

I do

not casually include Dickinson's letters with her poems.
Rather, I suggest that they are alternate means whereby she
communicates with her audience, an intimate and personal
reader.

And successful communication is accomplished, one

reader at a time, in great part, through the diverse
assumed personae she creates.

The power of the poet

emanates from the words of her personae.

As they "speak"

from the printed text the words that she, the poet,
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controls, they subtly manipulate, working their "magic"
upon her audience.
Her work thus becomes a verbal body of possibility,
one which she describes in Poem 657:
I dwell in Possibility—
A fairer House than Prose—
More numerous of Windows—
Superior— for Doors—
In that house of possibility, which is her poetry, an
absent presence, especially that of the poet who is creator
of the text, can be discerned by the reader who engages
that text.

Through a careful, and caring, manipulation of

her words, the poet imparts a highly-charged absent
presence, whose vitality dominates the reading experience.
Jorge Luis Borges refers to the textual presence as "that
living voice going on and on, and it's speaking to us"
(10).

Dynamic in its effect, the "voice" is reactivated

each time a reader willingly partners herself with a
Dickinson poem.
For the student of Dickinson seeking to understand how
the idea of the absent presence functions in the writer's
poetic and prose corpus, the task is formidable.

The sheer

volume of her work, without the complexities of her
language of absence, can intimidate even the professional
reader of Dickinson.

Consequently, I have to establish

parameters that will reduce my scope and limit my focus.
Even that task is not easy.

Unlike the literary corpus of
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Sidney and Shakespeare, Dickinson's corpus does not include
a self-contained sequence of poems that can readily be
separated from the rest of her work.

She did not compose a

sonnet-sequence or a separate poetic series that sustains
one clearly defined voice; neither did she create a
singular persona who is poet-lover throughout her poetry.
Following the pattern established in her prose, Dickinson
creates numerous personae who inhabit and speak from her
poetry.

Having mastered the ability to create convincing

personae for herself in her letters, she multiplies that
talent numerous times over in her poetry.
These multiple personalities range in scope from a
Daisy (#106) to a Dollie (#156), from a "Wounded Deer"
(#165) to a "Nobody" (#288), from a Housewife or "wife"
(#154, #199) to a Poet (#448), from a Sparrow (#84) to a
"Soul" (#303),

from a Morning (#232) to a cadaver (#465)—

just to name a

few. She drew her personae from the world

around her, from life as she experienced and observed it,
but she avoided specifics that might limit the
interpretation and narrow the understanding for her reader.
Poem 1294 explains;
Of Life to own—
From
Lifeto draw—
But never touch the reservoir—
As a poet, the

only life that she had was her own— as

daughter, sister, friend, lover, and poet.

Necessarily,

then, she draws from that life and from its ever-widening
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sphere that radiates into the lives of those around her.
However, and this is a significant aspect of the mystery
that shrouds any study of Dickinson, she does not ’’touch
the reservoir,” which is her actual life.

She does not

write poems that are easily distinguished correlations to
her personal experience.

Rather, she employs her skills as

poet to encapsulate personal experiences and auxiliary
observations and translate them into understanding for her
reader.
Using her powerful language, she "Distills amazing
sense/ From ordinary Meanings— " (#448).

That is, she

takes the specifics of life and metaphorically distills
them into general experiences.

The final step in the

process belongs to the reader on the opposite side of the
text, as she, too, distills meaning.

Utilizing the reverse

technique of that implemented by the writer, the reader
extracts meaning for her specific life from the general
statement that is housed in the metaphorical language of
poetry.
In contrast to her Renaissance predecessors, Dickinson
may not have designed a sequence as such.

However,

physical evidence attests to the fact that she originally
arranged certain poems into specific groupings, or
fascicles.

These fascicles were made from folded sheets of

paper, each sheet yielding four sides for writing.

She

would assemble four to six pages together, punch holes into
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the folded side, and string and tie ribbon through the
holes.

Apparently she rather painstakingly arranged forty

fascicles in this manner; then she tucked them away in a
drawer, where they lay in safekeeping until after her
death.

Unfortunately for Dickinson and even more

unfortunately for readers of Dickinson, editors took the
fascicles apart and rearranged at will the poetry that was
purposely wrought and carefully grouped by this nineteenthcentury poet who adamantly refused to have her work
published during her lifetime.

It is when we view these

fascicles together that we can reach a somewhat remarkable
conclusion:

a large number of the fascicle poems, when

read apparently as the poet originally intended them,
assume sequence-like characteristics.

These fascicles will

be the primary source from which I will delineate the
operation of Dickinson's absent presence.
The process remains complex.

Although original

manuscripts show the poems in their respective forty
fascicles, they provide little commentary to readers who
seek to understand Dickinson's reasons for her groupings of
the poems.

William Shurr's text The Marriage of Emilv

Dickinson:

A Study of the Fascicles provides some insight

into what the poet might have been about in the fascicles.
Shurr rather thoroughly explores Dickinson's poetry from a
belief that the fascicles yield a distinctive literary
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unity.

He argues that, much like a poetic sequence, they

represent a unified whole:
When the poems are read as Dickinson grouped
them, and when the groupings are read in their
original order, what emerges is a remarkable
unity. Most of the [fascicle] poems are
generated by a single experience or complex of
experiences.
Each fascicle has a core of
poems directly related to Dickinson's love affair
and, later-, to her anomalous marriage. Other
poems radiate from that center or relate to it in
some discoverable way. And the fascicles as a
whole show many of the characteristics of a suite
or a sequence, like Shakespeare's Sonnets.
(MED 125)
Viewing them in their original arrangement, Shurr assesses
"that about 150 of the 814 fascicle poems are love poems
addressed to a specific individual" (MED 7).

Sidney

includes 108 sonnets in his sequence and Shakespeare has
154 sonnets in his collection.

Might we conclude (at least

tentatively, until future research shows otherwise) that
150 of Dickinson's poems suggest a comparatively
substantial cluster of work detailing a poet-lover coming
to terms with an absent beloved?
Shurr's text adopts a biographical approach, something
which I cannot fully advocate, but he does make what seems
to be an important observation concerning Dickinson's
fascicles.

He rather convincingly argues that we do not

readily see the unifying thread that binds Dickinson's
fascicle poems because we seldom find, and even more seldom
read, her poetry as she organized it to be read.

When we

do look at the fascicles together, we find, as Shurr
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recognizes, that their unifying thread is love, a love that
remains vital and alive in the absence of the beloved who
is both the source and the focus of the love described.
George F. Whicher, another biographer of Dickinson,
likewise cites love as the fulcrum of her work.

Although

Whicher may not specify the fascicles as those poems which
focus primarily on love between poet-lover and absent
beloved, his comments seem to be directed to that part of
Dickinson's work when he writes in This was a Poet;

"Emily

Dickinson was the only American poet of her century who
treated the great lyric theme of love with entire candor
and sincerity" (269).

Dickinson is not the only American

poet of her century who treats love.

Walt Whitman

certainly writes of love, but his tone of bravado and gusto
is in sharp contrast to that which emerges from Dickinson's
poetry.
Like Whitman, she speaks candidly of love.

And like

him, she maintains that it is the most powerful of
emotions.

But her words of love come from a voice of

quiet, convincing certainty.

Dickinson succinctly

describes the ramifications of love in an 1878 letter to
Mrs. Samuel Bowles:
trying in the least."
aspect of existence.

"Love makes us 'heavenly' without our
It is pervasive, encompassing every
It is, according to Farr, that which

"allowed her to glimpse and record the relation between
this world and the next. . . .

Love was increasingly her
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subject, love as the essential element in all
understanding" (PEP 319, 321).

Not only is love that which

allows her to approach "circumference" (at least partial,
or slanted, understanding of this world and the next), it
also is that which enables meaningful relationships—
personal and textual.

And love is the force that motivates

her persona who is poet-lover to fashion an absent presence
from a physically absent beloved.
As in the sonnet sequences of Sidney and Shakespeare,
a large grouping of poems in the fascicles reveals a
singular persona whose voice emanates from the text.

It is

the voice of a female poet-lover writing to or about her
absent beloved.

The addressed "You," at least in "about

150 of the 814 fascicle poems" (Shurr, MED 7), is the
persona's physically absent, yet vitally present, lover? he
is her "Bright Absentee!"

Though absent from her by both

time and place, the beloved plays a significant role in her
artistic endeavor, as evidenced in Poem #339:
I tend my flowers for thee—
Bright Absentee!
My Fuchsia's Coral Seams
Rip— while the Sower— dreams—
Geraniums— tint— and spot—
Low Daisies— dot—
My Cactus— splits her Beard
To show her throat—
Carnations— tip their spice—
And Bees— pick up—
A Hyacinth— I hid—
Puts out a Ruffled Head—
And odors fall
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From flasks— so small—
You marvel how they held—
Globe Roses— break their satin flake—
Upon my Garden floor—
Yet— thou— not there—
I had as lief they bore
No Crimson— more—
Thy flower— be gay—
Her lord— away!
It ill becometh me—
I'll dwell in Calyx— Gray—
How modestly— alway—
Thy Daisy—
Draped for thee!
What makes this poem so critical for my analysis is that it
artistically, in highly erotic terms, describes the
function of the persona's absent beloved.

The "flowers"

that the poet-lover tends for her beloved are her life's
work, the words that she writes.

The beloved is both the

purpose and the power behind the words; he is the intent of
and the inspiration for her words.

Just as the rose cannot

remain static in its fragile beauty, neither can the poet's
words remain cloistered in her mind.

Like the rose that

will "break" petals upon the "Garden floor" even when the
master gardener is "not there," the poet-lover's words must
find expression upon the printed page even though her
beloved is absent.
If we look at this poem ("I tend my flowers for
thee— ") in conjunction with Dickinson's letters, we see
that the references to flowers (fuchsia, geranium, cactus,
carnations, hyacinth, and roses) clearly correlate to the
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words of the poet-lover.

In an 1853 letter to Henry V.

Emmons, Dickinson writes:
Since receiving your beautiful writing I have
often desired to thank you thro' a few of my
flowers, and arranged the fairest for you a
little while ago, but heard you were away—
I have very few today, and they compare but
slightly with the immortal blossoms you kindly
gathered me.
This letter reveals a mutual correspondence between
Dickinson and Emmons.

His words are "immortal blossoms"

for her; she reciprocates by sending him "a few of my
flowers"
image

artfully "arranged" so as to please him.

The

is of the artist at work, creating and then refining

an aesthetic text— a process of careful writing and
revision.
In another 1854 letter to the same Henry V. Emmons,
she again offers an arrangement of her words, apparently as
an apology for some "little mishap" that occurred the
evening before:

"Will you please receive these blossoms— I

would love to make two garlands for certain friends of
mine, if the summer were here, and till she comes, perhaps
one little cluster, will express the wish to both."
a "Master" letter of 1858, she writes:

Then in

"You ask me what my

flowers said— they then were disobedient— I gave them
messages."

If her "flowers" were "disobedient," they

possess a willfulness separate from the one who tends them.
Especially Poem 494 describes this independence of words:
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Going to Him! Happy letter!
Tell Him—
Tell Him the page I didn't write—
Tell Him— I only said the Syntax—
And left the Verb and pronoun out—
Tell Him just how the fingers hurried—
Then— how they waded— slow-slow—
And then you wished you had eyes in your pages—
So you could see what moved them so—
This first stanza says much about Dickinson's attitude
concerning writer, reader, and text.

Personifying all

three, she characterizes each aspect of the rhetorical
triangle:

the writer, or poet-lover, is "I"; the reader is

"Him"; and the text is "You."

In embodying the text, she

assigns power to the word that she recognizes as separate
from her power as poet.

As a writer, her primary task is

to create the essential verbal framework from which the
reader might glean meaning.

Thus, she claims to have "only

said the Syntax— /And left the Verb and pronoun out."

It

is then necessary for the words in her syntactical
arrangement to continue the work initiated by the writer.
In her repetitive admonition to her created text to "Tell
Him," she suggests that the word can speak to the reader of
the text in a way that she, the writer, cannot.
Just as she creates a dialogue with the words that she
writes, those same words subsequently create another
dialogue with the reader of her text.

In that later

dialogue between text and reader, the words will in turn
"say" something vital about the author and her creative
process:

"Tell Him just how the fingers hurried— /Then—
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how they waded— slow— slow.11

In a very real way, the words

reflect the sincerity, the struggle, and the love of the
poet for both her work and her audience.

Words, then, as

Dickinson describes here, serve as intermediaries between
writer and reader.

They are created by the writer, but

they act independently of their creator each time a reader
willingly enters into dialogue with them.
If words can act apart from the author's bidding, they
are not static markers on a page.

Rather, they are infused

with a dynamic life of their own, a life that is evidenced
when a reader visits a text and allows the words to produce
meaning for her.

The success of any textual dialogue is

thus contingent upon the reader; her response to the words
ultimately determines the outcome of the reading
experience.

Dickinson herself provides evidence of this

rhetorical operation.

In her first letter to Higginson,

dated 15 April 1862, Dickinson seems anxious for his
corroboration that her "Verse is alive."

She wants his

assurance that it "breathed" for him, that it spoke to him
in a real and vital way.

Her letters thus substantiate the

assumption found in her poetry that words are living,
dynamic entities which can affect a reader.
In another letter to Higginson, dated June 1869,
Dickinson comments on this vibrant quality of the written
word;
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A Letter always feels to me like immortality
because it is the mind alone without corporeal
friend. Indebted in our talk to attitude and
accent, there seems a spectral power in thought
that walks alone.
According to Dickinson, inherent in a letter, and
presumably in any text that is comprised of words, is a bit
of immortality, what she calls a "spectral power in thought
that walks alone."

Once the words are written, they belong

no longer exclusively to the person who penned them.
Rather, they are a power unto themselves.

While

independent of their creator when acting upon their reader,
they nevertheless maintain a vestige, a discernible
presence, albeit absent, of the originator of the text.
Although the one who wrote the words may not be
corporeal, may not be physically present to the one who
reads the words, the writer nevertheless imparts a part of
herself; her thoughts, her ideas, her experiences, and her
emotions are imbedded in the written words.
immortality for the author results.

A kind of

As the reader engages

in the writer's printed words, the two who are absent from
the other communicate in a very real way.

Words thus exude

a power, which may be "spectral" but clearly discernible to
the one who willingly participates in the act of reading,
to the one who, in the words of Walter Ong, does not "read
whimsically or with no reference to the writer's world" (QL
162).

The reader must partner herself with the writer, not

in a "willing suspension of disbelief," but in a willing
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assumption of credulity.

Then, and only then, can the word

work its '*spell" with the reader.
Paul Ricoeur addresses this intellectually complex
activity in The Conflict of Interpretations.

He recognizes

that numerous factors are implicated in any reading
experience which leads to understanding.

The language

system, which is carefully and creatively employed by the
writer, is certainly important, but it is only one of the
elements in interpretation.

The psychological profile of

the reader, her past and present experiences, is a
significant variable in any reading process.

Because

symbolic language is, by its very nature, subjectively
interpretative, it allows for numerous personal
applications.

Such is the realm of hermeneutics.

Ricoeur

says that "there is no closed system of the universe of
signs" (Cl 65).

To further extrapolate, there is no closed

system of hermeneutics, no closed system of interpretations
of a particular text.
Dickinson's term for this open system of signs is
"spectral," and she writes a simple little poem about this
not-so-simple quality of words.

Referring specifically in

#1212 to the spoken word, she says:
A word is dead
When it is said,
Some say.
I say it just
Begins to live
That day.
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Whether spoken or written, a word does not achieve its
potential until it is received either by hearer or reader.
Thus engaging the rhetorical triangle, the hearer (or the
reader) completes the communication process when she
listens to or picks up a text, which is comprised of words.
These words, as they continue the work of their
"spectral1’ creator, assume a duality of power and process:
as they produce understanding in the mind of the reader,
they necessarily establish a relationship between reader
and writer, a relationship that was forged by the writer.
Near the conclusion of his discussion about the
responsibility of the writer to visualize, and thus
initiate, a rapport with a potential reader, Ong writes of
that which I view as the implicit dualism in effective
communication:
Human communication is never one-way. Always, it
not only calls for response but is shaped in its
very form and content by anticipated response.
This is not to say that I am sure how the
other will
respond to what I say. But I have to
be able to
conjecture a possible range of
responses at least in some vague way. I have to
be somehow
inside the mind of the other in
advance in order to enter with my message, and he
or she must be inside my mind. To formulate
anything I must have another person or other
persons already 'in mind.' This is the paradox
of human communication. Communication is
intersubjective.
(QL 176-77)
According to Ong's analysis, communication, by its very
definition, is predicated on self and other:

the writer

seeks to impart some kind of "message" to a receiver, who
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is either intended or imagined.

As he outlines in another

essay, "The Writer's Audience is Always a Fiction," a
writer may assume either a general or a specific audience,
but that fictionalized audience determines, in great part,
the process of communication.

Although the vehicle for

communication may be composed subjectively by the writer in
the privacy of her personal thoughts, the power of that
communication is intersubjective, mutually dependent upon
both writer and reader.
Dickinson's preceptor and correspondent Higginson was
aware of this quality in Dickinson's words.

In a letter

dated June 1869, he writes that her letters and verses have
a "strange power" that creatively inhibit and personally
affect him.

Apparently her words were so remarkably

powerful, so successfully manipulative, that his paled in
comparison when he first attempted to reply to her
correspondence.

As a result, he found it "hard to write"

and "long months pass[ed]" before he answered her
correspondence.

We get the impression, though, that her

words haunt him in the interim; they force him "never [to]
relax my interest" in her and her work.

Higginson thus

inadvertently describes the creative power that enables the
poet to make her absence become dynamically present to the
reader.

That presence lingers, even manipulates, long

after the reading process ends.
power of Dickinson.

Such is the "magical"

Her work suggests, however, that the
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power is latent until both writer and reader enter into a
reciprocally loving relationship, which is achieved through
participation in the created text.
The "strange power" to which Higginson refers is first
activated when the poet pens her words, which she fuels by
love.

She and her love for her intended audience may

initiate the rhetorical process, but only when her words
are partnered with a reader does it reach completion.

Poem

809 further explains this idea:
Unable are the Loved to die
For Love is Immortality,
Nay, it is Deity—
Unable they that love— to die
For Love reforms Vitality
Into Divinity.
Ostensibly referring to the immortalizing love between a
lover and her beloved, these words also describe the love
between poet and reader.

If a reader communes with a

writer, who is the "Loved" creator of a text, then that
writer achieves a kind of immortality.

The words of the

poet retain a vitality that perpetuates the being of their
creator.

She may be physically absent from the text, but

the voice of her persona maintains her intimately personal
link with her future reader.
Her poetry and prose repeatedly point to this element
that circumscribes the process of communication.
emotional requisite is love:

That

love of writer for her

reader, and love of reader for the message her writer can
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offer through words.

Only when each of these elements is

in play can the poet create a poetry that will contain
"superior instants" (#306) of insight for her reader.
Numerous poems support the idea that love is the compelling
force behind Dickinson's work.
A cryptic one that sums up her business of love is
#1438:
Behold this little Bane—
The Boon of all alive—
As common as it is unknown
The name of it is Love—
To lack of it is Woe—
To own of it is Wound—
Not elsewhere— if in Paradise
Its Tantamount be found—
Love is both "Bane" and "Boon," something that everyone
desires, even though pain and heartache frequently
accompany it.

Although the "if in Paradise" may open a

slight window to doubt, I do not see that doubt as
contradicting Dickinson's claims in #917 that love exists
after death ("Love— is anterior to Life— /Posterior— to
Death— ").

Rather, doubt applies to the quality of that

love which continues beyond mortality.
Unlike love on earth that sometimes pains and wounds
both lover and beloved, love beyond the grave will be
intrinsically different.

No longer eros, cupiditas, or

philia, all of which are subject to human selfishness and
its consequent injury, love after death will be agape,
perfect and selfless.

An individual cannot attain love to
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that extent while on earth, but she can approximate it
through her relationship with her beloved. . That emotion
which exists between lover and beloved provides a brief
glimpse into what lies beyond the grave:
We learned the Whole of Love—
The Alphabet— the Words—
A Chapter— then the mighty Book—
Then— Revelation closed—
But in Each Other's eyes
An Ignorance beheld—
Diviner than the Childhood's—
And each to each, a Child,
Attempted to expound
What Neither— understood—
Alas, that Wisdom is so large—
And Truth— so Manifold!
(#568)
Apparently referring to a secular, rather than a spiritual
love, the poet-lover admits to the impossibility of
describing even this earthly scope of loving.

Erotic love,

like its spiritual counterpart, is so complex, so vast that
it defies explanation.

The best that one can do is to

glimpse its power and begin to understand its
ramifications.
For the poet-lover whose "business is to love," words
are the means whereby she seeks to "expound" the "Wisdom"
and "Truth" of that business.

Dickinson's reference to her

profession, the "business" of loving, echoes the Puritan
idea of "calling," of one who is "called forth" by God to
effect his work among mortals.

Unfortunately, like those

imperfect humans whom God selects for his work, her weapon
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in the expository process likewise falls short of its goal.
Poem 581 comments on her dilemma:
I found the words to every thought
I ever had— but One—
And that— defies me—
As a Hand did try to chalk the sun
This poem echoes the thought in #276:
Many a phrase has the English language—
I have heard but one—
Low as the laughter of the Cricket,
Loud, as the Thunder's Tongue—
Whether or not Shurr is correct when he argues that the
phrase that Dickinson hears repetitively in her world is "I
love you" (MED 66), it would seem that the thought that
defies words, the concept that defies concrete explanation,
is love.

A poet who is master

of words might only

approximate the experience for her reader.

Although she

cannot find words that will plumb the mystery of love, she
offers her poetry as a means to concretize that abstract
experience for her reader.
Nathan A. Scott, Jr., has recently commented on what
the poet-lover does in creating a poetic world for her
reader.

He writes in the introduction to his textvisions

of Presence in Modern American

Poetry:

The poetic world is rooted in the concrete
particularity of lived experience? and poetic
art, in its deepest aspect, is a way of loving
the concrete, the particular, the individual.
But, of course, to love is to enter the dimension
of . . . presence.
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The poetic world can be "rooted in the concrete
particularity of lived experience" without touching the
"reservoir" of actual experience, as Dickinson suggests in
Poem 1294.

That is, the poet can recreate a semblance of

reality, a form of transcendence, through her artistic
medium that allows the reader to share in the loving-inabsence experience of the personae.

Though the textual

recreation may be "magical" for the reader, the process of
textually simulating presence, of creating an absent
presence to which a reader might respond, is the result of
conscious artistry.
In a letter to Dr. and Mrs. J.G. Holland, dated
Summer 1862, Dickinson explains part of her effort which
produces mystery and "magic" for the reader.

Commenting on

love, the motivating purpose, of her poetry, she writes:
"My business is to love."

She compares herself as poet to

a bird whose business "is to sing," even when alone "on a
little bush at the foot of the garden."

Motivated by his

very nature, he sings even when no one hears.

Like the

solitary bird, the poet is prompted by a force that is
greater than she is.

The solitude that necessarily

accompanies this absence pervades especially her fascicle
poetry.
In an earlier letter to Susan Gilbert, dated 1854, she
writes about solitude as an integral part of her work:
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I would paint a portrait which would bring the
tears, had I canvass for it, and the scene should
be— solitude*, and the figures— solitude— and the
lights and shades, each a solitude.
I could fill
a chamber with landscapes so lone, men should
pause and weep there; then haste grateful home,
for a loved one left.
Reminiscent again of one "called" for a specific task, she,
like the solitary bird who sings when no one hears, not
only writes in solitude, but she writes of solitude.
Dickinson may have written in solitude, and she may have
written of solitude, but hers is a self-imposed isolation
which she personally manipulates to create her art.
This letter about solitude significantly reveals her
methodology as poet.

Quite specifically, it describes

Dickinson's purpose in writing poetry;

to demand

involvement and elicit emotional response from her readers.
So stipulated, she effects her self-described aim primarily
through the numerous and pervasive absences that dominate
her work.

Not only does she write of an absent beloved,

she relies upon absences— textual, grammatical, and
referential— to demand involvement from her reader.
Because of the nature of her business, she, too, must
"sing" without an audience; she, too, must create without a
reader in attendance.
reader.

Conversely, the same is true for her

In our post-aural era in which communication no

longer is a public event with a speaker and numerous
listeners, public reading of texts is the exception; an
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individual most often reads in the privacy of her own
thoughts.
Noting the similarities in both the reading and
writing processes, Ong addresses this cultural advancement
in his text Oralitv and Literacy:

"Writing and reading are

solitary activities that throw the psyche back on itself"
' (QL 69).

The inference is that as the writer and reader

retreat into the communicative process, they enter into the
abyss of self, which is the mind.

Therein, through the

printed text, both encounter the other.

The psyche of the

writer engages with that of the reader during the
composition process, while the reader likewise moves into
the mind of the writer during the interpretive process.
Ong particularly addresses the state of the reader in
his earlier work, The Presence of Word.

As he plots a kind

of history of the development of language, he comments
specifically that
reading of any sort forces the individual
into himself by confronting him with thought in
isolation, alone. The book takes the reader out
of the tribe. His thought still has minimal
social guise:
it is in a book, which comes from
another. Butthe other is not there.
The reader
follows thought all alone.
(EW 135)
Though physically "all alone" while
text, the reader is not

engaging a printed

fully alone in thought.

The

thoughts that she mentally digests and intellectually
assimilates are the thoughts encoded by another.

The
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determinations that the reader makes are indeed hers, but
they are shaped in great part by the absent presence of the
writer who initiated the thought process.
Underscoring this idea in her poetry, Dickinson
comments on the present-in-absence relationship between
writer and reader.

Necessarily in physical solitude, the

poet receives her inspiration:
The Soul's Superior instants
Occur to Her— alone—
When friend— and Earth's occasion
Have infinite withdrawn—
(#306)
The means to work her poetic "magic" comes to the poet when
she is alone, after the "occasion" of the poem has passed,
after the beloved has withdrawn.

Like the bird alone in

the garden, the poet writes in solitude with no one present
to applaud her endeavors.

And like the bird whose nature,

or "gift" is to make music, the poet's nature, or gift, is
to write poetry.
And certainly Dickinson's poetry is her attempt to
make "music" for her readers.

Surely not incidentally, her

poems are patterned after traditional musical forms.
"The Poet and the Muse:

In

Poetry as Art," Johnson reminds us

that "Basically all her poems employ meters derived from
English hymnology" (70).

Just as seriously as a musician

organizes tones to create a melodic tune to please a
listener,

Dickinson writes and rewrites her words to

fashion a verbal text that will elicit an aesthetic
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response in her reader.

That response partially results

from, as Joseph Allard writes in "Emily Dickinson:

The

Regulation of Belief," the poet's compelling "ability to
forge poems that succeed in their attempt to capture a
moment in the experience of one" (23) who is other to the
reader.

The role of the writer is crucial as she applies

her artistic and linguistic skills to the process of making
meaning in the text.

Hers, however, is not the only

significant role in the making and processing of meaning.
Without a reader, without one who shares, and thus
completes, the aesthetic experience, the writer and her
words fall short of making music.
Dickinson describes this responsibility of the reader
in poem #526:
To hear an Oriole sing
May be a common thing—
Or only a divine.
It is not of the Bird
Who sings the same, unheard,
As unto Crowd—
The Fashion of the Ear
Attireth that it hear
In Dun, or fair—
So whether it be Rune,
Or whether it be none
Is of within.
The 'Tune is in the Tree— '
The Skeptic— showeth me—
'No Sir! In Thee!'
The poet, as "Oriole," makes the music, be it "common" or
"divine."

The interpretation of that music, however, does

283
not come with the song; it comes through the hearing of the
song.

The reader's receptive "Ear," which feeds the mind,

is that which determines the quality of meaning; it is that
which assesses the musical message as "Dun, or fair."

In

like manner of the bird whose tune wafts from the tree
where he sings to the hearer apart from him, the message of
the poet is not confined to the mind of its creator.

It,

too, makes its meaningful music only "In Thee," only in the
mind of the absent reader who will be on the opposite side
of the text.
Dickinson thus ascribes great power to her reader,
whom she engages in an intimate person-to-person exchange.
If, as her writings suggest, solitude and absence of the
other are prerequisites for dialogue through the printed
word, the successful reader shares equally with the writer
in eliciting meaning from a text, but also of critical
importance in this rhetorical grid is the persona of the
poet-lover.
As previously mentioned, something which immediately
distinguishes Dickinson's poet-lover from Astrophil and
Will is that she is female.

As in the sonnet sequences of

her Renaissance predecessors, Dickinson's fascicles also
maintain a singular focus— love between a female poet-lover
and her absent beloved.

Since she did not destroy her

carefully wrought fascicles, she certainly envisioned a
reader somewhere in some place at some future time who
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would share these recorded experiences with her.

As Shurr

so persuasively argues, we tend to do Dickinson a
tremendous disservice.

When we do examine the fascicle

poetry, which is placed intermittently throughout even the
Johnson edition of Dickinson's poetry, we recognize that
her persona as poet-lover is fairly well sustained.

As she

writes of her absent lover, we sense the strength of her
feelings, the energy of her passion, and the power of her
love.

This strength, energy, and power are fused into a

substantive poetry of absence.
We need to remember that, especially in Dickinson's
poetry, absence does not congruently equate to loss.

Loss

connotes deprivation or depletion— of emotion, of conflict,
or of love.

A loss may have resulted in the absence, but

the absence does not necessarily correspond to that loss.
The poet-lover may have been deprived of the presence of
her beloved, but she transforms his absence into the
essential dynamic of the poetry.

All of the emotion, the

conflict, and the love that accompanied her relationship
with him is captured in the words of her poetry.
And, as Suzanne Juhasz argues in The Undiscovered
Continent, "Language, of course, turns out to be
Dickinson's greatest power and best weapon" (6).

Although

Dickinson may not use the term "weapon" to describe the
power of words, she writes several poems that correlate to
that image of linguistic aggression.

"There is a
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word/Which bears a sword" (#8) describes an armed word in
repeated battle where "It hurls its barbed syllables/And is
mute again."

The implication is that words are "mute," or

powerless in their inactive state.

During the reading

process, however, they resume their aggressive stance,
inciting the reader to hermeneutic "victory."
The two poems that most clearly depict words as
weapons are "My Life had stood— a Loaded Gun— " (#754) and
"She dealt her pretty words like Blades— " (#479).

"My

Life" reflects back upon the life of poetic genius, a life
which, like a loaded gun, discharges its powerful
ammunition.

That ammunition, for the poet,, is her

language, her words that have "the power to kill" or
noticeably affect her reader.

Conversely, the words

themselves assume a kind of immortality because they are
"Without— the power to die— ."

As long as the words appear

on the printed page, they are not dead.

They continue to

live apart from their creator.
Poem #479 graphically addresses this autonomy of the
written word:
She dealt her pretty words like Blades—
How glittering they shone—
And every One unbared a Nerve
Or wantoned with a Bone—
She never deemed— she hurt—
That— is not Steel's Affair—
A vulgar grimace in the Flesh—
How ill the Creatures bear—
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Radically separating language from the one who uses it to
write the poem, Dickinson describes the poet as one who
functions separately from the words.

Weapon-like, the

sharp-edged words can awaken a ,lNerve,, and can cut to the
"Bone" of the one who reads them.

Ideas may come into the

reader's mind through the words of the writer, but this
poem suggests that they assume textual autonomy, acting
apart from the writer.

Dickinson's image thus suggests

that ideas indeed have a "spectral" power, a power that
works beyond the physical reach of the poet.
Does such an image negate my premise that the absent
presence of the poet is a dominant factor in the rhetorical
triangle?

Not at all.

The words, as Dickinson writes in

#479, are hers initially.
makes them "pretty."

She is the skillful master who

She is the one who makes them

"glitter" in style and syntax and "shine" with ideas and
meaning.

Like indestructible "Steel," the poet's absent

presence emerges from the words which she writes.
A return to Juhasz and her discussion of Dickinson
yields an explanation for the poet's metaphor of words as
weapons:

words are to quicken thought.

Incisive,

sometimes even painful, words effect results when all
rhetorical elements are successfully implemented:

a loving

and responsible writer, a syntactically and aesthetically
correct text, and a loving and responsive reader.
these conflate through a reading experience, the

When
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consequence is tangible— evidenced frequently in feelings.
Though nebulous, feelings nevertheless signify a
discernible awareness of something having happened:
emotions tapped, thoughts engaged, or ideas shared.
Dickinson accomplishes each of these as she embodies a
language of absence.

For her, feelings are an integral

part of both the writing and the reading of a text.

Juhasz

deduces that feelings, for Dickinson, are paramount:

"Not

to feel is pointless,* it is not to be alive and, therefore,
it is death.

Thus Dickinson courts all feelings and finds

value therein" (IJC 173).

Juhasz goes on to say that

especially the feeling of pain is important because of "its
vitality and its pedagogical potential" and "is worthy of
pursuit, even though it admittedly hurts" (U£ 173).

Again,

I stress that pain is not tantamount to unhappiness.
Dickinsonian pain heightens awareness; it sharpens
perception; it awakens insight.

As Juhasz argues, her

language of absence, although it may herald pain for both
writer and reader, is a crucial part of the poet's
strategy.
I would counter that Dickinson does not limit her
experimentation with feelings to pain.
reservoir of all emotions:

She draws on the

disappointment/ecstasy,

sorrow/joy, loss/gain, despair/anticipation, and
doubt/confidence.

And through each of these antinomian

constructs, Dickinson departs significantly from the
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writings of her Renaissance predecessors as she not only
relies on, but implements, what can be for her reader,
painful textual absences and ambiguous references.

These

purposeful absences, as I will discuss later, are
Dickinson's means whereby she seeks to engage her reader
fully as a rhetorical partner.
Certainly other startling differences separate
Dickinson's poet-lover from those of Sidney and
Shakespeare.

Admittedly, her persona is female while

theirs are male, but the differences in gender, as I
interpret the majority of her poems, are not relevant to
the operations of the dominant absent presence.

I

recognize that some critics, such as Martha Nell Smith in
Rowing in Eden:

Rereading Emilv Dickinson, argue that we

misread Dickinson's work if we ignore what she identifies
as the lesbian overtones in the text.

But I would counter

that her canon (and consequently her audience) suffers if
it is forced into Smith's equation:

poet (Emily Dickinson)

+ beloved (Susan Gilbert Dickinson) = poetry.

In her

rereading of Dickinson, Smith strives to superimpose her
theory of the poet's personal life onto the poetry, a
potential quagmire for critical analysis.

The primary

error in Smith's assessment is her assumption that
Dickinson's poetry is narrowly autobiographical,
representing a verbal reflection of Smith's own, and
personally particular, interpretation of Dickinson's life.
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Farr reminds us that Dickinson's expressions of love
for her sister-in-law conform to accepted social customs of
Victorian New England.4

Dispelling the notion that they

were "'carnal' lovers," she recognizes the
tradition of romantic friendship and love among
nineteenth-century women.
There was, indeed a cult of fond
sentimentality among Victorian girls. By
including encomiums to cheeks, hair, and bosoms,
it [the tradition] acquired an ambiguous
eroticism.
(PEP 101)
A problem for modern readers of Dickinson is that we tend
to assess overt verbal eroticism between two women (such as
that found in Dickinson's letters) as physical in nature.
Products of a society with social mores different from
those of the Victorian era, our hermeneutic mandate is to
refrain from imposing judgmental twentieth-century
interpretations on nineteenth-century customs.
However, I recognize that part of Dickinson's genius
is that a critic can hermeneutically construe one, or some,
of her texts as lesbian in nature,

since all of

Dickinson's texts 'resonate with absences, both male and
female, they can subsequently allow crossings of the lines
of gender— heterosexual, lesbian, or other.

Because of her

treatment of absences, a variety of readers can (and do)
respond in radically different ways to her poetry.

In

making such a statement, however, I do not accept Smith's
homosexually biographical basis for Dickinson's poetry.
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Conversely/ neither am I convinced of Shurr's argument
that many of the fascicle poems depict Dickinson's
"anomalous marriage" fMED 14) to the Reverend Charles
Wadsworth. . Especially when Shurr explains Wadsworth's
seemingly abrupt departure to San Francisco, the
credibility of his thesis breaks down.

Devoting several

pages to his hypothetical assumption, Shurr argues that, in
order to avoid certain scandal, Wadsworth left his pastoral
post in Philadelphia after Dickinson told him that she was
pregnant with his child.

Shurr further deduces that this

fetus was aborted, perhaps with the assistance of Susan
Gilbert Dickinson (Shurr, MED 177).

Although much of

Shurr's book is informative and entertaining, I cannot help
but balk at his reliance on conjecture, sometimes reaching
unsubstantiated supposition, which he offers as a means of
understanding Dickinson's poetry.
Although I cannot accept Shurr's theory of an
"anomalous marriage" to Wadsworth, I agree that the
preponderance of evidence points to a heterosexual
relationship emerging from the text.

This determination

does not preclude the validity of other interpretations.
Quite the contrary, I recognize that those like Smith who
interpret Dickinson's work as homosexually biased, perhaps
inadvertently, offer an accolade to the poet and her work.
The multiple interpretations of gender and of relationship
between poet-lover and beloved attest to a poet and a
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poetry that can speak meaningfully to both the heterosexual
and the homosexual reader.
Regardless of personal bias, any reader can
successfully find meaning, and certainly pure pleasure,
from Dickinson's poems, all containing purposeful absences,
presumably to titillate and involve the reader.
#211, even pulsate with eroticism.

Some, like

Borrowing from nature,

Dickinson describes the consummation of love between
persona and her beloved as heterosexual, between a bee
(male symbol) who penetrates a flower (female symbol):
Come slowly— Eden!
Lips unused to Thee—
Bashful— sip thy Jessamines—
As the fainting Bee—
Reaching late his flower,
Round her chamber hums—
Counts his nectars—
Enters— and is lost in Balms.
Unmistakably seductive, this poem describes prolonged
pleasure in the sexual act, moving from foreplay ("Come
slowly— Eden!") to anticipation of ecstasy ("As the
fainting Bee— ") to loss of individuality for the female as
the male enters her and releases part of himself ("Enters—
and is lost in Balms").

This idea of loss, with an implied

reduction of self, is something that distinguishes
Dickinson's poet-lover from Astrophil and Will.

For the

purpose of this study, then, which is to plot and analyze
an absent presence that fuels the artist's creativity while
it empowers the writing process, I will refer to
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Dickinson's relationship of poet-lover and beloved as one
between an assumed female persona and her male beloved.
Dickinson's view of love, as described in #190, is
highly idealized:

"He was weak, and I was strong—

then— /So He let me lead him in— ."

Especially for a

nineteenth-century single female, this heterosexual
perspective may be considered radical as it allows for the
reversal of roles in sexual dominance and emotional
control.

But it is a view that plays itself out in much of

her poetry.

Dickinson's tendency to minimize the self in

order to maximize the power of her persona pervades
especially her fascicle poetry.

Jane Donahue Eberwein, in

Strategies of Limitation, advises the reader of Dickinson's
ploy:
Dickinson's readers must be alert to her tendency
to exploit whatever limitations she encountered—
often to intensify those limitations in order to
exploit them more. . . . To be tiny was not
necessarily to be negligible, or lacking in vital
power.
(SL

10)

To be tiny, to seem insignificant, and to function in
absence inversely represent Dickinson's strengths.

The

lack often enables what the poet refers to as
"circumference11— the bursting through of all limitations,
be they life into death, mortality into immortality,
presence into absence, eros into agape, or male into female
as described in #190.
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Much has been written about Dickinson's idea of
"circumference."

Critics who undertake an explanation of

this complex Dickinsonian term agree only that it suggests
manifold meanings.

In her text devoted to an understanding

of Dickinson's eccentric use of the word, Eberwein
concludes that "Circumference, for Emily Dickinson, is
death— the transitional point between the familiar circuit
world and either immortality or nothingness" (£L 164-65).
According to Eberwein, the "familiar circuit world" is the
"circuit of personal space," the knowable world of
"consciousness, identity, the senses and matter," while
circumference is "whatever might be outside" the boundary
of finitude (SL 161).
Kher, on the other hand, argues that "Circumference is
Dickinson's metaphor for resurrection.

Circumference,

which is the earth's outer limit, offers her a simultaneous
experience of life and death or life in death" (J±A 124).
Eberwein and Kher link circumference to that which occurs
after death.
options:

Eberwein says Dickinson recognizes two

immortality or nothingness.

Kher, quite

specifically, says circumference is resurrection into
another state of being.
I prefer the explanation of Judith Farr.

Farr takes

up the discussion of "circumference" in two separate
chapters of The Passion of Emilv Dickinson.

Initially, she

states that the unique term is "one of [Dickinson's]
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metaphors for poetry" (PEP 29).

Later, Farr expounds more

fully, linking "circumference" to love.

Analyzing

"circumference" as a reference to "artistic inspiration,"
Farr concludes that "'circumference' generally means either
poetry itself or the significance of all that exists, on
earth and in heaven" (PEP 319).

g

"Circumference" (the

poetic program) thus becomes the means through which
Pickinson and her reader might begin to approach
understanding of all that seems to defy understanding.
Laura Briggen develops a similar argument. In "Emily
Pickinson's Circumference:

Figuring a Blind Spot in the

Romantic Tradition," Gribben says that the poet's
perceptive ability, the talent that defines her as a
professional poet, "provides her with a much needed
foothold" (3).

She concludes that "circumference," for

Pickinson, thus becomes "the domain of all that is and can
be known or experienced.

It is enriched from within by

emotions, experience, language, and poetry, and it is
limited from without by death, eternity, and the sublime—
all that is unknowable" ("EPC" 17).

Lovingly molding that

which is present (emotions, experience, language) into
poetry, the poet comments on that which is absent, but that
which can be aesthetically actualized through words (death,
eternity, and the sublime).
It is this struggling for presence in the midst of
absence that fuels virtually all of Pickinson's poetry.
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And at the heart of the struggle is the poet-lover who
claims and then textually recreates presence from her
absent lover.

As she endeavors to glean understanding from

and add meaning to her sphere of life, she empowers her
reader to share the experience with her and, subsequently,
to translate that meaning into her personal life.
Like Astrophil and Will before her, Dickinson's
persona undertakes a metaphorical journey, but hers is
toward circumference:
Each Life Converges to some Centre—
Expressed— or still—
Exists in every Human Nature
A Goal—
Embodied scarcely to itself— it may be—
Too fair
For Credibility's presumption
To mar—
Adored with caution— as a Brittle Heaven—
To reach
Were hopeless, as the Rainbow's Raiment
To touch—
Yet persevered toward— sure— for the Distance—
How high—
Unto the Saints' slow diligence—
The Sky—
Ungained— it may be— by a Life's low Venture—
But then—
Eternity enable the endeavoring
Again.
(#680 )
This poem suggests that human existence is in a continuous
movement toward the raising of consciousness, what Eberwein
calls "a process of stripping away extraneous details to
reveal the essential elements of her life metaphor— the
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pilgrimage from limitation to circumference” (Sk 47).

This

consciousness is of self in relation to world and Other,
but it also includes a heightened awareness of the totality
of being— life/death, mortality/immortality, and
impermanence/permanence.
Although we observe Dickinson's poet-lover in a
journey, her movement toward knowledge differs
significantly from those found in the texts of the Greek
philosophers (Plato and Aristotle), the Biblical writers
(especially the New Testament), and the Renaissance writers
(Sidney and Shakespeare) mentioned in previous chapters.
Whereas each of them, or their personae, sought to
understand themselves in the realm of self, world, and
creator, Dickinson's writing suggests an alternative
pilgrimage.

She does not overtly question and seek to

understand the existence of an omnipotent Creator.
Spiritual tenets from Dickinson's strict nineteenthcentury Puritan upbringing can be found in her poetry.
Frequently affirming these traditional beliefs, she
compares the role of her poet-lover to that of the
suffering saint— but one without a savior.

Her persona

prays to God to relieve her of her "Misery" in love, but
her anguished pleas go unanswered.

Prayer, a seemingly

irrevocable aspect of Dickinson's heritage and upbringing,
suggests part of the poet's homage to the one whom she
recognizes as the Creator and sustainer of life.

Her
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persona prays to God, but He neither acknowledges nor acts
upon her pleas.

He is disinterested and uncaring (#376).

Ultimately, she comes to realize that the power resides
within herself as poet to redeem herself from the misery
that is hers.
As maker of meaning, she manipulates words to raise
herself, and consequently her readers, from the abyss of
misery:
I reckon— when I count at all—
First— Poets— Then the Sun—
Then Summer— Then the Heaven of God—
And then— the List is done—
But, looking back— the First so seems
To Comprehend the Whole—
The Others look a needless Show—
So I write— Poets— All—
(#569)
God and his heaven are a part of her existence, but they
rank fourth in a list of importance in her realm of
reality.

That which is all important is the poet.

Like Sidney, Dickinson ranks the poet highest in her
hierarchy:

she is above the sun, the summer, and the

heaven of God.

From atop her perch, she therefore, "dealt

her pretty words like Blades— " (#479) as the means to
begin "To Comprehend the Whole" of life.
only weapon (Juhasz, UC 6).

Words are her

Through them, she gains access

to understanding, which, in turn, empowers her to control
that life which has been given her.
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And Dickinson's world basically is limited to that
which she can, and for the most part does, control.
Primarily reclusive in her adult years, she personally
interacts with her immediate family and only a few friends.
She creates, however, an extended network of association,
corresponding with friends, old and new.

And it is

primarily through this correspondence that we witness her
efforts to control that world, to present herself to her
correspondents as she wants them to see her.

Thus, she

creates her own version of reality for her readers.
One encounters that "reality" through the
subconscious, the inner self.

World and creator are

relevant only insofar as they impinge upon this journey of
self in search of its central being.

Dickinson poetically

details a quest that plunges the conscious individual into
the abyss of the sublimated self to flounder for some
modicum of truth that might emerge from the deep.

Poem 642

describes this modernist quest that demands self-alienation
as a means of discovering truth:
Me from Myself— to banish—
Had I A r t Impregnable my Fortress
Unto All Heart—
But since Myself— assault MeHow have I peace
Except by subjugating
Consciousness?
And since We're mutual Monarch
How this be
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Except by Abdication—
Me— of Me?
The poet suggests that by a repetitive banishing of the
conscious self, by regularly retreating into the inner
self, an individual might achieve some monarchy of that
self ("Heart" and "Consciousness"), some validation that
she influences the exterior and controls the interior
spheres of her own existence.

"Abdication," as Dickinson

uses it here, is a conscious handing over of the mind to
that unconscious, almost subliminal, state of being.
And Dickinson's poetry records that psychic journey
for her reader.

The movement is necessarily erratic,

vacillating between the various antinomies that define
existence:

life/death, mortality/immortality, joy/despair,

self/other, and presence/absence.

But the act of writing

(and the consequent act of reading), as Ong argues, allows
at least partial understanding of this complex human
experience:
The highly interiorized stages of consciousness
in which the individual is not so immersed
unconsciously in communal structures are stages
which, it appears, consciousness would never
reach without writing. The interaction between
the orality that all human beings are born into
and the technology of writing, which no one is
born into, touches the depths of the psyche.
Ontogenetically and phylogenetically, it is the
oral word that first illuminates consciousness
with articulate language, that first divides
subject and predicate and then relates them to
one another, and that ties human beings to one
another in society. Writing introduces division
and alienation, but a higher unity as well. It
intensifies the sense of self and fosters more
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conscious interaction between persons.
is consciousness-raising.
(QL 178-79)

Writing

Paradoxically, writing, which is produced from the "highly
interiorized stages of consciousness" (the subjugated
conscious), is "consciousness-raising."

It becomes

intimately confrontational, forcing the reader likewise to
retreat into herself, the mind of her being where she
communicates with the writer.

Although it may create

"alienation" (disagreement), the text fosters "interaction"
each time a reader partners herself with it.
A poet like Dickinson who seems to understand this
literary complexity can manipulate the language to increase
the reader's capacity to understand.

By leaving "the Verb

and pronoun out" (#494) and incorporating numerous other
absences, she forces her reader into active participation
in the poetic process.

Then by going into her own abyss,

the recesses of her subjugated conscious, the reader fills
in the blanks with her own interpretation, thus elevating
her own consciousness and propelling her into an outwardreaching, ever-widening circular path from which she can
come to greater knowledge of the self that transcends self.
That transcendent state allows one, at least temporarily,
to experience "otherness"— of "other" and of "Other."
is this ontological movement which Dickinson calls
"Circumference."

It
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I realize that the terms "outward-reaching" and "everwidening" seem to contradict the idea of circumference,
which suggests a confining outer perimeter, but I counter
that these terms reflect the inherently paradoxical nature
of Dickinson's quest.

As Elisa New has put it:

The quest is becoming distinctly oxymoronic, for
the poet who would spread wide her narrow hands
to apprehend God, must search for the limit—
which is God— by finding first her own limit,
knowing both limits, insofar as they are genuine,
to be unknown, unrecognizable.
("DWDG" 12)
Spreading "wide" her "narrow" hands to "apprehend" an
unapprehendable God, in order to "know" that which is
"unknown" typify the frequent confusion and certain
complexity that attends any study of Dickinson's poetry.
Unlike Whitman who, claiming to be the center of his
universe, opens wide his arms to embrace all of humanity
throughout all time, Dickinson, placing herself on the
periphery, embraces the self to the self in an attempt to
move outside the boundaries of consciousness.

Where we,

her readers, may tend to be confused, she simply invokes
"circumference" to signify her musings of being in the
here-and-now and beyond.

The term is used repeatedly in

both her letters and her poetry.
In a July 1862 letter to Higginson, she writes, "My
Business is Circumference."

This letter does not

contradict her claim that "My business is to love."
contrary, each supports the other.

On the

The two letters were
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composed about the same time, and in each Dickinson seeks
to explain her professional integrity to Higginson.
Although Dickinson may have posed, may have exaggerated,
and may have lied in some of her correspondence to her
preceptor, she seems sincere in both of these letters.
business, indeed, seems to have been "Circumference."

Her
She

contends, however, that "Circumference" can be approached
only through love.
Dickinson's poetry time and again attests to the poetlover attempting to burst through the multifarious
boundaries that inhibit understanding, that confound wisdom
and truth both for herself and for her potential reader.
As she strives to achieve some semblance of affirmation for
who she is and what she is about in a world that offers
little plenitude, she creates a poetry of absence that
conversely is mind-boggling in its potential for plenitude
for her reader.

A quintessential Dickinson poem (#816)

describes this process:
A Death blow is a Life blow to Some
Who till they died, did not alive become—
Who had they lived, had died but when
They died, Vitality begun.
Resounding with the strain of present-though-absent, this
short poem affirms that which occurs between poet and
reader.

The Dickinsonian idea of life as death and death

as life refers both to the death of the writer who comes to
life when her words are read by the reader and death of the
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printed words which are renewed in that ••Undiscovered
Continent*' (#832) which is the mind of the reader.
Ong comments on this paradox inherent in a written
text:
The paradox lies in the fact that the deadness of
the text, its removal from the living human
lifeworld, its rigid visual fixity, assures its
endurance and its potential for being resurrected
into limitless living contexts by a potentially
infinite number of living readers.
(QL 81)
Although a reader may not be conscious of her part in the
resurrection of words, she nevertheless experiences it each
time she gleans meaning from a text.

She becomes

"affected" by both text and writer of text.
the reader of Dickinson, this is true.

Especially for

As she engages with

the poet and her poet-lover in the printed

text, she

actively participates in the highly affective quality of
that carefully wrought work.
In a letter to his wife, dated 16 August 1870,
Higginson quotes from an interview that he had with
Dickinson at her home in Amherst that attests to this, in
Dickinson's words, "aftermath" of the reading experience.
In that interview, Dickinson describes her criteria for
determining good writing, what she refers to as "poetry":
If I read a book [and] it makes my whole body
so cold no fire ever can warm me I know that is
poetry.
If I feel physically as if the top of my
head were taken off, I know that is poetry.
These are the only way I know it. Is there any
other way.

304
Good writing, then, is writing that is affective? it is
writing that can be judged in great part by the emotional
effects that it produces in its reader.

For Dickinson,

feelings are paramount; they become the means by which one
might determine the value of a work of poetry.

Her

"critical" determination for good poetry is thus contrary
to the argument set forth by W.K. Wimsatt and Monroe C.
Beardsley in "The Affective Fallacy."

Whereas they argue

that the (at least somewhat) objective critic is to
differentiate "between the poem and its results (what it is
and what it does)" ("AF" 21), Dickinson refuses to separate
the poem from its effects.
Without denying the affective quality of poetry,
Wimsatt and Beardsley maintain that emotions are not the
business of the critic, while Dickinson concludes that
emotions are the business of the intimate reader, her only
critic.

We have to remember that Dickinson sets forth a

highly subjective agenda:

a sensitive poet presumably

writing for an equally sensitive and implicitly personal
audience.

She writes intimately, suggesting a one-to-one

correspondence between herself and a familiar other.

The

only "critic" that she envisions is her willing and
emotionally responsive reader.
If a poem, or indeed any printed text, succeeds in
creating an affective response which results in a
reciprocal relationship between writer and reader, the
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reader clearly stands to benefit from the reading process.
In Poem 919, Dickinson describes what seems to be an
overriding purpose in her poetry, to relieve her reader
from a similar pain of absence from which her poet-lover
suffers:
If I can stop one Heart, from breaking
I shall not live in vain
If I can ease one Life the Aching
Or cool one Pain
Her poetry, then, becomes a poetic prescription that will
enable her readers to work through absence, to distill
absence into positive presence.

Essential in that formula

for circumference, for understanding, is emotional pain.
If "A Wounded Deer— leaps highest" (#165), Dickinson
suggests that the poet-lover, who is the assumed persona,
likewise must be emotionally wounded in order to relate the
means whereby a textually productive absent presence can be
achieved from absence.
Unlike Borges, I differentiate between the poet and
the poet-lover; the poet-lover, not necessarily Dickinson,
the poet, "needs misfortune" ("BDED" 10), usually in the
form of the absent beloved, in order to reproduce textual
presence.

After full, and fulfilling, presence with her

beloved, the poet-lover must necessarily plumb the depths
of absence so that she might write the whole of the story.
If the experience is aesthetically translated, the poet-
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lover's journey from presence into absence may culminate in
an absent presence that inhabits the text.
In This was a Poetf Whicher quite convincingly
compares the journey of Dickinson's poet-lover to that of
Dante's protagonist in Vita Nuova;
The individuality of her contribution lies in the
fact that these poems are not merely reiterated
expressions of passionate longing and regret, but
successive moments in the intricate progress of a
soul through the deepest of human experiences.
They record with minute veracity the subtle
changes in a woman's nature as she becomes
conscious of her heart's unalterable commitment,
passes through self-sustained illusion and
painful disillusionment to an agony of
frustration, and emerges at last impregnably
fortified on a new plane of being. Not many
poets have traced the stages of a like psychic
journey to the very edge of doom and back. But
somewhat the same pattern of spiritual growth
through deprivation we may recognize in the grave
symbolic pageant of Dante's Vita Nuova.
(269-70)
If Dickinson's fascicles outline the poet-lover's psychic
journey into the treacherous experience of love, then we
might more readily view them, as Shurr would have us do, as
a poetic sequence that is comparable to Sidney's Astrophil
and Stella and Shakespeare's Sonnets.

But more than either

of theirs, hers is an experience ambivalently triumphant in
its return from doom.

Without the painful experience, she

would not have had the knowledge; without the deprivation,
she would not have had the emotional growth; without the
loss, she would not have had the poetic gain; without the
absence of her beloved, she would not have had his absent
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presence to inhabit her poetry.

Utilizing her skills as

poet, she redeems each of these negative elements.

As she

transforms the negative into positive emotional resources,
the poet invites her reader to share the textual
experiences of her persona.
In order to achieve desired participation from her
reader, Dickinson must convincingly, as from personal
experience, write about the movement from absence into a
paradoxical fullness of absent presence.

Without drawing

from the "reservoir" of her own life, she is to create a
convincing life-like experience, or a multitude of
experiences.

The role of the poet is crucial:

The Poets light but Lamps—
Themselves— go out—
The Wicks they stimulate—
If vital Light
Inhere as do the Suns—
Each Age a Lens
Disseminating their
Circumference—
(#883)
The key elements in this poem (Poets, Lamps, and Wicks),
correspond to the rhetorical triangle of writer, text, and
reader.

The suggestion is that the poet merely

"stimulates" circumference, that paradoxically everwidening movement toward understanding.
For her readers, who are the "Wicks" that enable the
light, she simply provides the poetic text, the "Lamps" to
light the way toward understanding.

Determining that
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Dickinson employs synecdoche and metonymy in this passage,
Laura Gribben broadens my analogy:
'Lamps' have wicks (synecdoche) that produce
'Light'— as do 'Suns' (metonymy). . . .
Though poets light lamps, or create poems, the
light, vitality, and meaning of their poems are
determined by each individual age.
("EDC" 5)
The wicks (the readers) are part of the whole of poetry
(the lamps).

The readers, through vicarious experience,

are the ones who determine the "light" of understanding.
The real incendiary power, Dickinson seems to
indicate, results from the dynamic action that occurs
between the reader and the words that continue to
disseminate knowledge long after the poet puts those words
to paper.

She describes this action in Poem 1261:

"A Word

dropped careless on a Page/May stimulate an eye/When folded
in perpetual seam."

A reader may find understanding about

herself from a word or phrase that the writer "dropped"
carelessly, without much serious thought, on the page.

The

suggestion is that inspiration for the reader comes
arbitrarily, at different times and places, long after the
writer completes her task of empowering the word.
Indeed, one can hardly read a Dickinson poem without
sensing this power and responding viscerally to the words
therein.

From "Wild Nights— Wild Nights 1" (#249) to "He

fumbles at your Soul/As Players at the Keys" (#315) to "I
heard a Fly buzz— when I died— " (#465) to "There is a
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pain— so utter— /It swallows substance up— " (#599), the
willing reader simply cannot read impassively.

She wants

to know the source of the wild nights; she wants to learn
who fumbles with her soul; she wants to understand how the
deceased can hear a buzzing fly; and she wants to
comprehend a pain that can overpower substance.

Perhaps

this is one reason that some critics pursue the
biographical explanation:

it "answers" some of the

unanswerable questions of Dickinson's poetry.

Possibly one

reason that she does not provide irrefutable answers that
suggest singular interpretations is that hers would then be
a poetry of closure.

And if hers were a poetry of closure,

it would inhibit total immersion of her reader.

But since

her poetry denies closure, it demands full participation
from her reader.

Since hers is a poetry that allows one

absence to give way to other absences, it opens the
floodgate to hermeneutic possibilities.

Certainly this is

effected by creative design, and not merely by authorial
accident.

Also certainly by design is Dickinson's

experimentation with language, especially with absences
therein.
Unlike the sequences of Sidney and Shakespeare,
something pervasive immediately complicates the reader's
understanding of the experience of Dickinson's persona.
Not only does she write of the absence of her beloved, but
essentially all of her poetic language suggests absence.
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Indeed, hers is a poetry of absences.
writes in Dickinson:

As David Porter

The Modern Idiom, absence is

the primary condition of her art. The absence
was the sacred poverty out of which her verbal
imagination leaped. The poverty made the poetry
possible, even justified it. For she heaped
words in the void as her kind of consolation.
What power was left to her lay in her restless
160)
Like Astrophil and Will before her, Dickinson's persona,
who is poet-lover, reformulates absence of her beloved into
presence through her poetry.

But more than either of them,

she embraces absence as a means of achieving presence, as
the medium for approaching circumference.

Earlier in his

text, Porter aptly recognizes, "There is absence at every
level:

morpheme, word, phrase, poem, text, corpus, and the

life as its matrix" (D:MI 5).

As Dickinson herself admits

in Poem 494, she not only "left the Verb and pronoun out,"
but she also omitted references to particulars that would
allow definitive readings of her work.
These absences necessarily invoke her reader,
compelling her to become involved in the Dickinson text.
The reader's responsibility in the process is tantamount to
that of the writer? she must submit herself to an intimate
interchange with the text in order to reach some meaningful
determination of that which is omitted or altered.

Indeed,

Dickinson's aversion to standard punctuation (suggested by
her signature dash), her lack of specific reference
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(confounded by their numerous possibilities), and her
avoidance of plenitude (evidenced by conflicting elements)
dominate much of her poetry; and all demand the reader's
close scrutiny and intellectual engagement.

Any number of

Dickinson's poems reveal these absences, these aversions to
standard linguistic practices, and these seemingly blatant
contradictions to fact that pervade her work.
However, one poem in particular emphasizes these
absences, aversions, and antinomies as it cpmments on her
poetic reasoning for incorporating opposites to entice her
readers;
'Tis Opposites— entice—
Deformed Men— ponder Grace—
Bright fires— the blanketless—
The Lost— Day's face—
The Blind— esteem it be
Enough Estate— to see—
The Captive— strangles new—
For deeming— Beggars— play—
To lack— enamor Thee—
Tho' the Divinity—
Be only—
Me—
(#355)
This poem startles the reader with its cataloging of
opposites that "entice" (and are enticed by) the other:
grace/deformed men, bright fires/blanketless, Day/the lost,
sight/the blind, Thee/Me.

Establishing a causal

relationship, the persona posits that lack, or absence,
yearns for, even demands, that which it does not have;

the

deformed yearn for a grace that will make them whole; the
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blanketless desire fires to keep them warm; the lost await
the dawn of day to show them the way; the blind pray for
sight; and the Me, who is poet-lover, yearns for Thee, who
is the absent beloved.

Specifically, that which is without

seeks presence of the other.
Another short poem describes how presence is achieved
from absence:
To fill a Gap
Insert the Thing that caused it—
Block it up
With Other— and 'twill yawn the more—
You cannot solder an Abyss
With Air.
(#546)
Dickinson argues that one cannot fill a gap, an absence,
with a substitute; if one tries, the gap simply widens as
it yearns for that which caused the fissure.

The only hope

for filling the chasm is to "Insert the Thing that caused
it."

Since it is impossible to fill a void with something

that is physically not there, one must transmute that which
was formerly present into its absent presence.

As the poet

undertakes this metaphorical transformation through her
words, she can retain those properties of the beloved that
provide comfort, security, and love to her.
A poem, which is really an analogue to the absent
presence, explains what happens:
I see thee better— in the Dark—
I do not need a Light—
The Love of Thee— a Prism be—
Excelling Violet—
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I see thee better for the Years
That hunch themselves between—
(#611)
Here the poet-lover claims that through the intervening
years of separation from her beloved, she sees him
"better— in the Dark."

She sees him better in his absent

presence than she did in physical presence.

She can make

this claim because she has successfully, through her
continued love for him, redefined his presence in her
poetry.

Like a prism that refracts multi-colored shades

from a single light, her love can refract various
constructs of his absent presence through her poetry.

His

parting, his absence, is that which stimulates his absent
presence.
Poem #1714 explains:
By a departing light
We see acuter, quite,
Than by a wick that stays.
There's something in the flight
That clarifies the sight
And decks the rays.
Parting is the pain that quickens; it is the catalyst that
makes the feelings for the departed one more acute.

The

pain, then, "clarifies the (poetic] sight" and "decks"
(adorns or enhances) the absence into an absent presence.
And that absent presence can become whatever the poet needs
him to become in a particular moment, as expressed in her
many poems to the beloved.
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Shurr refers to this process as "presence-throughabsence":
Though absent, he is a permanent resident in her
mental universe.
These two themes— Dickinson's sense of her
status now as a professional poet (to match the
professional status of her beloved), and her
realization of the beloved's presence-throughabsence— merge at times to a new realization:
that is precisely his presence-through-absence
and the experiences they have shared which
furnish the best subject matter and motivation
for her as a professional poet.
fMED 85)
Although Shurr's term "presence-through-absence11 may be
phrased differently from my term "absent presence," he and
I refer to similar states of textual being.

The absences

of life, whether experienced by the author or created for
her persona, provide the drama for the poetry.

Those

absences comprise the "stuff of life" that force personal
growth upon the individual.

The poet "takes the stuff of

life, molds it, and projects it as art" (Kimbrough 52).
Without the antinomies of life/death, mortal/immortal,
finite/infinite, certitude/illusion, and absence/presence,
existence would be stagnant.

Poetry, which necessarily is

drawn from that life, then, too would be lifeless and
inert, unable to draw a potential reader into
participation.

But because Dickinson was so fully aware of

the absences that inhabit life, she was able to incorporate
them especially into her fascicles, which focus on "that
after Horror" (#286), with its accompanying "great pain"
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(#341).

Because these emotions are, to varying degrees,

shared by all, her work "invites the reader to dive into
his or her own abyss in order to find the existential truth
concretely yet perpetually" (Kher, M

44).

Dickinson does not guarantee that her readers will
glean immediate understanding.

Quite the contrary, she

forewarns of certain difficulty because she tells the truth
"slant":
Tell all the Truth but tell it slant—
Success in Circuit lies
Too bright for our infirm Delight
•

•

•

•

•

The Truth must dazzle gradually
Or every man be blind—
(#1129)
If "Circuit" is that personal, mortal space which
determines the individual, and if "Circumference"
represents, as Eberwein writes, the "boundary itself
between the circuit of personal space and whatever might be
outside" (SL 161), then poem 1129 speaks of the processing
and accessing of "Truth" on this finite side of
"Circumference."

The implication here is that blatant

truth is too powerful for the reader to grasp; indeed, it
may "blind" in its intensity.

The task of the poet, then,

is to slant the truth in an artistic (metaphoric,
metonymic, and synecdochic) way so that the reader be
"dazzled" into truth, so that she might gradually discern
some kernel of truth about the nature of human existence;
she then can apply that distilled truth to her own life.
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This ability is that which most distinguishes a great poet
from a mediocre one.

Through the slanted truth, the poet

achieves a double aim: to stop her reader's "Heart from
breaking" (#919) and to ensure perpetuity for herself.
For Dickinson, a truth that might stop a "Heart from
breaking" is variously described:

it is "Bald, and Cold"

(#281); it is equivalent to Beauty (#449); it is "stirless"
(#780); it is "as old as God" (#836); it is "slant"
(#1129); it is "good Health" (#1453); and, ultimately, it
"outlasts the Sun" (#1455).

The combined images suggest

the pervasive goodness of truth:

although it may be cold

and harsh, hence painful, it is implicitly beautiful
because it frees one from harmful intellectual conceptions
and hurtful emotional relationships.

Dickinson thus

reformulates the biblical promise "the truth shall make you
free" (John 8:32) into a rhetorical gamble:

if a reader is

willing to chance the temporarily uncomfortable recognition
of truth, which is the reading of it through the
aesthetically rendered words of the poet, she chances to
gain far greater perceptual knowledge.
What results for the writer who disseminates these
poetic bits of slanted truth is perpetuity.

Through

transforming absence into an absent presence in her poetry,
Dickinson gambled her talent and indeed gained immortality
through her words as they effect meaning for her readers:
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She staked her Feathers— Gained an Arc—
Debated— Rose again—
This time— beyond the estimate
Of Envy, or of Men—
And now, among Circumference—
Her steady Boat be seen—
At home— among the Billows— As
The Bough where she was born—
(#798)
In death, finally having achieved ultimate "Circumference,1'
she offers her poetry to her readers as the aesthetic means
whereby they might approach their own "Circumference.11
Through her poetry that remains and houses her absent
presence, she continues to speak across the centuries to
those who willingly enter into dialogue with her.
Dickinson and her poetry of absence provide a fitting
conclusion to this critical exploration of rhetorical and
literary absent presences that come into play in the
reading of a text.

Her work, in many ways, typifies the

struggle of the poet who seeks to overcome differance, when
the resultant effect is that writing tends to multiply
differance.

To quote Mills-Courts as she explains this

Derridean paradox, "Instead of gathering, differance
institutes 'dissemination'; instead of permitting arrival,
it produces a 'detour, a delay'; instead of granting
appropriation, it generates 'dispossession'" (PE 11-12).
Through this study of selected works of Plato,
Aristotle, New Testament writers, Sidney, Shakespeare and
Dickinson, I have sought to show that "dissemination,"
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"detour," "delay," and "dispossession" do not preclude
meaning.

Meaning may be deferred, and it may be abridged.

But it can be, and is, effected whenever a willing, a
responsible, and a responsive reader partners herself with
the absent presence of a writer whose text represents an
equally willing, responsible, and responsive effort.

Ideal

plenitude between writer/reader/text may be impossible, but
very real communication can be achieved as multiple
rhetorical (writer/reader) and literary (personae and
characters) absent presences are engaged in the process of
reading.

Notes
Chapter 2
1. Note the masculine reference to person, who ultimately
represents the assumed reader. This reference will change
in subsequent chapters. During the process of writing, I
automatically, and rather naturally,
responded according
to the audience presumed by each of the writers. Since the
original readers of Plato, Aristotle, and the New
Testament, were a predominantly male audience, the
masculine pronoun seemed most relevant.
Conversely, since Astrophil's sonnets were directed to
Stella, reference to a female reader appeared to be more
appropriate, especially when I considered that Sidney's
sonnets would have been read to gatherings of the court,
gatherings which certainly would have included women.
When I began writing the chapters on Shakespeare and
Dickinson, I again used the feminine pronoun "she" in
referring to the reader of the text. In a subsequent
reading of what I had written, I was admittedly puzzled by
what I had done. In fact, this reference to reader as
female became something of a paradox to me, especially
since I argue that the beloveds, to whom both Shakespeare
and Dickinson direct their poetry, are male.
After analyzing why I assumed a female reader, I
reached a rather startling conclusion. Much like Gorgias
suggests in his Encomium and Ross Chambers further develops
in Story and Situation: Narrative Seduction and the Power
of Fiction. I realized that I, as reader of my own text,
was analyzing the word/reader (logos/listener) relationship
similarly. The word, as male "seducer,11 was successfully
eliciting a response from me, the female reader.
Mine is not a unique reaction.
Indeed, current
reader-response criticism envisions the audience as female.
Jacques Lacan (Feminine Sexualityf Juliet Mitchell and
Jacqueline Rose, eds., trans. J. Rose, Norton Pub., Co.,
New York, 1982) and a number of studies made by Sigmund
Freud support such a premise.
I ask that you recognize these shifts in person, not
as erratic shifts, but as controlled determinations of the
writer of the text.
2. Charles P. Segal ("Gorgias and the Psychology of the
Logos," Harvard Studies in Classical Philology. 66 (1962):
99-155) provides an extensive and informative discussion of
the erotic logos as Gorgias perceived it. Focusing on the

319

320
sophist's "rhetorical works and their psychological
implications" (100), Segal develops his essay from the
premise that Gorgias's views reflect those of his society.
As such, "The Helen in particular is based largely upon an
analysis of human actions in terms of emotional causality"
(104).
Segal's essay is well worth the reading because it
situates Gorgias's discussion of eros in the milieu that
produced it.
3. Mark Wigley (The Architecture of Deconstruction;
Derrida's Haunt. The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1993) develops
his thesis from an interesting, but nontraditional,
premise:
"to translate deconstruction in architectural
discourse" (1). As he identifies Derrida with Heidegger's
view of "Being" (Sein), he recognizes that "Metaphysics is
the identification of the ground as 'supporting presence'
for whatever stands like an edifice" (8).
In noting the correlation between discourse and a
physical edifice, a building, Wigley overlooks a seemingly
obvious link to Aristotle's triangular view of discourse:
logos/ethos/pathos.
For the builder, triangular support is
essential; it makes the edifice rigid, preventing its
collapse.
The triadic structure in discourse likewise is that
which maintains the dynamism of the word? it is that which
forestalls the collapse of written communication.
4. A recently published collection of essays (Aristotle's
Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays, ed. David J. Furley and
Alexander Nehamas, Princeton University Press, Princeton,
1994) provides critical commentary on current rhetorical
issues that are rooted in classical Aristotelian thought.
Chapter 3
1. In his forward to Essentials of Bible History (The
Ronald Press Co., New York, 1947), Elmer W.K. Mould
establishes the Bible as "the most important book in the
English language" (v-vi).
Although some may question his claim, few can
objectively ignore the impact that the Bible made on both
the spiritual and the literary worlds: its content
permanently impacted humanity in the ways that it perceived
and expressed "otherness."
2. In his introduction to The Bible as History, Abingdon
Press, Nashville, 1968, William Barclay espouses three
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views of history: the "circular and repetitive," the
"haphazard" and purposeless, and the "purposeful" and
Christian (11-13).
Seeking "to present Bible history within the setting
of contemporary world events" (17), Barclay joins other
writers in a textual effort that points to "God's
revelation in history" (18).
Though written from a decidedly Christian perspective,
the book is valuable to my study in that it quite
successfully objectifies the Christ, placing him in the
context of history.
Chapter 4
1. Paula H. Payne, "The Poet Orator's Praise:
Epideictic
Discourse in Sidney's Astrophil and Stella" fThe Sidney
Newsletter, 9, 1988, pp. 11-21), argues that Sidney
fashions Astrophil's "unspoken monologue out of three
distinct and different types of Aristotelian discourse:
forensic, epideictic, and deliberative rhetoric" (11).
Focusing on epeideictic oratory (praise or blame), Payne
provides specific evidence that many, if not all, of
Sidney's sonnets fit the mode of Aristotelian discourse.
2. Robert M. Coogan, "The Triumph of Reason: Sidney's
Defense and Aristotle's Rhetoric (Papers on Language &
Literature, 17, 1981, pp. 255-270) details the correlation
between Sidney's literary treatise and Aristotle's
rhetorical treatise.
3. Eva Schaper (Prelude to Aesthetics. George Allen &
Unwin, Ltd., London, 1968) develops the thesis that Plato
and Aristotle originated aesthetics, the "living debate of
issues concerning the concepts involved in speaking about
the arts and the appreciation and creation of art works"
(11). Crediting Aristotle with inaugurating "aesthetics as
a theoretical study" (13), she contends that the "presence"
(134) of these philosophers invades and shapes any critical
enterprise.
4. Ovid Renewed: Ovidian Influences on Literature and Art
from the Middle Ages to the Twentieth Century (edited by
Charles Martindale, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1988)
is an informative collection of essays that traces some of
Ovid's influences on Western literature.
Sidney's
rendering of Astrophil's plight from poetic despair to
artistic hope at least faintly echoes the Metamorphoses.
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Chapter 5
1. M.M. Bakhtin (Art and Answerabi1itv; Earlv
Philosophical Essavs. Ed. Michael Holquist and Vadim
Liapunov, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1990)
discusses this dynamic textual relationship between poet
and persona. Translated as "architectonics,11 this activity
suggests a triangular relationship between author, text,
and hero (persona).
2. Joseph Pequigney (Such Is Mv Love: A Study of
Shakespeare's Sonnets. University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 1985) clouds the relationship between Will and his
Fair Friend with a literal reading. Forcing the modern
homosexual interpretation upon an Elizabethan fact of life,
male friends who genuinely but not necessarily physically
loved one another, Pequigney unnecessarily problematizes
Shakespeare's sonnets.
I cannot be as generous as Michael Field (Shakespeare
Quarterly. 38, 1987, 375-77) who reviews Pequigney's book:
It ought to be clear that Such Is My Love is a
major reinterpretation of Shakespeare's sonnets.
While the tone of certainty, the attack on the
major traditions of criticism of the sonnets, the
stress on very explicit erotic references in the
poems, and the effort to show that the received
order is demonstrably correct may annoy some
readers, annoyance will have to yield to respect.
For even if not all of his claims prove valid,
Pequigney is so rigorous and sensible in
substantiating them that no casual dismissal is
possible.
(377)
I do not casually dismiss Pequigney's reading.
I simply
suggest that he fails to factor in the Elizabethan view of
male-to-male relationships which allowed for overt
expressions of love.
Chapter 6
1. Mary Arensberg's "Introduction: The American Sublime"
(The American Sublime. State University of New York Press,
New York, 1986) carefully defines sublimity. Beginning
with Longinus, whose text On Great Writing initiates the
idea, she says that the "Longinian sublime is essentially
rhetorical and identified as the reader's response to great
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utterance.” In such an analysis, Arensberg comments that
"the moment of sublimity is always a language scene which
produces an uncanny metaphorical effect" (3).
After delineating five Longinian "rhetorical and
psychological structures which inform the problematic of
the sublime, ancient or modern" (3), Arensberg suggests
that the American sublime bridges the ancient sublime
through "the Kantian drama of the imagination," where the
sublime is subdivided into "mathematical" and "dynamical"
(4, 5). Providing a cursory overview of the essays in the
text, Arensberg says that Emerson, Whitman, Dickinson,
Marianne Moore, Adrienne Rich, and Elizabeth Bishop draw on
"various models of the sublime" to create their own
distinctly American version of sublimity.
2. Jorge Luis Borges's interview at Dickinson College
(Boraes the Poet, University of Arkansas Press,
Fayetteville, 1986) was conducted in the Socratic method.
Professor James Hughes, the interviewer, served as
interlocutor to "Socrates," Luis Borges. At the conclusion
of the interview, members of the audience were given an
opportunity to question the guest speaker (8).
The interview is thus representative of metarhetoric.
As Borges and his interlocutor discuss the poetic rhetoric
of Dickinson, they subsequently call attention to their own
language as rhetoric.
3. The thesis put forth by Helen Regueiro Elam ("Dickinson
and the Haunting of the Self," 83-99, The American Sublime.
Ed. Mary Arensberg, State University of New York Press, New
York, 1986) is that this lingering and powerful authorial
presence results from the writer's "abysmal experience of
self-loss" (83). As "Dickinson's poems uncover this abyss
within the self" (96), her reader shares in the struggle
"which poetry tries to heal and which it reveals" (84).
4. Peter Gay (The Bourgeois Experience: Victoria to
Freud, Vol 1, Education of the Senses. Oxford University
Press, New York, 1984) ambitiously seeks, through several
volumes, to give "symphonic treatment" to "the bourgeois
experience" (3). Proceeding from a historical perspective,
his first volume is an "inquiry with bourgeois sexuality
and with its mature form, love" (4).
Like Farr, he concludes that modern readers have
grossly inaccurate conceptions of Victorian relationships,
both male to female, and female to female. Although he
recognizes that he may "complicate" our preconceived
notions, Gay aims to "correct those tenacious
misconceptions that have dogged our reading of Victorian
culture" (3).
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Gay's text is highly informative and deserves at least
a referential glance in any study of Emily Dickinson. His
carefully compiled index is especially helpful in locating
specific passages that comment on particular misconceptions
of the Victorian era.
5. Judith Farr (The..Passion of _Emilv Dickinson. Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, 1992) builds an argument that
Samuel Bowles, rather than Charles Wadsworth, is the
referent for Dickinson's "Master.11 For the most part, she
ignores Wadsworth as an integral player in the creative
life of Dickinson, the poet.
Farr suggests that not one but two "beloveds" emerge
from the fascicles. One is female (Sue Gilbert Dickinson),
and the other is male (Samuel Bowles). The poet-lover's
feelings toward the first are innocent in their affection;
her feelings toward the second are passionate in their
admiration (182-83).
6. In her book Dickinson: Strategies of Limitation (The
University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, 1985), Jane
Donahue Eberwein provides a thorough discussion of
Dickinson's differentiation between "Circuit" and
"Circumference." Arguing that Dickinson's quest was
implicitly religious, Eberwein assesses that "Circuit" and
"Circumference" are a part of the poet's willful strategies
which she incorporates to express the
dilemma of human limitation . . . with
powerlessness paired with omnipotence, finitude
with infinity, mortality with immortality,
deprivation with plenitude, misery with
blessedness, man with God.
(73)
"Circuit" and "Circumference" are the antinomical states of
existence, the conscious (the finite) and the unconscious
(the potentially infinite).
The "business" of the poet allows those who are not
poets to venture into that abyss of "Circumference."
Through her aesthetic slanting of "Truth," the poet offers
a momentary glimpse into that which might lie beyond
mortality.
7. In "Tropes of Presence, Tropes of Absence," a chapter
in The Languagefs^ of Poetry: Walt Whitman. Emilv
Dickinson. Gerard Manlev Hopkins (The University of Georgia
Press, Athens, 1993), James Olney analyzes the absent
presence somewhat differently from the way that I approach
it in this study. Like Olney, I recognize the metaphorical
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significance of the term, but I apply that metaphor as an
ontological construct. As such, the term "absent presence"
metaphorically describes various rhetorical and literary
states of being— writer to reader, reader to writer, writer
to personae, and reader to personae. These separate
entities, working in unison, determine the outcome of any
reading experience.
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